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3Abstract
This thesis argues that America’s national ideological history is crucially relevant 
to understanding the Bush administration’s resistance to thinking about 
international order in the balance-of-power terms prescribed by realists. Bush 
pursued a world order based on the assumption of an underlying harmony of 
interests and the universal validity of an idealised conception of American liberal 
political values. He also sought an indefinitely sustainable American primacy in 
terms of hard power. The thesis argues that this strategy, despite some 
suggestions that it was ‘revolutionary’, was in fact the latest evolution of long- 
established trends in American internationalism. The thesis seeks to make the 
case that a nation’s foreign policy strategy is the product of interaction between 
national/international circumstances and an evolved national culture or 
‘character’ reflecting embedded ideological principles developed over the course 
of that nation’s history. Thus, it suggests, American internationalism has 
particularities that Can only be fully understood through awareness of the United 
States’ ideological journey over the course of its history to a posture of global 
engagement. The thesis uses analysis of five key periods to make its argument 
for the relevance of ideological history, starting with the Founders’ Era and 
proceeding through presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and Harry 
Truman before concluding with the Bush administration. It argues that the 
ideological cast given to America’s pursuit of its interests in the early decades of 
independence impacted upon the nation’s 20th Century leaders’ construction of 
their arguments justifying the transition to international engagement. As a result, 
rather than contentedly entering into the existing Europe-dominated world order 
based on ‘the balance of power’, US leaders made America’s internationalism 
conditional on the pursuit of a new world order reflecting the ideas of liberal 
universalism and military might in the service of ‘civilisation’.
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Introduction
This thesis combines the study of International Relations and History. Its aim in 
so doing is not to water down the standards of either, but to provide an 
illustration of how, when applied to a substantive issue, the two can interact 
productively while holding true to their respective principles. In applying history 
to the recent past, it seeks to argue for the causal relevance of the past to a state’s 
ideological strategy-formation: a contribution to IR. In bringing together 
secondary literature and certain primary sources on four distinct periods, united 
by a narrative drawing links with the present, the thesis also offers an original 
synthesis of historical materials: a contribution to History.
The particular focus is United States foreign policy. More specifically, it is the 
strategic visions or ‘worldviews’ of US statesmen concerning the nature of the 
international system and America’s role within it. The thesis was first inspired by 
the contrast between the language used in the George W. Bush administration’s 
National Security Strategy document of 2002 and its deeper ideological content.1 
Though its conceptual centrepiece was the aspiration to create “a balance of 
power that favours freedom”, the document in fact declined to embrace the 
assumptions upon which a conventional understanding of order based on a 
balance of power would rest. That is to say, it did not base its analysis of 
America’s international situation upon the assumption of inherent conflict 
between the national interests of great powers. Instead, it focused on the idea that 
there was unprecedented scope for a comprehensive alliance of all the world’s 
major powers on a single ‘side’, and was premised on the historically inevitable 
triumph of a set of idealised liberal values with which the United States 
identified itself.2 This universalisation of American values -  or as American 
leaders would have it, the realisation in the concrete of universal values -  would
1 White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, (White House, 
September 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [accessed 19/06/08],
2 The word ‘idealised’ is used because the United States has not always acted in line with liberal 
ideals either at home or abroad. Nevertheless, the nation is still regarded in American political 
discourse as embodying those values.
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provide the basis for peaceful concert between all powers. In addition, the 
strategy did not accept the existence of material counterweights to American 
power in the international system. Rather, it supported the pursuit of an 
unchallengeable American hegemony in military resources. As such, in spite of 
its use of the term ‘balance of power’, suggestive of realism as a guiding 
philosophy, the National Security Strategy did not appear to reflect an embrace 
of genuinely realist principles on the part of administration.
From this initial analysis, the central questions of this thesis then came into 
focus: Was there a connection between the Bush administration’s rejection of 
proper balance-of-power thinking about international order, and the longer-term 
contours of American history? Was this administration aberrant in adopting the 
strategic perspective just outlined, or was this a long-term, historically embedded 
characteristic of American leaders’ strategic worldview? And if the latter was the 
case, might the closer study of America’s history shed light on the origin of such 
a characteristic?
In addressing these questions, this thesis inserts itself into a sector of vigorous 
debate in the study of US foreign policy. As the literature review in Chapter One 
makes clear, the classical realist school, including such scholars as Kennan, 
Morgenthau and Kissinger, argued throughout the second half of the 20th Century 
that ‘unrealistic’ thinking has been a consistent feature of American foreign 
policy. By this they meant unwillingness to see with appropriate clarity that the 
basis of international relations lies in power and national interest, displaying 
instead a preference for what Kennan called ‘legalistic-moralistic’ thinking with 
insufficient basis in reality.
More recently, neoclassical realist scholars such as Dueck have embraced this 
analysis, arguing that ‘ideological’ choices to pursue liberal universalist goals 
rather than national interests (as realists define them) have repeatedly led to
3 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984); Hans J. Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination of, 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1952); Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Touchstone, 1995).
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mismatches between American aspirations and available resources.4 Such 
criticisms have fed into contemporary realist criticism of the Bush 
administration. This thesis accepts and expands upon this school’s position in the 
following ways:
1. It agrees that the features of the Bush administration’s strategic 
perspective highlighted above are not anomalous. Rather, they are the 
recurrence, in strong form, of impulses previously occurring in US 
foreign policy.
2. It provides detailed support through historical analysis for the suggestion 
-  sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit -  in classical realism, and also 
in constructivism, that ideology, broadly defined, can play an important 
role in affecting the way a nation conceives its role and interests. It does 
this by exploring the particular way that ideology impacted on American 
thought in key periods of its transition from hemispheric separatism to 
global internationalism.
3. It offers a causal explanation for the American resistance to simple 
balance-of-power thinking. This explanation combines the materialist 
realist principle that material and external circumstances shape national 
policy, with the principle that past ideology can constrain subsequent 
strategic choices. Specifically, it argues that while the strategy created in 
the early decades of the United States’ independence was based on the 
particular national circumstances prevailing at that time, it was 
constructed ideologically in such a way that this subsequently affected the
t hbasis of America’s 20 Century internationalism.
With this argument being its goal, the thesis aims not simply at the narration or 
interpretation of historical events, though this is provided. Its other objective is to 
isolate for the purpose of analysis the ideological principles which US leaders 
constructed and deployed in their advocacy of certain strategic courses in the key
4 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)
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periods selected for study. Thus, the chief focus of the thesis is ‘ideology’, 
meaning the necessary intellectual simplifications used by leaders to explain and 
justify the national courses they advocate, both to themselves and to others. In 
selecting this focus, the thesis implicitly embraces the idea that states may have a 
‘national culture’ or ‘national character’ when it comes to foreign policymaking. 
That is to say: the way to understand the behaviour of the United States in the 
international arena is not solely by the study of states and the international 
system in general, but also through the study of the particular formative 
influences operative upon the United States. As such, as well as contributing to 
the realist debate, its conclusions also cross into debates regarding ‘strategic 
culture’ in the discipline of IR5 and ‘American exceptionalism’ in the fields of 
US history and politics.6
The thesis focuses chronologically on four historical periods with the aim of 
substantiating the core thesis arguments: (1) that American internationalism 
evolved ideologically in such a way as to be averse to balance-of-power thinking 
about international order, and (2) that the ideological constructions of the key 
periods studies here had causal influence, shaping the strategic formulations of 
subsequent periods. This serves in part to explain the American aversion to 
balance-of-power thinking that this thesis argues remains operative in the 21st 
Century.
The specific periods chosen have been selected because they are key moments of 
simultaneous change in US foreign policy thinking and in the structure of the 
international order. This is the case in the pounders’ Era for two reasons. First, 
the United States had just been created and was obliged to construct its 
foundational foreign policy strategy. Second, the international system was being 
shaken both by the breakaway of America from Britain and by the wars resulting 
from the French Revolution. The following two chapters, on Theodore Roosevelt
thand Woodrow Wilson, are best viewed as a pair, surveying the same early 20 
century period from the perspectives of two actors with different but overlapping
5 For an overview of this literature see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture, 
International Security, 19:4, pp. 33-64.
6 For overview, see Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996)
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ideological worldviews. This was a key period of change because the United 
States, much grown in power, made its first serious moves into global politics 
through imperial acquisitions, a rejuvenated Monroe Doctrine, involvement in 
intercontinental diplomacy and ultimately war. In addition, the international 
order was shaken to its foundations by the outbreak and conduct of the First 
World War. The same features are present in the period of the administration of 
Harry Truman. The United States conclusively made the transition to a globally 
entangled grand strategy supported by heavy military investment, and at the same 
time the international order was redefined, as a result of the outcome of World 
War II, as a bipolar contest between superpowers, one of them America.
It is important to state clearly three things that this thesis does not intend to do or 
to argue. First, it does not set out to be a comprehensive survey of all US foreign 
policy throughout the nation’s history since independence. There are many 
interesting periods in America’s journey since 1787 that are not addressed. Apart 
from the obvious reason of limited space, this is because, it is contended, no 
other periods qualify, at least not to the same extent, as key periods of change, as 
defined above. Those cases chosen by this thesis can claim to have bome witness 
both to profound, sudden change in the international order, and to related change 
in US strategic thinking, that would influence significantly all who came later. 
Other periods cannot claim this to the same degree. The Nixon administration, to 
take one example, made efforts to move the ideological basis of US policy 
towards a more explicitly realist footing. Yet it is difficult to argue that it 
succeeded in leaving a lasting legacy to that effect, or that the international 
system was transformed during this period, even extending all due respect to the 
significance of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s diplomatic ‘opening’ of China. Rather, it 
would be more accurate to say that this period represents a period of policy 
variation within the overall framework set internationally by the Cold War and 
domestically by the containment strategy of Truman.
Second, this thesis is emphatically not an argument that there has been only a 
single, uniform set of ideas running through all US history. The American policy 
discourse has given air at various times to ideas quite contrary to those set out in 
the Bush National Security Strategy, Wilsonianism, Roosevelt’s imperialism and
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the Truman Doctrine (indeed, these visions are themselves distinct from one 
another). To argue that there has been no realism in the US foreign policy debate 
would be quite wrong. As the literature review in the next chapter makes clear, 
the realists with whom this thesis finds itself often in accord have in large part 
been Americans, or at least influential residents of the United States. This thesis- 
does not make a futile effort to deny the existence of such elements in the 
American discourse. It merely seeks to argue that over the long term other ideas 
have been paradigmatically more dominant in the making of US grand strategy. 
This is a point realists themselves accept, and which is indeed a pillar of their 
own historical critique.
Third, although superficially it may appear to make an argument for long-term 
continuity in US foreign policy, this thesis is in fact about both change and 
continuity. This thesis does not argue that the foreign policy of Bush is the same 
as that of Truman or Wilson, any more than it seeks to argue that Wilson or 
Roosevelt simply mimicked the ideas of the Founding Fathers. Each of these 
leaders or groups of leaders was faced with radically different national 
capabilities and international circumstances in making their policies.
Accordingly, they were compelled to change the ideas on US foreign policy 
prevailing at the time of their arrival in power, in order to meet the demands of 
the nation’s situation. What this thesis argues is that within the range of options 
available to these leaders, they made choices which reflected not purely the 
demands of circumstance, but the ideological constraints which were set for them 
and which they set for themselves in adapting to those demands. Each period saw 
not the simple continuity of the prevailing ideology in new circumstances, but 
significant change in the prevailing ideology. But in each case, what emerged 
was constrained and influenced by what had gone before, and the policy that 
resulted reflected the obligation of leaders to drive forward the evolution of the 
structure of ideological principle inherited from the past, not begin with a blank 
slate.
This account of change and continuity begins in the period which I have termed 
the Founders’ Era, stretching approximately from American independence to the 
proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This is an essential starting point,
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and not only because it is a somewhat neglected period in International Relations
thliterature concerning the United States, the majority of which focuses on the 20 
Century and after. Starting here is essential because this is where the ‘causal 
story’ told in the thesis as a whole begins. In this period, the first leaders of the 
United States developed a strategic worldview designed to fit with the power 
capabilities of the nation and the imperatives and opportunities presented by 
international circumstances. In advancing and justifying this strategic perspective 
they constructed ideological principles that would later act as a source of 
constraint upon subsequent leaders, requiring the tailoring of the justifications for 
their strategic choices in such a way as to sustain a sense of compatibility.
In the 1780s, the desire to avoid replicating the European balance of power, and 
the wish to minimise foreign interference in North America, led to the 
establishment of the United States under the Constitution. This was followed by 
a commitment to a policy of detached non-alignment in all political and military 
matters pertaining to the rival European powers. This was then expanded into the 
Monroe Doctrine, essentially a spheres-of-influence paradigm whereby Europe 
and the United States should mutually refrain from interference within one
another’s domains. These strategic decisions all make sense when analysed in
/
realist terms, as the pursuit of a sound strategy of national interest based on 
gradually expanding US power, wealth and territory. On the level of ideological 
construction, however, the policy went beyond simple pursuit of narrow US 
interests. Instead the ideological dimension of the strategic consensus forged in 
the Founders’ Era, after acrimonious disagreements at the outset, made the case 
that the United States existed in a separate sphere of interests and a superior 
sphere of values: in effect, that it existed not as a component in the Europe- 
dominated international system based on the balance of power, but apart from it. 
Thus detached, strategically and ideologically, from the European state system, 
without need to engage in power-balancing, the United States could in its 
leaders’ minds limit its international ties to hegemonic pre-eminence within the 
Americas. By virtue of its ‘American’ nature and benign US influence, this 
cutaway portion of the international system could exist in a more peaceful order 
than that the Europeans had built for themselves. Thus, American policy in this 
period was justified by reference to an ideological construction of the national
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interest that portrayed America’s non-alignment as based not on simple 
calculation of interest but upon America’s moral and strategic ‘separateness’ 
from the European balance of power, a degenerate ‘Old World’ basis for order.
The international realities that led to the creation of this strategic paradigm 
inevitably changed, as the size and power of the United States grew and events 
elsewhere in the international system changed the global strategic situation. Yet 
the ideological principles created to justify this original American strategic 
consensus represented a part of the intellectual and political reality facing US 
leaders when the arrival of the 20th Century brought with it imperatives for 
change to a more globally entangled posture. That change thus had to be tailored 
ideologically to make it compatible with the bedrock principles perceived to have 
been at the root of strategy over the preceding century. This ideological 
dimension in turn had implications for the policies pursued and the manner in 
which they were presented.
The second historical chapter focuses on the contribution of Theodore Roosevelt. 
Coming to the presidency immediately after a brief surge in imperialist sentiment 
in the United States during and after the Spanish-American War of 1898, 
Roosevelt made determined efforts to mover the nation to a more internationally 
engaged mindset than had prevailed previously. Proclaiming the interventionist 
‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, he provided the 
ideological basis for a much deeper political and economic penetration of the 
region by the United States, justified by reference not just to US interests but also 
to an ideologically imperialistic notion of ‘common interests’ and the spread of 
‘civilised’ values and practices. Tirelessly beating the martial drum, Roosevelt 
also made some progress in convincing Americans, historically sceptical of 
standing armed forces, of the necessity and virtue of military strength.
Through engagement with diplomacy and conflict resolution in East Asia and 
Africa, Roosevelt also began to erode American taboos prohibiting 
‘entanglement’ in European nations’ political-military affairs. He was 
constrained from going as far as he might have liked by the residual strength of 
Founders’ Era consensus, but he nevertheless outlined a perspective on
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international relations that embraced interventionism, militarism and a sense of 
progressive, moralistic historic mission, ideas of a semi-imperial sort which had 
an important impact both in his own time and after the Second World War. 
Sometimes seen as an icon of realism in the realm of foreign policy, this chapter 
argues that the features of Roosevelt’s thought just mentioned must qualify such 
a reading of his character and significance.
The third historical chapter of the thesis discusses Woodrow Wilson, and the 
ideological perspective -  ‘Wilsonianism’ -  that bears his name. Wilson 
broadened and escalated the ‘civilising’ interventionism Roosevelt had initiated 
in Latin America. More significantly for global order, he was permitted by the 
domestic and international upheaval brought about by the Great War in Europe to 
be bolder in his efforts to remould international order and America’s thinking 
about its role within it. With the destruction of Europe’s old order in war, Wilson 
believed that America could lead the way in building a ‘new world order’ 
founded on universal cooperation and collective security. His confidence that this 
would be possible stemmed in great part from a conviction that history had 
dictated the universal liberalisation and democratisation of the world’s nations, 
placing their ‘peoples’ -  essentially pacific in their instincts -  in command of 
their governments.
Conscious of the ideological legacy of detachment which had to be overcome in 
establishing a new American internationalism, Wilson massaged the ideological 
debate to make it appear that the US need not join the world order as it had 
previously existed. Rather, as he made the case, a form of ‘deal’ was on the table: 
a new American global engagement could occur, but on the condition that the 
‘balance of power’ basis for order should be abolished in favour of a cooperative 
‘community of power’, predicated on the spread of American values and 
practices. In making American internationalism contingent on the pursuit of this 
ideologically liberal ‘deal’, Wilsonianism had a profound and lasting effect on 
the character of American engagement with the world. It is important to note that 
one of the key reasons driving the formation of the ideology was the need to 
negotiate a way past the residual ideology of hemispheric separatism crafted by
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the Founders more than a century earlier, based on the imperatives of their own 
time.
The fourth historical chapter covers the early Cold War, specifically the Truman 
administration. This is an interesting case because, to many eyes, the entire Cold 
War would seem a counterpoint to Wilsonianism, a period wherein a ‘balance of 
power’ clearly was pursued by US leaders. While accepting the existence in 
practice of a kind of balance, this chapter argues that this was less the product of 
an acceptance by American leaders of legitimate countervailing interests on the 
part of other powers than the result simply of hard practical constraints on 
America’s power. The Truman administration buttressed its strategic posture 
with an ideological paradigm that, in spite of the balance of power that resulted 
from containment, was profoundly universalistic, albeit (temporarily) frustrated 
in its aspirations. In contrast to some contemporaries who leaned towards a more 
‘realistic’ balance of power approach, Truman crafted an ideological approach 
which treated the Soviet Union not as a legitimate rival power with its own 
national interests but as an ideologically illegitimate obstacle to the attainment of 
the universal peaceful order Wilson had foreseen. Reprising Wilsonian articles of 
faith regarding the directionality of history, the Truman administration conceived 
of and portrayed the Cold War as a global conflict between ideals and systems of 
government that could only be ended by the capitulation or conversion of the 
adversary. Even George Kennan, the ‘resident realist’ of the administration
' n
implicitly endorsed this strategy in his most notable writings of this period.
Diverging from Wilsonsianism’s faith in the power of moral force in the 
international community, however, the Truman administration also reprised 
Rooseveltian principles regarding the importance of placing military might 
behind right, thus enabling the pursuit of the Wilsonian ‘deal’ partly through the 
erection of a titanic new national security apparatus and reliance on military 
intervention and deterrence. This fusion of Wilsonian ideas concerning the 
pursuit what Wilson called the ‘dominion of right’ -  i.e. a cooperative world 
order based on US leadership and universal liberal democracy -  with
7 ‘X’ [George Kennan], ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25:1/4, 1946/47, 
pp.566-582
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Rooseveltian willingness to embrace the moral righteousness of preparatory 
militarisation, represented a decisive moment in US history. As the Cold War 
progressed, Truman himself became a symbol for this mixture of idealism and 
hard power regarded as the ideological model for subsequent administrations. By 
opting to pursue this approach instead of a true balance-of-power attitude 
towards post-war order, the US altered its own future and that of the world 
significantly, and further entrenched the national inclination to resist conscious 
realism and balance-of-power thought.
Drawing the historical material together in order to illustrate its relevance, the 
final substantive chapter concentrates on the George W. Bush administration, 
with particular emphasis on the National Security Strategy, but also with 
reference to other important foreign policy speeches and pronouncements. This 
chapter aims to illustrate the ways in which the choices made by US leaders at 
the key moments outlined in the previous chapters, influenced as they were by 
national and international context, were critical in the evolution of a particular 
kind of American internationalism, of which the Bush strategy embodied a 
somewhat extreme variety. In effect, the thesis argues that the core principles of 
the Bush NSS, especially universalism, resistance to ‘balance of power’ thinking, 
and presupposition of the feasibility and virtue of US hegemony, were the 
evolved ideological product of the particular way in which US internationalism 
was forged out of national history and circumstance over the long term.
The final chapter then seeks to draw the thesis argument to a conclusion, 
demonstrating the cohesion of the long-term historical account offered by the 
thesis as a whole. The thesis is, in effect, the story of how at successive stages, 
each building on what went before, a series of ideological ‘moves’ brought 
America logically from its foundation to its present perspective. In doing this, it 
does not wish to convey the impression of believing that the Bush administration 
somehow represented the fulfilment of America’s political destiny, or that that 
administration can retrospectively justify its specific policies by reference to 
some teleological reading of the American journey. Neither does it wish to 
imply, though it is always a risk in writing history ending with the present, that 
the current administration is somehow the ‘end point’ of America’s development.
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It does, however, wish to say that the Bush administration represented a 21st 
Century evolution of established trends in American thought.
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1. Location in the literature and theoretical 
underpinning
Introduction
This thesis aims to draw the disciplines of International Relations and History 
together in productive synthesis. In setting itself this challenge, it locates itself in 
two literatures: IR and US foreign policy history. Both are vast, rendering an 
exhaustive survey neither feasible given constraints on space nor necessary given 
the topic at hand. That fact notwithstanding, it is appropriate to explain at this 
stage the ways in which the subject matter of the thesis meshes with the broader 
frameworks provided by these literatures.8
The IR and History literatures have often unfolded quite separately from one 
another, even though they draw on the same core of factual information at 
different levels of depth. To the extent that they usefully can, the early sections 
of this chapter draw links between the two, providing in the process a rounded 
picture of the thesis’s location within both. In so doing, the chapter does not in 
the main seek to ‘pick sides’ in the major intra-disciplinary debates. Its objective 
is to explain that the inquiry around which the thesis is constructed can in fact be 
reconciled with several of the major analytical approaches within each discipline.
The later sections of the chapter seek to engage with some of the philosophical 
issues arising from the thesis’s focus on the interrelation of ideology and national 
interests, and the relevance of national history to subsequent strategic thinking. 
Though the chapter is informally divided into these two parts, the material 
discussed in this latter section is not unconnected to the discussion of literatures 
that precedes it. Its purpose is to focus more narrowly on the precise topic 
covered in the thesis, and render its deeper philosophical assumptions explicit. In
8 For my taxonomy of American historiography I am in part indebted to Francis G. Couvares et al 
(eds.), Interpretations o f American History, 7th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 2000), two vols, 
as well as the specific texts cited below.
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so doing it complements the conceptual clarification that has gone before. In this 
second part of the chapter, the key concept of ‘ideology’ is defined, the case is 
made for the study of ideological change over time, and some methodological 
implications of this choice of topic are made explicit. The choice of historical 
cases is also justified.
This chapter has three goals: First, to show that the argument made by the thesis 
connects with the major strands of thought in the IR and History literatures. 
Second, and in the process of achieving this first aim, to show that IR and US 
foreign policy history need not necessarily be conceived as separate fields of 
inquiry, but can -  perhaps should -  be seen as inextricably intertwined. This 
thesis aims to demonstrate that an IR argument regarding the behaviour of a 
particular nation can be made more solid on the basis of a deeper historical 
understanding of that nation. Third, the chapter aims to explain why the study of 
‘ideology’ is a useful angle of approach when seeking such an understanding, 
and to demonstrate that this thesis pursues the study of ideology in a way that has 
been thought through to a satisfactory level of conceptual depth.
Positioning the thesis within IR and US history
This thesis argues that national ideological history forms part of a causal 
explanation accounting for American resistance to ‘balance of power’ thinking 
concerning international order. In doing so, it first presents four chapters 
(Chapters 2-5) of period-based historical analysis. These set out in detail the 
view that interaction between America’s international context and the ideas of its 
leaders produced new strategic thinking, which featured elements of both change 
and continuity in official ideology. Chapter 6 then provides a detailed and 
evidenced analysis of the Bush administration’s grand strategy, again 
emphasising ideology. This chapter highlights the absence of genuine balance-of- 
power thinking, and the administration’s emphasis on universal values, common 
interest and American hegemony. Drawing in the preceding historical analyses, 
the Conclusion makes the case that the Bush administration’s embrace of these
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ideological principles locates its thinking at a point of logical evolution from 
what has gone before.
The thesis argument is neither for revolutionary change nor seamless continuity. 
The thesis as a whole seeks to illustrate the interaction of international context, 
national history and ideology in shaping strategy in key periods. It argues that 
during the period in its early years when the United States might have been 
‘socialised’ into balance-of-power thinking through relations with the European 
states, it instead seized on the opportunities presented by geography and 
circumstance to refrain from that through a strategy of hemispheric separatism. 
Thus, the nation did not 'learn' the standard European balance-of-power 
approach, meaning basing one’s conception of foreign relations on the 
competitive interaction with equivalently powerful states in pursuit of rival 
interests. By the time the United States came later to be embroiled in Europe, the 
global order was in tumult. As a result US leaders saw potential to transpose 
America’s liberal universalist ideas of order onto the global stage rather than 
simply slotting America into the existing order. Thus the ideological legacy of 
resistance to balance-of-power thinking combined with circumstance, i.e. rising 
US power and a collapsing international order, to produce a liberal universalist 
internationalism as the basis of US foreign policy.
Realism
Because the idea of balance-of-power thinking features prominently in the thesis 
argument, the realist school, which gives significant attention to the concept of 
the ‘balance of power’, is a good place to begin discussion of the literature. The 
common feature of all theories of realism is concern with the nation state and 
with power. Realist writings focus on the quest of states to obtain power -  for 
reasons that vary depending on the strain of realism -  and the intended and 
unintended consequences of that effort. Beyond this commonality, however, 
there are divisions within the realist school, the most significant being that 
between the neo- or structural realist approach and the older approach now 
known as ‘classical’ realism.
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The structural realist approach, because considered more scientific in 
formulation, has been more prominent in the discipline in recent decades, and 
thus merits first mention. Advanced most famously by Waltz, it takes the 
international system as its level of analysis and defines that system as an 
anarchical one in which states first and foremost seek security.9 It goes on to 
explain state behaviour by reference to the imperatives of that pursuit. The key 
variable in this explanatory framework is the distribution of power in the 
international system, changes in which are used to explain shifts in state 
alignment.
Within this version of the realist framework, the ‘balance of power’ is 
understood as an automatically operative mechanism of the international system. 
As material power shifts in the system, states react in such a way as to maximise 
their security: using alliances to balance against any power that becomes too 
strong. A state that accrues much more power than its rivals will tend to 
overreach thanks to the lack of externally imposed limits on its behaviour, 
promoting balancing trends that ultimately restore equilibrium. A ‘balance of 
power’, therefore, is thought to emerge from state behaviour in much the same 
way that market equilibrium emerges under classical economics: not as the 
product of conscious design on the part of the actors, but as the system-level 
consequence of decisions made at the unit level in response to private motives.
Others have followed Waltz in offering structural explanation, but have 
disagreed as to whether ‘balancing’ behaviour is as inevitable as Waltz appears 
to claim.10 Mearsheimer is perhaps the best known of the post-Waltz generation
9 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a 
flavour of the debate surrounding Waltz’s ideas, see Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its 
Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). It is important not to overstate 
neorealism’s claims concerning the overriding influence of systemic pressures in ‘causing’ state 
action. Waltz himself admits that international pressures work in the manner of a ‘market 
mechanism’, in that they may be defied by individual states, albeit with dire consequences which 
deter such defiance and provide general rules for behaviour. See Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on 
Theory o f International Politics: A  Response to my Critics’, in Keohane (ed.), op. cit.. pp. 322- 
45. See also discussion in Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), pp. 92-118.
10 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective”, Foreign 
Affairs, Jul/Aug 2002, 81:4, pp. 20-33; William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar
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of structural realists, though his account emphasises a more ‘offensive’ quality to 
states’ pursuit of security than Waltz’s ‘defensive’ reading.11 These disputes are 
secondary, however, to the fundamental emphasis on material capabilities, and 
the ‘balance of power’ as an impersonal, unconsciously emergent phenomenon.
The classical realist school is perhaps understood best by appreciating the factors 
it incorporates that neorealism, taking realism as a starting point but seeking 
conceptual parsimony, strips out. In its modem form, classical realism is best 
known to International Relations and the study of US foreign policy through 
authors such as Morgenthau, Kennan and Kissinger.12 Classical realists, unlike 
neorealists, are not exclusively concerned with the system level: they engage in 
what Waltz, in his well-known distinction, terms ‘theories of foreign policy’, i.e. 
those which seek to explain the behaviour of a particular state, as well as theories 
of international relations, i.e. those which explain the operation of the 
international system.
In pursuit of this, classical realists have been more open to explanations of state 
action that include domestic political factors and contingent decision-making. 
Classical realism does share with the structural variant some effort to identify 
universal patterns in state behaviour: it argues, for instance, that as a state’s 
material capabilities grow, its definition of its national interests broadens, along
World’, International Security 29:1 (summer 1999), pp. 5-41; and ‘US Strategy in a Unipolar 
World’ in Ikenberry, America Unrivaled, pp. 98-118. In response, Waltz would deny that 
balancing is ‘inevitable’ per se, merely highly probable because the systemic imperative supports 
it. For Waltz’s thoughts on unipolarity, see, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, in G. John 
Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future o f the Balance o f Power, (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), pp. 29-67.
11 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier”, Sep/Oct 2001, 80:5, pp. 46-61; 
The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 2001). Mearsheimer has 
moved over time towards explanations that emphasise capacity of national decision-makers to 
err, and the importance of domestic political influences on policymaking. This may draw into 
question his credentials as a fully ‘structuralist’ thinker. See Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, 
“An Unnecessary War”, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2003 No. 134, pp. 51-61; Mearsheimer and 
Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (London: Penguin, 2008)
12 Hans J. Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination, (London: Methuen & 
Co., 1952); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984); Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Touchstone, 1995). There are, 
of course, many other Classical Realist analysts of the same period with names less well known: 
particularly excellent is Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign 
Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953)
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with the scope of its foreign policy actions.13 However, it concerns itself with the 
role of national politics in shaping particular cases in a way that is in the main 
absent from the system-level analyses of structural realism.14 Building in more of 
the language of modem theory, neoclassical realism has emerged as a revised 
variant school in recent years, using the central principles of classical realism to 
make a contribution to the contemporary debate.15
For classical and neoclassical realist thinkers, the ‘balance of power’ is not 
something that emerges spontaneously from states’ actions. Rather, states must 
pursue such a balance as a conscious policy objective in order to attain 
international stability. States are aided in this quest if they share a core of basic 
values sufficient to ensure acceptance of one another’s legitimacy, and if they are 
prepared to actively coordinate their policies in pursuit of the objective of a 
stable balance.16 For these realists, attaining a balance of power requires national 
leaders to show restraint in the pursuit of national interests. To be sustainable, an 
order must offer all its members a sufficient stake to justify their acceptance of 
the fundamental rules of the status quo. If states do not show this restraint, and 
instead pursue utopian universalist objectives, the balance becomes destabilised 
and war results.
The classical realist school does argue for the existence of ‘reality-based’ limits 
on a state’s potential achievements in foreign policy, but it does not predict that a 
stable balance is sure to emerge at the system level from any given scenario, or 
that balance is the natural condition of international affairs. Indeed, this version 
of realist analysis makes central the idea that national leaders may harm their 
own interests by failing to appreciate the realistic limits circumstance places 
upon them. Classical realism perceives two major interconnected threats to a
13 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins o f America’s World Role, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998)
14 This is not to say that structural realists are necessarily so bold as to deny that such factors 
exist, merely to note that their theories are by definition not keen to use them as components in 
their explanations.
15 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p.3
16 This is a prominent feature in Morgenthau, though there are also elements of the more 
structural sense of balance in his thought. For discussient see Richard Litte, “The Balance of 
Power in Politics Among Nations', in Michael C. Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The 
Legacy o f o f Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations, (Oxford: OUP, 2007)
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successful foreign policy: overreach and idealism. Overreach occurs when 
national leaders pursue objectives which are unattainable given the means 
available, or at least given the means they are in fact prepared to devote to the
• 17projects in question. Idealism becomes a problem when leaders do not 
appreciate that the sole currency of international relations is power, and 
mistakenly believe that they can advance their objectives by recourse only to
1 ftlegal or moral reasoning.
Classical realism is intimately linked with the study of History. Indeed, writers 
such as Kissinger and Kennan were writing works of history themselves, albeit 
with the intent that the result should serve as contemporary policy analysis too. 
‘Realism’ has also played a role in the writings of those more unequivocally 
designated as historians, especially in the study of the early Cold War.19 For 
example, John Lewis Gaddis -  at least in his post-revisionist period before 
converting to ‘neo-orthodoxy’ -  wrote the history of US policy with emphasis on 
realist concerns: the balance of material power, the security dilemma between the 
superpowers, the political choices made by each side in defining the scope of 
their interests, and the unintended quality of the Cold War’s emergence. Such 
work evidently reflects key features of the realist understanding of International 
Relations.20
The thesis presented in this dissertation shares much intellectual ground with the 
classical and neoclassical realist schools, an affinity arising from several features 
of its analysis. First, it is concerned with foreign policy at the national level 
rather than merely international relations at the system level. Second, it concurs 
that rising material power on the part of a state tends to lead to a broadening of 
its definition of its interests. The story of America’s rising horizons during the
17 All realists make this point, but see for example Lippmann, The Cold War, (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1972)
18 Kennan argued that the dominance of ‘legalism’ and ‘moralism’ in US foreign policy thought 
were a serious barrier to its effectiveness.
19 This is unsurprising given the coincidence of timing between the rise of realism and the events 
of the Cold War. It can be argued that realism has owed its disciplinary popularity to its ‘fit’ with 
the Cold War arrangement of international affairs.
20 See John Lewis Gaddis; see his The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Strategies o f Containment: a critical appraisal of 
postwar American national security policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). For 
lengthier discussion of the historiography of the early Cold War, see Chapter 5.
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periods under study here reinforces realism’s contention that America’s growing 
world role since its foundation has been inseparably tied to its rising material 
strength in that period. Third, classical and neoclassical realism accept that there 
is a role for contingency in foreign-policy-making, and thus are interested in the 
nationally specific political and cultural forces at work within a given state. 
Dueck, for instance, argues that the United States could have pursued a number 
of different courses at various points in the evolution of its foreign policy, but 
chose particular courses because they were more compatible with its embedded 
political culture. This is an argument with which this thesis agrees, and to which 
it seeks to lend evidential support. Fourth -  a related point -  classical and 
neoclassical realism propose that a balance-of-power is not a spontaneous 
systemic phenomenon, but something states need to consciously seek, and 
therefore that ‘balance-of-power thinking’ is a strategic state of mind that states 
may or may not adopt. This thesis argues that American leaders have resisted 
thinking about international order with a ‘balance of power’ mindset of the sort 
prescribed by realists, because established ideological considerations draw 
policymakers away from this mode of thinking. This is an argument that fits with 
the bulk of classical realist analysis.
The thesis diverges with realism on a couple of points. First, it remains agnostic 
regarding the normative and prudential prescriptions that realism uses its 
historical analysis to justify. This thesis does not provide the sort of 
deconstruction of the consequences of the policies it describes that would be 
required to make a persuasive argument that policy would be more successful if 
it embraced realist advice. Classical realism is, at core, an ‘error theory’ of US 
foreign policy, arguing that policy has mostly been misconceived and should be 
reoriented in line with realistic principles. This thesis makes no such claim. 
Second, one basis of realism has tended to be the argument that the pursuit of 
‘ideological’ objectives leads nations, in this instance the United States, to 
damage and frustrate their own national interests. Such an argument appears to 
give ‘the national interest’ an objective quality that this thesis does not 
presuppose. This thesis takes interests to be essentially subjective constructs of
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the nations that pursue them, and thus a nation cannot be ‘wrong’ about what its 
interests are.21
This thesis can therefore be said to be in line with classical realism in its 
argument, subject to the aforementioned qualifications. Indeed, it is realists’ ideal 
o f what foreign policy should be, and their critique of US foreign policy’s failure 
to realise this ideal, that gives this thesis its central theme. When the thesis 
speaks of a balance-of-power approach to foreign policy, it is referring to a 
realist understanding or order. As Morgenthau conceives it, a realistic 
perspective assumes that ours is “inherently a world of opposing interests and of 
conflict among them” meaning that “moral principles can never be fully realised, 
but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of 
interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts”.22 This is a perspective 
that, according to this thesis, US leaders have with notable consistency refused to 
embrace, opting instead for an ideology of liberal universalism. The historical 
evolution of this phenomenon is the object of my inquiry here.
Liberalism
The liberal school of International Relations differs from realism on at least two 
significant points. First, it is more directly concerned with domestic systems of 
state government, believing that democracies differ in important ways from non­
democracies in their international behaviour. This can be developed further into 
the theory of the liberal/democratic peace, which posits that the world can be 
made more peaceful by the spread and eventual universalisation of the liberal 
form of government.23 Second, its analysis, while not dismissing entirely the
21 Indeed, to suggest that it can is to replace the Wilsonian discourse of objective interests in 
harmony -  to which realists vehemently object -  with a realist discourse of objective interests in 
intractable conflict. It is debatable whether this is an improvement.
22 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1985)
23 For discussion of liberal/democratic peace see Michael W. Doyle, “A more perfect union? The 
liberal peace and the challenge of globalization.” Review of international studies. 26(Supp.) 2000 
December, pp. 81-94; Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace”, American Political Science 
Review, 99:3, August 2005, pp. 463-466; Doyle, “Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:3, Summer 1983, pp. 205-235; John M. Owen, “Democratic
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relevance of states’ relative material capabilities, emphasises the importance of 
norms, institutions and interdependence.24 Like realism, liberalism contains 
divergence between writers who prioritise the system level -  ‘structural liberal’ 
explanations, as it were 25 -  and those that pay more attention to choice at the 
individual state level. On both levels, however, liberals tend to agree that the 
scope for the pursuit of common or harmonious interests is greater than realists 
suppose.
The foremost analyst combining liberal theory of the international system with 
analysis of United States foreign policy is Ikenberry. He argues that while 
America’s material capabilities placed it in an advantageous position in the post- 
WWII world, its success in the period that followed was chiefly the result of the 
liberal nature of its society and its policy choice to pursue what he terms 
‘strategic restraint’. Other societies, he proposes, feared the United States less 
because its openness as a society meant they could access its decision-making 
and read its intentions more easily; meanwhile, its restraint in imposing its will 
on other states despite its superior power capabilities led them to regard its 
influence as more benign than the alternatives. Thus, the United States was able 
to create a network of formal institutions and informal understandings in the 
postwar era that translated its capabilities into effective influence.26 The idea that 
‘power’ amounts to something distinct from material capabilities, and requires
77norms and institutions to be useful, is a major theme in liberal analysis.
Peace Research: Whence and Whither”, International Politics. 41:4, December 2004, pp. 605- 
617; Owen, “How liberalism produces democratic peace” International Security. 19:2, Fall 1994, 
pp. 87-125
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977). The ‘English School’ of IR, though not 
necessarily ‘liberal’, also places emphasis on norms and ‘institutions’ -  in the broad sense of 
accepted patterns of behaviour -  which move inter-state relations away from pure machtpolitik 
and towards being an ‘international society’. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  
Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)
25 For example, see John M. Owen IV, ‘Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy’, in 
Ikenberry, America Unrivaled, pp. 239-259; Thomas Risse, ‘US Power in a Liberal Security 
Community’, in Ikenberry, America Unrivalled, pp.260-283.
26 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding o f Order 
after Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and ‘Democracy, Institutions 
and Strategic Restraint’ in Ikenberry, America Unrivaled, pp. 213-38
27 Joseph Nye, The Paradox o f American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It 
Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Nye, “The American national interest and 
global public goods”, International Affairs, Apr2002, 78:2, p.233
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The concept of a ‘balance of power’ does not occur so prominently within the 
liberal paradigm because of this more multidimensional understanding of 
‘power’ itself. To the extent that the concept has relevance to liberalism, it is as a 
precondition for the development of liberal order: a balance of material 
capabilities greatly favouring the United States and its liberal allies enabled its 
successful pursuit of a liberal agenda. That agenda has consisted of more open 
global economic and political systems, pursued through effective international 
institutions and embedded over time by the spread of liberal democratic norms to 
a growing number of states. The policy of the United States, by this reading, has 
not been the preservation of a balance of power, but the leveraging of its material 
strength to achieve the maximum possible spread of its political and economic 
values and the global institutions based upon those values.
On this point, liberal and classical realist analyses partly converge: realists can 
accept that the US uses institutions instrumentally to advance its interests, based 
on a foundation of underlying hard power. But there are two clear points of 
difference: First, liberals believe that America’s engagement with such processes 
can and should go beyond the pursuit of ‘narrow’ self-interest, to encompass the 
provision of global public goods. Second, realists are not convinced, as liberals 
tend to be, that goals such as universal democracy and effective global 
institutions are attainable. When realists level their warnings against overreach 
and idealism, they are usually targeting liberals, whom they perceive as pursuing 
these objectives.
The schools of US foreign policy history with clearest links to liberalism are the 
traditional/orthodox28 and also the progressive29, the former largely endorsing the
28 An outstanding example of traditional diplomatic history in practice is the work of Samuel 
Flagg Bemis. See his A Diplomatic History o f the United States, 5th ed., (New York: Holt, 
Rhinehart and Winston, 1965); and John Quincy Adams and the Foundations o f American 
Foreign Policy, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949). For an example of more recent work of the 
orthodox school see John Lewis Gaddis; We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997)
29 The dean of progressive history was Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation o f the 
Constitution o f the United States, (New York : Macmillan, 1913); The Idea o f National Interest: 
An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Macmillan, 1934). Beard was 
noted in the 1930s and ‘40s for his isolationist sentiment and opposition to entering WWII. A 
sample book from recent years that displays similarities of approach, in that it gives much play to 
the driving force of economic factors, but which differentiates itself by emphasising regionalism
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liberal agenda, the latter being critical of it. The traditional/orthodox school tends 
to accept American good intentions and -  with caveats -  to tell a positive story 
regarding the US rise to power and influence. It regards the imperialist phase of 
the late 19th Century as in essence an aberration from a dominant tradition of 
anti-colonialism, and follows a narrative of evolution from ‘isolationism’ to 
reluctant engagement which judges the decisions of American statesmen with 
some sympathy, based on those statesmen’s own perceptions of their context and 
decisions. This fits with the liberal portrayal in IR of the United States as an 
unusually benign great power with the capacity to entice allies into a mutually 
beneficial world order. The progressive analytical framework shares liberals’ 
pervasive interest in the role of economic forces and the importance of non­
governmental actors. It also accords a coherence and effectiveness to the US 
government’s pursuit of universalistic liberal and capitalist ends that the realist 
school does not. Progressive history, however, is more negative in its 
perception of the ‘American project’ than analysts such as Ikenberry. Some 
progressives have been close to Marxist in their critiques, sharing the liberal 
analysis of what America’s goals were as a matter of descriptive fact, but 
abhorring them on a normative level. In the post-WWII decades, the progressive 
school metamorphosed into the revisionist school of foreign policy history, 
retaining at its core the argument that America’s capitalist system serves as the 
root cause of a globally ambitious and ethically questionable US strategy of 
dominance.31 Some recent work, such as that of Kagan, has the potential to link 
together the field of analysis more tightly by combining a progressive focus on 
the importance of America’s domestic character, including some 
acknowledgement of its dark side, with a more generally positive sentiment, less
below the level of the national unit, is Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict 
and Change in American Foreign Policy, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998)
30 Kennan for instance, treats the longstanding policy of the ‘Open Door’ in Asia as an example 
of ineffectual ‘legalistic-moralistic’ thinking, while the progressives view it as an important 
component of a determined master plan.
31 Probably the two most notable standard-bearers of this approach are William Appleman 
Williams and Walter LaFeber. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy o f American 
Diplomacy, (New York: Dell, 1972); The Contours o f American History, (New York, WW. 
Norton, 1989). Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation o f American Expansionism 
1860-1898, (London: Cornell University Press, 1963); Inevitable Revolutions: The United States 
in Central America, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993); America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945- 
2000, 9th ed., (London: McGraw-Hill, 2002)
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tinged by the left-of-centre disillusion and so-called ‘isolationist’ sentiment of 
much progressive history.32
As with classical realism, this thesis accepts elements of liberalism’s descriptive 
account while not necessarily sharing its normative conclusions. That it can 
claim affinity with both perspectives without self-contradiction is an indication 
that the two approaches are not mutually incompatible, at least to the degree 
sometime implied by textbook demarcation. One area of commonality between 
this thesis and liberal analysis is acceptance of differentiation between states on 
the basis of domestic political character. This thesis is it is not a comparative 
study of democracy and non-democracy, and thus does not set out to prove that 
America’s domestic system makes it different from less liberal nations. 
Nevertheless, it does suppose that America’s foreign policy cannot be understood 
without reference to the efforts of political leaders to justify foreign policy 
ideologically via the domestic political process.
Classical realism presents us with a factual proposition in want of an explanation: 
why does the United States reject the prescriptive side of the realist agenda, 
balance-of-power thinking in shorthand? This thesis looks partly to ideology to 
provide an answer, an approach that parallels the liberal willingness to turn to 
domestic politics for explanations. Phrased another way, the question posed by 
realism is: ‘Why do certain liberal tenets -  most especially the desire to spread 
liberal democracy and belief in the essential complementary and harmonious 
quality of national interests -  play a dominant role in the US foreign policy 
discourse?’ Liberalism offers a partial answer to this question by suggesting that 
liberal democracy encourages certain kinds of political reasoning and action on 
the part of a state and discourages others. (It is worth noting, though, that 
classical realists do this too: Kennan was outspoken in his concern that 
democratic control hinders the implementation of an effective, i.e. ‘realistic’, 
foreign policy). In proposing national ideological history as a relevant factor, this 
thesis pursues a similar intellectual track to liberalism in looking to the 
consequences of America’s domestic politics, but making liberalism itself the
32 Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the Worldfrom its Earliest Days to the 
Dawn of the Twentieth Century, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
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focus of the inquiry. It may be thought of in the following way: The thesis 
analyses and explains the American aversion to balance-of-power thinking. Part 
of the explanation is that the aversion exists largely because of American leaders’ 
adherence to liberal ideas, but this in a sense merely restates the thing that is to 
be explained. Liberalism’s emergence -  its manner and causes -  is therefore 
under the thesis’s microscope.
As with realism, the thesis diverges from the liberal approach to analysis in 
eschewing normative and/or prudential claims. It does not seeks to make 
pronouncements regarding the true sources of ‘legitimacy’ in international 
affairs, or the means by which the United States might best seek to encourage 
acceptance of its authority by others under a new world order. Nor is it aimed at 
testing liberal claims to the effect that the realities of international life reward 
cooperative behaviour rather than open competition, the claim on the basis of 
which it is sometimes tested against realism. The thesis differs from progressive 
history in that it does not emphasise either secrecy or injustice in its analysis of 
American leaders’ promotion of capitalism. This thesis is concerned with how 
and why liberal tenets emerged as pillars of US strategic philosophy, not with 
their truth or falsity, virtue or vice. For a liberal analyst such as Ikenberry, this 
question of substance is central. For this thesis, it need not be.
In taking the self-perception of American actors -  usually -  at face value, this 
thesis may be criticised, as the liberal school history and politics often is, for 
being credulous in its treatment of rhetoric and public pronouncement. Are there 
not other, darker motives below the surface of what is officially advanced as 
justification for US policy? On a theoretical level, this concern is addressed in 
the appropriate section below. As to the more political question of whether the 
thesis is an exercise in apologetics: it is not. This is intended to be a work of 
explanation -  however partial -  not of justification. The subject of enquiry is the 
operation of ideology through history as an influential factor enabling and 
constraining foreign policy choice within American political culture. It is its 
intention to avoid normative judgments, however tempting it may be to impart 
them.
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The *empire9 school
Differing somewhat from both the realist and liberal modes of analysis, which 
take the conventional IR framework of the state system as a given, is a third 
school of thought which has argued that the global role of the United States is 
best understood through intellectual paradigm of ‘empire’.33 Those advancing 
this case have argued that the relative scale of American power means that the 
US should not be seen merely as one power in the Westphalian state system, but 
as an imperial entity confronting the challenges historically associated with the 
creation and maintenance of imperial power and stability.
Some have viewed this as no bad thing, hoping, at least in theory, for a beneficial 
effect on world order if America were to willingly embrace something 
amounting to an imperial role.34 Others have been critical, arguing that the 
pursuit of ‘American empire’ is destructive, and self-destructive.35 Divided on 
the ethics and desirability of American empire, these analyses nevertheless share 
common doubts regarding the ability of the US to sustain the ideological and 
practical commitment necessary for successful empire, owing to its anti-colonial 
history and fragile public morale. This ‘empire school’, inevitably runs the risk 
of fixating on a question of terminology: ‘should we call America an empire?’ At 
its best, however, it has been invaluable in focusing debate on assessing the 
plausible scope, as a matter of practicality and/or legitimacy, of American power 
and responsibility in the modem world.
33 See Michael Cox, “The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation -  Again”, 
Millennium vol. 32, no. 1 (2003), pp. 1-29, which provides a useful survey of the re-emergence of 
‘empire’ as a term in the policy discourse as well as an explicit defence of the concept’s 
relevance. See also Cox, “Empire by denial: the strange case of the United States”, International 
Affairs, Jan 2005, 81:1, p i5-30; and Cox, “Empire, Imperialism and the Bush doctrine”, Review 
of International Studies, 30:4 (2004), p.585
34 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall o f the American Empire, (London: Allen Lane, 
2004); Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
(London: Vintage, 2003); Max Boot, ‘The Case for American Empire’, Weekly Standard,
October 15, 2001; Sebastian Mallaby, “The Reluctant Imperialist”, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 
2002, 81:2, p2-7.
35 Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire, (London: Verso, 2003); Michael Mann, “The first failed 
empire of the 21st century”, Review of International Studies, 30:4 (2004), p.631; John 
Newhouse, Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Order, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2003)
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In the same way that the IR debate between those accepting and rejecting the 
‘empire thesis’ has been politically charged, the attempt to link it with the 
historical literature reveals great potential for polarisation. The US experienced
tVionly the briefest flash of avowed imperialism, in Asia at the turn of the 20 
Century. As a result, the obvious historical counterpart to the ‘empire studies’ IR 
school -  traditional (small ‘c’ conservative) imperial history -  is hot voluminous. 
To the extent that it exists, it consists of arguments by analogy drawing parallels 
between the British and American experience.36
On the other side of the political spectrum, however, the critical work of the New 
Left embraces the idea that the United States has behaved imperialistically in its 
foreign policy, using that as starting-point for a trenchant critique of US policy. 
Taking up the essentials of the ‘economic explanation’ of history favoured by 
progressives such as Beard, Williams and LaFeber, the New Left added a more 
comprehensive hostility to the American domestic order, attributing the Cold 
War primarily to the imperial ambitions of US elites. At that conflict’s end, it 
used the same principles to criticise humanitarian intervention and democracy 
promotion as violent neo-imperialism, attributing the problems of terrorism and 
general global violence to the failures of the capitalist and racially hierarchical 
American hegemonic project.37
The relationship of ‘empire’ to the ‘balance of power’ is one of transcendence. 
Those who argue that the United States should be studied in parallel with 
imperial history in effect make the case that it needs to be taken out of the 
context of the state system with which IR has tended to deal, and studied as some
36 Ferguson, Colossus', Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Vintage, 
1989)
37 Gabriel Kolko, The Politics o f War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis o f1943-45, 
(London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969); Confronting the Third World: United States foreign 
policy, 1945-1980, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Another Century o f War, (New York: 
The New Press, 2002). Joyce and Garbiel Kolko, The Limits o f Power: the world and United 
States foreign policy, (New York, Harper & Row, 1972). Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, 
(London: Vintage, 1992); The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, (London: Pluto 
Press, 1999); A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the 
West, (London: Verso, 2000); Hegemony or Survival: America’s quest for global dominance, 
(London: Penguin, 2004). Chomsky’s aggressive deconstruction and attack is linked to detailed 
argument concerning the manipulation o f public opinion on foreign policy within ostensibly free 
and democratic societies. See Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: 
The Political Economy o f the Mass Media, (London: Vintage, 1994).
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other, qualitatively different, kind of entity. If it is or has been an empire, the US, 
whether it should thrive or stumble, should be understood as having relations 
with others that are essentially hierarchical rather than co-equal, rendering the 
conventional understanding of power-balancing unworkable.
This thesis does not subscribe to the empire school’s core argument that the US 
is best studied as an imperial power, for a number of reasons. First, the 
geographic demarcation of the ‘American empire’ has never been sufficiently 
clarified. Over which territories or nations is it suggested that the United States 
exercises imperial authority? If the empire is understood to be global, then the 
influence of the US does not appear strong enough in many places to justify such 
an argument. If it exercises imperial power only some places, then these need to 
be specified and enumerated. An explanation needs to be provided of how the 
‘American empire’ relates to territories beyond its control differently from those 
within it. Second, a related point, this thesis does not believe that the lines of 
authority between the US and its ‘subjects’ have been defined with sufficient 
clarity to make the case that an empire exists. Aside from Iraq, which since 2003 
has existed in a quasi-colonial relation to the United States, the US appears to 
exercise an external influence over other powers that stops short of that exercised 
by past empires over territories considered part of the empire proper. Third, the 
near-blanket refusal of the American political discourse to embrace an imperial 
perspective presents insuperable barriers to the implementation of the policies 
required to make such an enterprise practicable, a point which even pro-empire 
texts recognise as a serious problem. Finally, the empire studies school faces a 
paradox if it makes the claim, as some do, that the United States is a ‘new kind’ 
of empire. If the justification for invoking the politically charged language of 
empire to describe the US is utilitarian, i.e. that it is useful to draw parallels with 
empires past, this is rendered problematic by an admission that US power differs 
qualitatively from any imperial power that has existed previously.
This thesis shares the view, on which the empire studies school astutely picks up, 
that a desire to ‘transcend’ the balance of power system features prominently in 
the US strategic outlook, that this is highly significant, and that such 
‘exceptionalism’ is one characteristic of imperialist thinking. It also, however,
40
shares the realist concern that maintenance of an actual empire is beyond the 
practical capacity of the United States. This is in part for ideological reasons, and 
the thesis agrees with liberals that imperialism goes against the grain of 
American beliefs regarding liberty and legitimacy. Even a power that pursues 
hegemony can adopt what this thesis means by a ‘balance-of-power’ realist 
mindset if it continues to think of international order as defined by inherently 
conflicting national interests that must be balanced and manipulated to produce 
order, as well as reality-imposed limits on even the strongest state’s power. The 
argument made by this thesis is that within the ideology of American liberalism 
there are elements of imperialistic sentiment, including tendencies towards 
universalism, unilateralism and exceptionalism. Crucially, however, this 
alternative approach is not imperialism as conventionally understood. What 
American strategy aims for -  and sometimes presupposes -  is willing and 
spontaneous embrace of its own political and economic ideas by others, not 
submission through compulsion to American authority.
In its historical analysis, this thesis does not subscribe to the New Left critique of 
American imperialism, which overplays the desire for domination in American 
political thought. In addition, New Left analysis can also sometimes be guilty of 
a schizophrenic approach to official rhetoric, sometimes using it to support its 
claims regarding American motives, then disregarding such rhetoric when its 
content is inconvenient. In showing that a more sinister interpretation can be 
placed on American activism abroad, and highlighting skulduggery in particular 
cases, this school makes a contribution, but its focus is different from what this 
thesis sets out to achieve.
A note on * exceptionalism*
A few words on ‘exceptionalism’ may be appropriate here. This is the idea that 
the US emerged as a special political entity because of the unique circumstances 
in which it developed, which combined, inter alia, Enlightenment ideas with 
expanding territory, cheap land, vast immigration, limited government and the 
rule of law. The specific reasons advanced for America’s ‘special’ quality vary,
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but usually centre on interaction between the values brought by immigrant 
settlers and the unique environment of the USA’s continental territory.38 This 
proposition can in turn be used to account for apparently anomalous national 
traits displayed subsequently, e.g. high levels of religiosity despite advanced 
economic and social development, or deep and widespread hostility to socialistic 
political thought.39
Exceptionalism, as sometimes formulated, can imply a ‘chosen’ quality on the 
part of America or its people that this thesis does not believe can be defended.40 
The thesis argument is at base, however, an environmental explanation of how 
the United States came to be as it is, and in that respect it has something in 
common with the exceptionalist school, and perhaps even Turner. The thesis 
does make an argument that in being averse to balance-of-power thinking 
American leaders have thought about international order in a way that rejects 
understandings predominant in other states at other times. It is important to be 
clear, however, that the thesis does not argue that this has been the result of 
spontaneous divergence on the part of American leaders based on innate moral or 
intellectual difference from other nations’ elites. Neither is it intended to imply 
that no other nation has ever tended towards universalistic liberalism and away 
from balance-of-power realism in strategic outlook.
The thesis argument is that America’s circumstances, domestic and international, 
interacted to produce particular ideological tendencies over time. The outcome of 
this process was not predetermined, nor is its present outcome fixed. To assess 
whether the particularities of the American approach makes the US ‘unique’
38 The best known recent scholar of exceptionalism is Seymour Martin Lipset, American 
Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996), but in modem 
academia the theme goes back as far as Frederick Jackson Turner’s ‘Frontier Thesis’ in the late 
19th Century. Turner argued for the formative effect of the unique American environment on the 
American mind, characterised by plentiful cheap land on a rugged frontier, arguing in the process 
against the theretofore dominant ‘germ’ theory of American development attributing US political 
culture to intellectual inheritance of ideas from Europe. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier 
in American History, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920). As a concept, the notion of 
America’s exceptional status goes back a good deal further, at least as far as John Winthrop’s 
‘City on a Hill’ sermon, and was first brought to prominence under its present name by Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, (New York: Library of America, 2004)
39 For some recent discussion of America’s uniqueness, see John Micklethwaite, The Right 
Nation: Why America is Different, (London: Allen Lane, 2004)
40 For criticism of this sort of exceptionalism see William Pfaff, “Manifest Destiny: A New 
Direction for America”, New York Review, LIV:2, Feb 15, 2007, pp.54-59.
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would require a comparative study beyond this thesis’s scope, though it would be 
an interesting piece of further research. As to whether the United States’ 
particularities make it ‘special’, this is a thinly disguised claim to superiority that 
the contents of this thesis do nothing to support.
The study of ideas and discourse
In addition to the ‘traditional’ schools of analysis set out thus far, there are others 
that concentrate primarily on ideas and the language used to express them. 
‘Constructivism’ as the study of the social emergence of ideas has been termed, 
makes the process by which such ideas are manufactured and disseminated its 
focus, as well as the use of language in their formulation. This work varies in the 
degree of fundamentalism with which it approaches the question. Some 
constructivism is moderate, working within much of the established IR 
framework to make the case for the relevance of shared social ideas, especially in 
establishing norms between nations.41 Some post-structuralist work, on the other 
hand -  an extension of similar writing in the field of literary criticism -  goes 
deeper in its attempt to deconstruct the nature of the separation between the 
domestic and the international, the social process by which this is done and the 
political forces underlying the language used.42
These approaches are interested in the ‘balance of power’ not, as structural 
realists are, as a given feature of the international environment, but as a linguistic 
and ideological construct serving to advance particular political objectives via a 
prescribed way of thinking about international order and the role of the state. 
From a critical perspective, those who favour radical international reforms regard 
balance-of-power thinking as a conservative discourse serving the political ends 
of those advantaged by the social status quo.
41 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1999)
42 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998)
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It is crucial to recognise that in addressing these issues constructivism builds on 
the ideas of classical realism and liberalism rather than achieving a decisive 
break. As set out earlier, both these latter approaches are explicitly concerned 
with the role of shared values and norms. Though realism clearly gives more 
explanatory weight to material factors than does constructivism, realists are not 
unaware that the pursuit of a balance of power is an essentially conservative 
project, trading on shared notions of state legitimacy and international propriety. 
As such it clearly has a place for ideas, norms and language within its 
explanatory framework. Hence, there is a good deal more room for integrated 
overlap than sometimes supposed between traditional and more recent 
approaches. In seeking to show how and why an individual nation has opted to 
conceptualise its policy in terms antithetical to balance-of-power thinking, there 
is no necessary disjunction between the approaches in regard to either the 
question asked or the methods that need be pursued to answer it.
Works explicitly on the subject o f ideology and US foreign policy
There have been several published scholarly analyses highlighting dominant 
strands in the ideology of US foreign policy ideology. The most theoretically 
grounded is that of Hunt, who identifies three particular features as consistently 
present throughout the course of the nation’s history.43 There are other examples, 
however, including the instructive contribution of McDougall, and, with more 
contemporary focus, Lieven’s work on American nationalism.44 The realist work 
of Osgood, meanwhile, which makes the argument that US policy has oscillated 
between bouts of exaggeratedly assertive idealism and withdrawal also comes 
within this genre of ‘American ideological studies’.45 One might also point to 
Klingberg’s work on of cyclical movements in US social mood regarding foreign
43 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
44 Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American encounter with the 
world since 1776, (Boston: Mariner Books, 1997); Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: an 
Anatomy of American Nationalism, (London: HarperCollins, 2004).
45 Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953)
44
policy.46 More recently, in the political science literature, Monten has sought to 
link the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ to long-term historical ideological trends, 
arguing in theoretical terms for the policy relevance of nationally specific 
ideological factors 47 In this he acknowledges a debt to Brands, whose work also 
fits this category.48
This genre of work attempts to identify long-term patterns within the underlying 
premises of American foreign policy at the grand-strategic level. In so doing, it 
embraces a conception of ideology similar to that set out by this thesis, while 
also reaching into the realm of ‘culture’ to underpin the analysis. This thesis 
emulates what these authors have attempted in seeking to discern dominant 
themes within the particular national culture of policymaking in American 
society, and to explain how these have exercised influence over policymaking 
over the long term. These works do not in the main focus on the same theme 
used by this thesis to link present policy to the past.49 That fact notwithstanding, 
the existence of such scholarship does help to locate this thesis in an established 
section of the academic landscape: a genre of long-term historical, political and 
cultural analysis, aimed at achieving contemporary relevance through cross­
cutting analysis of International Relations, US foreign policy and History. Given 
that Hunt, Osgood and McDougall have produced recognised contributions to 
scholarship by writing within this genre, this dissertation can claim this as valid 
precedent for the legitimacy of its own contribution.
The thesis does not aim to provide mere replication, however. For one thing, it 
focuses on a particular issue -  resistance to balance-of-power thinking -  that is
46 Frank L. Klingberg, Cyclical Trends in American Foreign Policy Moods: The Unfolding of 
America’s World Role (London: University Press o f America, 1983)
47 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism and Democracy 
Promotion in US Strategy”, International Security, 29:4, Spring 2005, pp. 112-56.
48 H.W Brands, What America Owes the World (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).
49 The themes which Hunt identifies are national greatness, racial hierarchy, and conservative 
hostility to revolution. Lieven, who looks at American nationalism as a whole and not just in 
regard to foreign policy, likewise identifies a duality in American thought: tension between a 
universalistic and inviting civic nationalism and a more bellicose ‘private club’ sense of 
Americanism, the struggle between which can produce confused and confusing policy. 
McDougall, Klingberg and Osgood are closer in their enterprises to what this thesis attempts, 
focusing in a similar way on America’s ‘terms of engagement’ in dealing with the international 
system. In their own ways, all conclude that America has struggled to find a golden mean of 
engagement with the world between over-commitment and undue restraint.
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distinct from the topics of the scholars just named. Further, it differs from Hunt 
in that his is an argument for continuity, while this thesis also describes change, 
albeit while attributing causal influence to the past. It argues not that the same 
core ideological framework has been at work throughout US history, but rather 
that the American ideology evolved from the interaction of founding principles 
(themselves a product of contemporaiy circumstances) and changing material 
circumstances, domestic and international.
This study of change over time puts the thesis closer in analytical thrust to 
McDougall. Unlike McDougall, however, it does not portray the ideological 
change it describes as a misguided choice to move from a virtuous founding 
tradition to a crusader ideology. The thesis argues that the modem ideology 
criticised by McDougall was the product of interaction between the founding 
principles he praises and national circumstances that made increased US 
international entanglement inevitable. In this regard, the thesis endorses the 
classical realist view that material circumstances required change, while still 
allowing that that the manner of that change’s occurrence was influenced by 
ideological factors constraining policy choice. Indeed, the thesis is on balance 
closest to Osgood’s realist work in both style and interpretive conclusions, 
though he looks more deeply at a single contiguous period -  roughly 1898 to 
WWII -  in contrast to this thesis’s focus on a longer-term narrative and five 
separate key periods.
Defining ‘ideology’
In focusing on the concept of ‘ideology’, and making an argument for 
evolutionary links between ideas past and present, some definition of terms is 
appropriate. Hunt defines ideology as “an interrelated set of convictions or 
assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily 
comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that
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reality”.50 This is a definition with which this thesis is comfortable proceeding. 
Ideology, for the purposes of this thesis, is understood to be the means by which 
the human mind takes the infinite data of reality and turns it into a simplified 
‘worldview’, a necessity of mental function which allows for reasoning and 
ultimately action in the political realm. Hence, it should be clear, this thesis does 
not use ‘ideology’ to refer only, as in some pejorative uses of the term, to 
blinkered political perspectives which wise men should seek to escape. On the 
contrary, it starts from the assumption that all political perspectives are 
inherently, and of necessity, ‘ideological’.
In this regard, the thesis embraces the broad definition of ideology offered by 
Seliger, and adapted for the study of foreign policy by Macdonald. That is, 
ideologies are:
. .  .sets o f  factual or moral propositions which serve to posit, explain and justify 
social ends and means o f  organised social action, especially political action, 
irrespective o f  whether such action aims to preserve, amend, destroy or rebuild 
any given order. According to this conception, ideology is as inseparable from 
politics as politics is from ideology.51
Thus, this thesis considers ideology to be embedded in any and all approaches to 
the making of foreign policy. In this, it diverges somewhat from some other 
approaches that try to take the role of ‘ideas’ somewhat seriously, e.g. the liberal 
analysis of Goldstein and Keohane.52 These authors seek to argue that ‘ideas’ -  a 
concept approximating ‘ideology’ for our purposes here -  can play a role in 
determining state action, and see this as challenging theories that assert all state 
action is the predictable outcome of national interests. While the resultant inquiry 
is noteworthy and its findings useful, it appears to take the existence of ‘interests’
50 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 
p. xi. The explanation of ideology and culture adopted here owes something to Hunt’s own 
theoretical arguments, see esp. pp. 11-18.
51 Douglas J. Macdonald, “Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for 
Empirical Analysis.” in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, 
Interpretations and Theory, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), pp. 180-204. Quotation 
p.191.
2 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions 
and Political Change, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
47
as an objective factor driving state action in a way that is exogenous to political 
subjectivity. In that regard, the authors’ approach to the issue actually shares
53something with the realist theories whose conclusions it seeks to challenge.
Rather than seeing ideology as something that competes with national interests 
for a share of influence in determining state action, this thesis supposes that the 
very activity of defining the national interest, and judging what it demands in 
terms of policy, is itself bound up in the mechanism of ‘ideology’ as defined 
above. It argues that what matters in deciding a nation’s foreign policy is not 
simply the material reality of the international environment, but the intellectual 
framework with which policymakers approach that environment. A nation’s 
culture of foreign policy thought develops through the interaction of international 
circumstances with the reaction of political leaders to those circumstances. This 
process produces dominant factual beliefs concerning how the international 
system functions and normative ideas as to the role of the particular nation within 
that system. Being a mental creation that mediates objective reality, simplifying 
the world to enable reasoned action, this framework is by definition ideological. 
Governing administrations operate within this context, and add to it through their 
own actions and pronouncements.
Such an argument takes the thesis some way towards the brand of moderate IR 
constructivism espoused by Wendt, who argues that a state’s conception of 
interest is bound up with a socially created identity that is causally prior to 
interests. That proposition is not dissimilar to the thesis’s use of ideology as a 
determinant of perceived interest. Wendt, however, focuses on shared 
understandings between states in the international arena, while this thesis opts to 
focus on the national tradition of foreign policymaking of a single state, i.e. the 
USA.54 More radical critical thinkers, such as Campbell, have also argued that 
national identity, culturally produced and reproduced over time, exercises 
influence over foreign policy.55 To this extent, the thesis therefore overlaps with 
the critical approach, though in focusing on the construction of the concept of
53 On neorealism and its relationship with liberal critics, see Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its 
Critics
54 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, esp. pp. 224-245.
55 Campbell, Writing Security
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‘the international’ Campbell inquires a step deeper into the fundamentals of 
social philosophy than this thesis.
Within the national context, ideology takes operational meaning as the 
mechanism through which statesmen interpret the world themselves, and by 
means of which they subsequently explain and justify policy positions to other 
political actors and to the public. In order for policy to move forward in practice, 
leading statesman must mobilise a critical mass of assent on the part of political 
elites and the attentive segment of the mass public behind their particular 
construct of the national interest and the programme of action they argue is 
necessary to advance it. To put it another way, successful leaders -  at least in a 
context of democratic control -  need to bring the nation into accord with the 
fundamentals of their ideological outlook on foreign policy. The essential quality 
of this process of justification and consent in the political sphere means that 
ideology and its construction cannot consist purely in private intellectual 
reasoning on the part of the individual. Rather, it is a social entity, constructed in 
response to environmental considerations and used to build coalitions of political 
support, as well as to provide intellectual self-justification in the mind of its 
formulator.
Continuity and change in national ideology
Sometimes the role of ideology is to serve as the base of disagreement within a 
society, allowing for the articulation of divergent conceptions of the ‘national 
interest’. Different groups within a single nation may approach foreign policy 
with rival premises, reaching differing conclusions about good policy on that 
basis.56 But as well as identifying national division, the social analyst may also 
seek to identify ideological themes that have predominated with a degree of 
continuity throughout a nation’s history. There have been disagreements in the
56 For an interesting effort at the taxonomy of different ideological subgroups concerned with 
American foreign policy, see Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign 
Policy and How it Changed the World”, (New York; Routledge, 2002). His categories of 
Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian and Jacksonian are by now reasonably well known in the 
field.
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United States as in all nations at all times in history, yet it is still plausible to 
argue that there has been a dominant ideological framework supporting the 
nation’s approach to foreign policy and international affairs.57 In making the 
argument that the United States has embraced a form of liberal ideology averse 
to balance-of-power thinking, this thesis does just that.
It is, however, important to note clearly that this thesis is not aimed exclusively 
at identifying either continuity or change in American ideology. Rather, it is 
concerned with the manner in which necessary ideological change occurred, and 
the critical influence of the interaction between the demands of circumstance and 
the limits imposed by established ideological principle. Specifically, it argues 
that America’s modem ideological posture is best understood through reference 
to two things: First, the nation’s founding tradition of ideological separation from 
the European ‘balance of power’ system. Second, the manner in which 
America’s leaders -  especially Presidents (Theodore) Roosevelt, Wilson and 
Truman -  managed the country’s ideological transition to widespread 
international engagement. The result of their handling of that transition has been 
a particular approach to internationalism which treats American engagement with 
the international system as conditional upon the reform of international order, 
shunning balance-of-power realpolitik in favour of the pursuit of cooperative 
order based on the universalisation of American values and practices under US 
leadership. The central goal of the thesis is to argue that the predominant US 
ideology today is the product of the particular manner of the nation’s ideological 
transition from Founders’ Era detachment to 20th Century internationalism.
The relationship of national ideas and national circumstances, and the 
relevance of history
An essential premise of this thesis is that the ideological past is highly relevant to 
the present. Intuitively this seems sensible, and hopefully more rather than less so
57 Many of the schools of history described earlier seek to do just this. Beard, for example, argues 
that American foreign policy from the late 19th century on reflected the domination of a 
Hamiltonian conception o f ‘interest’ over a Jeffersonian one o f ‘nation’. Beard, Idea o f National 
Interest, op. cit.
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after reading the chapter thus far. It does carry within it, however, the implication 
that there can be traditions of foreign policy that are essentially national. This 
idea of ‘national character’ is a proposition that runs counter to a hard 
structuralist account of the international system.58
The debate over the appropriate level of analysis for understanding foreign 
policy is a sufficiently rancorous part of the discipline of IR that offering a 
definitive answer to the problem here would be too ambitious. In any case, the 
thesis itself uses history to construct an argument that national factors have been 
relevant; to seek to prove that point in this ground-laying first chapter, before the 
body of the thesis itself, would be to put the cart before the horse. At this stage 
all that can sensibly be done is to state assumptions explicitly. To that end, it 
should be noted that it is indeed the contention of this thesis that there is a 
particular ideological culture of foreign policy in the United States. The content 
of the thesis itself, it is hoped, goes some way towards supporting this 
contention.
This assertion of a national political culture of foreign policy overlaps with the 
broader debate within social science generally concerning the relationship 
between agency and structure, and its parallel counterpart debate over material 
versus ideational causes. Structurally oriented explanatory theories of IR are 
defined by their prioritisation of structure (the international system) over agency 
(on the part of states or individuals). They have also tended to minimise the 
causal power they accord to ideas, positing that material capabilities are the 
primary variable determining the structure’s operations. Lengthy discussion of 
the cascade of issues potentially raised by these debates is undesirable in a thesis 
not devoted primarily to that subject, but maximal clarity as to the assumptions 
on which this research has been based is wise.
58 Such theories, it is often said, for example that of Waltz, posit that states are interchangeable 
units, with no relevant behavioural consequences arising from differences in domestic politics or 
governmental philosophy. Whether any theorist actually does defend such a stark position -  
except in the manner that, say, an economist defends the notions of ‘rational man’ and ‘perfect 
information’: as factually inaccurate but useful modelling assumptions -  is a matter for debate.
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For the purpose of this enquiry, the thesis implicitly embraces the ‘structuration’ 
perspective advanced in the field of sociology, and later expanded to other fields, 
by Giddens.59 Under this framework, causal primacy is denied to either units or 
the whole they comprise. The ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of explanation are 
analysed as inextricably interwoven, yet neither capable of explaining the other 
entirely in its own terms. As applied to international politics, this model implies 
that the international system is comprised of units (states) whose actions 
collectively generate forces that then operate with a ‘life of their own’ at the 
macro level. Through the operation of these systemic forces, the system thus 
becomes causally influential on unit behaviour through the application of power 
and moral norms. The macro level, however, does not acquire comprehensive 
explanatory power over the units through this process. The system, having first 
been produced by state behaviour, is not fixed; it can change over time, 
influenced by changing practice on the part of units, even as the units continue to 
be influenced and constrained by existing structures. Efforts to explain change in 
international affairs cannot therefore be complete if they rely exclusively upon 
either the decisions of individual states bereft of context, or on the international 
system without relating that to the attitudes and behaviour of constituent states. 
Relying exclusively on either level for explanation involves one in a circular 
‘chicken and egg’ argument regarding cause and consequence, because each is 
meaningful only in interrelation with the other.
With regard to the specific argument of this thesis, this means with regard to the 
internal/external debate that causal supremacy is attributed neither to America’s 
international environment nor to its domestically generated political forces. 
Likewise, with regard to structure/agency, causal supremacy it is attributed 
neither to the spontaneous decisions of individual statesmen, nor is it accepted 
that those statesmen are channelled into an inescapably fixed course by the 
dominant ideological disposition of the nation as a whole. One can only properly 
understand the reasons for the ideological trajectory of the American nation, and 
its change over time by, appreciating both its national and international 
circumstances and the decisions made by its leaders in reaction to those
59 See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f  the Theory o f Structuration, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986). Giddens is a cited influence on the theory of Wendt.
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circumstances; by appreciating both the ideological principles and innovations 
constructed by particular American leaders and the pressures of pre-existing 
social ideological conviction within which they had to operate.
The thesis takes a similarly synthesis-oriented view of the interaction between 
material and ideational factors. It rejects the causally unidirectional, reductionist 
view that ideology is merely a superstructure determined entirely in content by 
material factors. Yet at the same time, the suggestion that ideological postures 
develop spontaneously in the intellectual realm and take social hold through 
mechanisms divorced from material circumstances seems implausible. Thus, the 
thesis asserts that the nation’s material circumstances and its ideology interact to 
produce national policy, and that efforts to grant exclusive causal power to one 
over the other are inherently misguided.60
Turning to actual thesis content, it is contended that an ideology regarding 
foreign affairs developed in the Founders’ Era that was the product in great part 
of the circumstances in which the nation found itself. This means both the 
international environment and the nation’s material resources. The ideology that 
resulted, however, though produced as a result of circumstances in one period, 
continued to exercise causal influence over the nation’s foreign policy thinking 
after those circumstances had changed. In time, the underlying shift in national 
circumstance -  most especially the great increase in American material wealth 
and power -  combined with events in the international system -  most importantly 
the World Wars -  to drive change in foreign policy. As a result, the nation’s 
dominant ideological posture had to change too, in order to adapt to new 
circumstances. The crucial point, however, is that the manner of that change and 
the ideology that resulted were not simply the product of the new national 
circumstances dictating course, but the product of interaction between those 
circumstances and pre-existing ideological principles. The narrative offered by
60 To take one example, the historical field is divided over whether the end of the Cold War with 
the fall of the Soviet Union was the product of ideational change or material collapse. To the 
extent that this is an interpretive debate over relative importance, this is of course legitimate. 
Explanation based on unidirectional causality, however, is not fruitful: by far the most plausible 
explanation is that the two intertwined inextricably. That is to say that the Soviet Union opened 
up to new ideas because it was faltering in its material strength, and it was faltering materially in 
large part because of the determined implementation of ideas at odds with reality.
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the thesis thus serves to illustrate the residual causal influence of ideas even as 
they are rendered outmoded by changes in the circumstances that originally 
sparked their construction.
In concluding this subsection, it may be wise to clear up one remaining question: 
how explicitly must statesmen refer to the thinkers and ideas of the past in order 
to legitimate this argument? The answer offered by this thesis is that the 
influence of historically prominent national ideologies need not be an entirely 
conscious affair in the minds of policymakers in order to make a sound argument 
for their relevance. This makes sense in light of the principles already outlined 
concerning national culture, and the definition of ideology as an evolving body 
of social understanding. In dealing with the US we have a particularly good case 
for arguing that ideological influence has transmitted from past to present. As 
Hunt notes, the nation has known remarkable political stability and continuity 
through its history. As a result, there has been a relatively stable ideological 
environment in which political understandings have been transmitted down the 
generations through multiple rhetorical tropes and touchstones. This means that 
actors within US politics are, by virtue of their very presence in that context, 
steeped in inherited ideology. When it comes to assessing the impact of history in 
ideological policymaking, it is therefore legitimate to move beyond merely 
identifying explicit historical allusions in the speeches of public figures, though 
in a historically self-conscious society such as the United States there is no 
shortage of those. A president need not quote Woodrow Wilson in his speeches, 
for example, for it a sound argument to be made he is operating on the basis of 
Wilsonian ideas about international affairs. A figure such as Wilson has been 
sufficiently integral to the evolution of American foreign policy as to contribute 
to the intellectual framework inherited by all policymakers, whether or not they 
are personally familiar in depth with his life and words.61 Such is the nature of 
ideology, as outlined above, that its transmission from past eras is as often 
implicit as explicit.
61 Vis-a-vis US foreign policy, this is true of someone such as Wilson in a way that it would not 
be true of, to choose a random example, Plutarch, without expending considerably greater effort 
to prove the reality of the alleged influence. It is intuitively obvious that a suggestion of influence 
through culture and tradition becomes increasingly tenuous the more distant the figure in question 
becomes in time, place and topic of focus from the actors he or she is alleged to have influenced.
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The usefulness of public statements as evidence
The major sources of evidence used to support the argument of this thesis include 
private documents reflecting the views of the leaders selected for focus, and 
public statements made by those leaders. This is drawn from published 
collections of speeches, public pronouncements, and private and public letters, as 
well as certain key papers drawn from presidential archives. In addition, the 
interpretations offered here of individuals’ and administrations’ views are 
supported by a balanced portfolio of secondary historical and biographical 
literature, a first-hand sifting of all relevant primary sources over such a broad 
sweep of time being impractical.
There are self-evident criticisms to be made of an approach that accords 
substantial interpretive weight to public pronouncement are self-evident, and 
these have been noted by Hunt among other. There are sometimes differences 
between what political actors believe privately and what they find it expedient to 
say to the mass public. Nevertheless, when focusing specifically on ideology -  as 
opposed, for example, to bureaucratic politics -  there are sound arguments that 
public material still represents appropriate source material. As defined above, 
ideology is a form of socially instrumental thought, not a matter of purely private 
mental construction. It encompasses the shared assumptions and understandings 
held by both political elites and the public, of which policymakers make use in 
order to secure the support necessary to enable the formation and implementation 
of policy. Hence statements made in public or semi-public forums at the very 
least give insight into these shared understandings, even if not into the private 
thoughts of the speaker.
There is reason to suppose that individual statesmen are often generally broadly 
sincere in the ideological framework they offer for their policies at a grand
62 The distinction between public and private letters is blurred in the case of early American 
political leaders, as letter-writing was often a means for a politician to disseminate his thoughts 
more widely than the specified addressee.
63 Hunt, pp. 15-17
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strategic level.64 This should not be surprising, given that leaders are themselves 
produced from within the same society in which the public’s shared ideological 
understandings are inculcated. Even if  we assume a degree of insincerity, 
however, this does not render public statements meaningless. In choosing to 
outline their perspective in the terms that they do, political leaders themselves 
reinforce the reality of the socially ingrained ideology to which they tailor their 
words. Further, by invoking shared ideological principles to justify policy, actors 
thereby constrain themselves to within the reasonable limits of what those 
avowed principles permit. While all students of politics are aware that principles 
are often stretched in practice, or set aside when secrecy permits, it is equally 
true that once a principled justification has been presented for a policy, that 
policy cannot be cast aside publicly without political consequence. At the very 
least, brazen inconsistency draws serious criticism, and a government’s very 
survival can be threatened by total breakdown between policy as implemented 
and its declared basis in ideological principle.65
Policymakers and their successors are thus to some degree bound by views 
previously publicly propounded, both by themselves by their predecessors, if 
those predecessors have done so with sufficient frequency to establish a lasting 
tradition. Disavowal of or disregard for previously ingrained public 
understandings is a difficult process, necessarily gradual in the implementation 
and not guaranteed success even then. Thus leaders are constrained by 
ideological parameters even as they seek to use them to mobilise support.
The idea that ideology sets ‘parameters’ is important: ideology does not 
determine the decisions statesmen make in a narrow sense, but it does construct a 
framework of limits within which they must operate. Lieven, describing his own 
work on American nationalism, sums it up well with regard to his own work: “As 
a study of political culture and its historical origins, this... is not intended to
64 For example, Draper’s relatively critical biography of George W. Bush suggests that there is 
not much distinction between what the president personally believed and what he said in his 
speeches. Robert Draper, Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush, (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 2007)
65 Witness the immense political costs to the Bush administration of sustaining the practices of 
detention without trial and ‘harsh interrogation’ of prisoners while simultaneously pursuing a 
rhetorical strategy that emphasises liberty and condemns torture.
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provide a detailed explanation of particular events or decisions, any more than a 
study of Russian or German nationalism is intended to set out the immediate 
reasons why the Tsar or the Kaiser took the steps they did in July and August of 
1914. Rather, such studies try to provide the ideological and cultural context 
which made such decisions possible.”66 That is what this thesis seeks to achieve.
Ideology is not fixed within a nation’s collective mind, and it can be varied over 
time through the application of persuasive leadership and -  at least as important 
-  as a result of changes in national circumstances, domestic and external. 
However, crucially for the argument of this thesis, this change simply cannot 
take the form of the abrupt and wholesale discarding of existing ideological 
understandings. Even radical leaders such as Wilson, on whose ideological 
innovations a chapter of this thesis focuses, must explain how the place towards 
which they seek to take the nation relates to the history from which the nation 
has emerged. In the process of this sort of transition, the ideology of the past 
exercises sizeable influence over the present, and the way in which leaders 
manage ideological transition has consequences for the parameters within which 
future policy may be created.
Justification of the periods under study
The choice of periods is justified briefly in the Introduction, but a few more 
words may be appropriate here. In a work taking the longue duree of US history 
as its subject, some periods must of necessity be prioritised over others. Why, 
then, these periods and not others? The answer is that the periods chosen 
represent key junctures in the formation of American ideological attitudes 
towards international affairs at the grand strategic level.
The first period chosen for study is the ‘Founders’ Era’, encompassing the period 
from the establishment of the US Constitution through to the proclamation of the 
Monroe Doctrine. This period is key because it saw the new nation develop an
66 Lieven, p.2
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identity as an international actor for the first time, and lay its foundational 
tradition of hostility to accepting the ‘balance of power’ as a basis for 
international order. The thesis argument is that the particular form of American 
internationalism that evolved in the twentieth century was a result of manner in 
which the ideological transition from this foundational tradition was managed. 
Only by setting out in detail what that founding ideology was, and the context in 
which it came about can the thesis properly succeed in its analysis.
The next two cases, which go together to constitute a complementary pair of
t f ianalyses covering overlapping periods, are located in the crucial early 20 
century. This was a key period of change, when the growth of US material 
strength and shifts in the international system prompted a transition to greater 
international engagement. These chapters present detailed studies of the foreign 
policy thinking of presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and the 
manner in which they made the ideological case for this transition. The way these 
leaders explained events to the nation, and sought to persuade it to embrace a 
new global role, profoundly affected America’s attitude towards international 
order in ways that continued to resonate almost a century later. Roosevelt’s 
contribution centred on the importance of international activism, military 
strength, and a commitment to the advance of ‘civilisation’ and ‘national 
greatness’ that was tinged with imperialism. Wilson, to whom international 
circumstances afforded more opportunity to pursue radical reform of 
international order, contributed a vision of the replacement of the ‘balance of 
power’ with a cooperation-based new world order. Through this vision, he forged 
a lasting ideological link between American international engagement and the 
pursuit of liberal universalist objectives.
The fourth period is that of the early Cold War, specifically the years of the 
Truman administration. This period is key because it represented the final 
acceptance on the part of the United States, after wavering during the inter-war 
years, of a comprehensive US commitment to the maintenance of global order. 
Ideologically, this took the form not only of accepting an unprecedented global 
military burden, but also insisting on America’s need to press a global agenda of 
liberal universalism concerning political and economic values and practices.
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National and international circumstances during this period sparked not only a 
revival of Wilson’s ideas regarding international commitment and liberal 
universalism, but also -  due chiefly to the perceived external threat presented by 
the Soviet Union -  a rethinking of American attitudes to the accumulation of 
great military strength in peacetime. In this period the United States could in 
principle have embraced European-style ideas concerning the maintenance of 
order through the ‘balance of power’. It could also have conceived of its national 
objectives, as realism prescribes, as the pursuit simply of maximal power for 
itself in an inherently competitive system of legitimate rivalry between states. It 
did not do so, despite the fact that the post-WWII international environment in 
many ways presented the perfect opportunity. Demonstrating this point, and 
drawing the connection between Truman’s strategic choices and the thesis’s 
overall narrative, is necessary to pre-empt the suggestion that the Cold War 
might serve as a counterexample to the argument that the US has resisted 
balance-of-power ideology at key moments of change and decision.
This thesis is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of American foreign 
policy history. It presents an argument about the importance of certain key 
moments of ideological change to the evolution of subsequent strategic 
principles. No snub is therefore intended to periods not chosen for detailed 
attention. All periods of US history are to some degree relevant to the topic of 
this thesis, and the argument is intended to hold when applied to periods beyond 
those focused upon here. But it is crucial in writing a thesis, especially one 
already very broad in scope, not to attempt to do so much as to in the end achieve 
nothing. The thesis should be assessed not on the comprehensiveness of its 
narrative, but on the coherence of its argument, and the compatibility of that 
argument with the evidence.
Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to locate the thesis with regard to the IR and History 
literatures, and to demonstrate the underlying theoretical soundness of the 
enquiry undertaken. In so doing it has made it clear its affinity with some central
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aspects of classical and neoclassical realist analysis. In particular, it takes 
realism’s account of a balance-of-power approach to international order and sets 
it as its task to explain America’s historical refusal to approach its foreign policy 
strategy in the way that the normative component of realism prescribes. It 
accepts realism’s argument that growth in a nation’s material strength and 
changes in its international context have consequences for the way it conceives 
of its interests and its foreign policy. It also argues that the international 
environment is not sufficient to explain national behaviour, but that the latter 
must be understood as the result of interaction between that environment and 
factors emanating from within the nation itself. In particular, it argues that the 
national ideological tradition of the United States, evolved over time, has played 
an influential role in the way the nation has reacted to changes in its national and 
international context.
In placing this emphasis on the role of ideology, the thesis shares some ground 
with moderate constructivist approaches to international relations. In accepting 
the role that the domestic constitution of the state plays in foreign policy, the 
thesis shares some ground with liberalism. Its interest in liberalism, however, lies 
not primarily in assessing the truth of liberalism’s theoretical propositions per se, 
but in accounting for the emergence of liberal universalism as the dominant 
ideology guiding US foreign policy. With some similarity, the thesis is sceptical 
as to the claims of the ‘empire school’ that the US has as, a matter of fact, 
constituted itself as an imperial power, but is nevertheless interested in studying 
the imperialistic features of the liberalism that it does believes has guided its 
strategic thought.
In seeking to explain what it does, this thesis proposes that much of the 
explanation for the way ‘America’ thinks lies in the study of its national history. 
Part of this explanation is the story of America’s material rise as a great power, 
and then as a superpower. Another part, however, is the emergence on the basis 
of that rise of a particular American brand of internationalism that rejected 
balance-of-power thinking, embraces liberal universalism, and makes US 
engagement with international affairs contingent upon pursuit of this reformist 
international agenda. The thesis tells the story of how this ideology emerged as a
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result of interaction over time between America’s circumstances and its leaders’ 
ideas, between the embedded principles created by past national context and the 
demands made by a new context. It is the story of how some of America’s 
greatest leaders constructed for the benefit of the American people, and were 
themselves convinced by, a narrative that asserted a rising America need not take 
its place in the ‘balance of power’ order Europeans had created, but could build a 
new world order based on its own liberal principles. Like any piece of self-aware 
analysis, it cannot claim to provide the whole of the truth, nor to be the last word 
on the subject. But the account that it provides does, it is hoped, contribute 
something of significance to the understanding of the United States and its 
actions.
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2. The Founders’ Era Consensus
‘A Hercules in the Cradle’ 67
Introduction
The American states became independent in 1776 or 1783, depending on whether 
one adopts the American or the British perspective. They did so in substantial 
part due international factors, in two senses. First, the push by the colonies’ 
residents for independence was spurred by a tax dispute stemming from the 
funding of wars to secure and expand the British colonial position in North 
America, the most proximate being the Seven Years War (1756-63). Though 
keen on the idea of expanding their holdings on the continent at the expense of 
the French and their Indian allies, and willing to contribute to the fighting itself, 
the colonists bridled at ‘taxation without representation’ and the wider issue of 
British control over American destiny it symbolised. There was thus a line of 
causation between the Franco-British wars in North America and the split
Aftbetween Britain and its colonies.
The second international factor, arising after the outbreak of armed conflict, was 
France’s support for the American fight for independence. Spurred by its broader 
agenda of rivalry with Britain in the European and global arenas, France signed a 
treaty of alliance with the Americans in February 1778, after the colonists’ 
victory at Saratoga had signalled the viability of their independence project. This 
broadened the War of Independence into an international conflict, providing the 
Americans with crucial French military support, while simultaneously diverting 
British resources to other theatres where the hostility of France, and its ally 
Spain, might pose a threat. It is therefore accurate to say that American
67 Phrase from Alexander Hamilton, To George Washington, April 1794, Hamilton, p.813
68 The basic historical narrative providing background for this chapter comes most notably from 
Maldwyn A. Jones, The Limits o f Liberty: American History 1607-1980, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983); Alexander DeConde, A History o f American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Scribner, 1963).
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independence owed a good deal to the operation of the European balance of
69power.
This chapter begins its analysis immediately after the states’ attainment of 
independence, when the newly free Americans had to define their states’ 
relationships with each other, and their collective relationship with the world. 
The former question was ultimately resolved with the creation of the Union, a 
project justified in significant part by arguments pointing to international 
relations. The US then faced a series of challenges in its relationship with the 
international system, most especially (a) how to manage diplomacy with its 
embittered former colonial master, Britain, (b) how to react to revolutionary 
turmoil in France, which sparked a colossal cycle of war in Europe and beyond, 
and (c) how, once it had been decided to attempt to do so, to maintain US 
neutrality in the midst of a global war centred on Franco-British enmity. Having 
survived this period of international instability, the United States then laid the 
basis for its policy through the remainder of the 19th Century with the 
proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in December 1823.
The chapter argues that the founding leaders of the United States made decisions 
that by and large reflected a reasonable interpretation of the national interest 
given the national and international context. What emerged was, first, Union 
between the American states, then -  after some debate -  a bipartisan policy of 
detached non-entanglement with regard to European rivalries, and ultimately a 
spheres-of-influence demarcation of global authority in the form of Monroe’s 
pronouncement. It should be made clear that the argument of this chapter is not 
that the Founders’ Era represented a period of policy entirely at odds with a 
realist reading of foreign policy, which centres on the prioritisation of power and
69 For detailed interpretive discussion of the international dimension of America’s early politics, 
see Jay Winik, The Great Upheaval: America and the Birth o f the Modern World, 1788-1800 
(New York: Harper, 2007). Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World 
from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2006), pp. 1-180; Michael Lind, The American Way o f Strategy, (Oxford: OUP, 2006). The latter 
two authors both take an interest in the ideological issues that are the chief interest of this thesis, 
but they disagree on the importance of moralistic interventionism. Lind considers Kagan’s work 
to be neoconservative propaganda. See Lind, ‘Dangerous History’, Prospect, 140, Nov 2007, 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/dangerous history 6238 [accessed 
19/06/08]
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• 70interests and the importance of capabilities and national circumstances. What 
this chapter does argue is that the national and international circumstances of the 
early United States invited its leaders to resolve their founding policy choices not 
by conscious and explicit engagement with the global balance of power but by 
withdrawal from it into a local theatre in which the US itself was increasingly 
unrivalled. Within North America, the United States resolved the problem of 
potential power rivalries through Union, thus abolishing the independent co­
existence of sovereign entities that might have necessitated the armed rivalry of 
interests in an anarchical setting -  in essence, a ‘balance of power’ as 
International Relations traditionally understands the term. In relation to the rest 
of the world, Americans’ agreed resolution was exclusion of Europeans from the 
Americas and a strict taboo against American involvement in European alliances.
The chapter suggests that while these solutions were realistic responses to the 
circumstances faced by the United States in this period, they were justified 
ideologically in a way that intellectually ‘removed’ the United States from the 
global theatre. In the process they obviated the need for America to conceptualise 
its international role as one of operation within a competitive system of states 
pursuing rival interests: in shorthand, the European/global ‘balance of power’. 
The language used to set out US policy advanced the idea that American 
interests, and the values underpinning them, were not in competition with those 
of the European states that made up the core of the international system, but 
rather that they were essentially separate from them. Thus, the Founders’ Era, 
while generating ostensibly realistic policy on its own terms, also laid the 
ideological foundations for an American school of policy thought that would last 
a good deal longer, and that would militate against subsequent American 
engagement with the world on balance-of-power terms.
The chapter assembles this argument in the following sequential steps. First, it 
establishes the national and international context in which the Founders operated.
70 Morgenthau, among others, has made a plausible case that the Founders pursued a policy that 
was, in its essentials at least, realistic, meaning a rational course given American capabilities and 
international context. See Hans J. Morgethau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination, 
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1952), pp. 1-39. See also Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The 
Revolutionary Generation, (New York: Vintage, 2002), esp. pp. 120-160.
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Second, it makes the case that the Union itself was the product of aversion to 
looking to ‘the balance of power’ as a basis for international order. Third, it 
analyses in some detail the early foreign policy problems faced by the United 
States as a result of the operation of the European balance of power. Fourth, it 
then shows how what it calls ‘Founders’ Era consensus’ on foreign policy 
emerged, settling earlier disputes between rival political leaders through 
agreement around the principles of separation and non-entanglement. Finally, it 
shows that the Monroe Doctrine then established the principles of this consensus 
on a hemispheric scale, setting the course for US foreign policy for decades to 
come. These sections combine to show that avoiding participation in the balance- 
of-power system of global order, an objective aided by geography, was central to 
the foundational foreign policy of the United States.
National and international context
The United States was bom large but not strong. Americans had won 
independence not by equalling the British in wealth or military capability -  
though they did achieve notable battlefield successes at Saratoga and Yorktown -  
but through a mixture of attrition, foreign support and superior staying power. 
Once independent, the states were not, strategically speaking, in a position of any 
great strength: though there was little likelihood they could ever be re­
subjugated, they remained vulnerable to military and economic pressure from 
more powerful European states. Britain retained a presence on in North America 
through its ownership of Canada, and also through a series of military outposts 
within what was on paper US territory, de facto possession of which it retained 
for some years after American independence. To the west, Spain’s ownership of 
the Louisiana territory, though less daunting than the British presence, 
nevertheless presented a potential source of vulnerability.
The international system of the 1780s was dominated by European powers. 
Indeed, through their development of the modem ‘state’ itself these European 
nations were the creators of much of the ‘international system’ as subsequent 
thinkers have understood it. The most significant powers were Britain and
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France, with a weakening Spain also a significant force. In the east, Russia had 
steadily risen in power and prominence, attaining the status of great power within 
the European system. Between France and Russia lay Austria, as well as several 
lesser powers including the Netherlands and the precursors of the German state.
All the greatest powers of Europe were monarchies of one form or another, 
•though with some variation in what that meant in practice, ranging from the 
British king’s relative accountability to elected institutions to the autocratic 
tsarism of Russia. These states competed with one another for power -  meaning a 
mixture of territory, treasure and control -  through frequent wars. These wars 
took place in Europe itself and also on other continents, the fighting sometimes 
done by colonists and other proxies, as in the conflicts between Britain and 
France in North America. To the inhabitants of the newly independent America, 
therefore, European politics was associated chiefly with two things: monarchy 
and war, a perception that was not altogether unfair. The European balance of 
power was viewed as an amoral -  perhaps even immoral -  mechanism through 
which kings and tyrants fought bloody conflicts of self-interest
American independence was based upon a significant challenge to monarchical 
legitimacy, asserting an extensive programme of rights possessed by individuals 
even in their dealings with a king. This was, of course, a challenge to one of the 
pillars of the European order, one of the reasons why the British were keen to 
resist it. The monarchical basis of European order was disturbed again, more 
grievously, in 1789 with the commencement of the French Revolution, which 
brought with it a long and vicious cycle of wars throughout the European 
continent itself. The story of US foreign policy in the Founders’ Era is one of 
how it dealt with the old, established European order, the putative new order 
announced by the French Revolution, and the war between the proponents of 
each to gain the upper hand. It is thus, in short, the story of how Americans 
sought to manage their relationship to the European balance of power.
Prior to the question of how the United States might relate to Europe, however, 
was that of how the states should relate to one another. From independence until 
1788-89 they operated under the Articles of Confederacy. The central authority
66
established under the Articles, the Congress, struggled to offer coherent 
government due to a shortage of powers. Specifically, it could not legislate 
directly for individuals, levy direct taxes or regulate trade. For funds it relied on 
requisitions from state governments. The thirteen states each possessed a single 
vote, with nine required for approval of important matters such as treaties, and 
amendments to the Articles themselves requiring unanimity. Such constraints 
reflected the intention at the time of the Articles’ formulation that the states 
should retain their “sovereignty, freedom and independence”. The arrangement 
was in effect, as the man who drafted the Articles described it, more “a firm 
league of friendship” than a true union.71
Such a set-up produced predictable weakness of central authority. Demands for 
money from state governments often went unheeded. Preoccupied with local 
affairs, the states neglected to appoint representatives to Congress promptly, and 
as a result it met irregularly and unproductively. The nation’s weightier political 
figures gravitated to state governments, where real power lay. In the absence of 
revenue, the debts of the recent war went unpaid, and America’s overseas credit 
rating sank. Worse, it became clear that the national authority was not competent 
to quell civil disorder, relying instead on the loosely coordinated efforts of state 
militias. Shays’ Rebellion, a revolt against debt collection by farmers in 
Massachusetts in 1786-87, led many to fear a breakdown of basic order. These 
fears were intertwined with a sense of vulnerability to threats from abroad. In 
retaining its fortified posts within the northwestern border of the US, Britain 
cited as justification America’s failure to enforce debts owed by Americans to 
British subjects. London also imposed severe restrictions on American trade with 
the British Empire, aiming to impart a retrospective lesson on the benefits of 
imperial inclusion. The central government’s inability to enforce the payment of 
the debts even if it chose to, or to retaliate economically against Britain’s slights, 
reinforced the perception of impotence.
It was in this context that the movement for a new constitution arose. Two of the 
most significant actors were Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, whose
71 John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, quoted in Jones, p.64.
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backgrounds could scarcely have been more different. Hamilton was an outsider 
and upstart: an illegitimate boy from the West Indies who had propelled himself 
up into the American elite through service as George Washington’s wartime 
aide-de-camp and a good marriage into New York society. Notable for 
administrative flair, bountiful mental energy and an argumentative streak, by the 
mid-1780s he was making a reputation for himself in Congress and the New 
York Assembly.72 Madison, by contrast, was the scion of a line of Virginia 
planters needing nothing on the scale of Hamilton’s luck and self-promotion to 
get ahead. Still, he too had found himself during the Revolution, having been 
drifting unenthusiastically towards the law before it. He spent it not on the 
battlefield but as an elected representative, becoming acquainted in the process 
with Thomas Jefferson, who was a few years older and became a mentor of sorts. 
Madison shared with Hamilton a gift for the written word, a mastery of detail and 
a formidable work ethic. But while the adoptive New Yorker was a natural 
executive, the Virginian’s talents were more those of a parliamentarian. No great 
orator, Madison nevertheless built a reputation as a quiet but relentlessly logical 
debater who could extract results from assemblies.73
Hamilton and Madison played indispensable roles in bringing about the new 
constitution. First, their efforts were instrumental in engineering a full-scale 
constitutional convention at Philadelphia in 1787 out of a loose mandate to revise 
the Articles. Madison’s ‘Virginia plan’ then served as the starting point for 
designing a federal government with the powers to levy direct taxes, regulate 
trade, and raise armed forces. Finally, each then put in a heroic performance at
72 For biographical information on Hamilton and his ideas I base myself on: Ron Chemow, 
Alexander Hamilton, (New York, Penguin Press, 2004); Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton: 
A Concise Biography, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Marie B. Hecht, Odd 
Destiny: The Life o f Alexander Hamilton, (New York: Macmillan, 1982). On foreign policy 
specifically: Gilbert Lycan, Alexander Hamilton & American Foreign Policy, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1970); John Lamberton Harper, American Machiavelli: Alexander 
Hamilton and the Origins o f U.S. Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). My representation of his views is also based on primary sources, namely Alexander 
Hamilton, Writings, (New York: Library of America, 2001). The above are on the whole 
sympathetic to Hamilton; for a more critical perspective see especially the biographers of 
Jefferson. Hamilton is often cast in dichotomous contrast with Jefferson as a defender of elitism 
and moneyed capitalism, notably in Claude G. Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton: the Struggle for 
Democracy in America (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Riverside Press, 1925).
73 See Irving Brant, The Fourth President: A Life o f James Madison, (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswood, 1970), and, for primary materials, James Madison, Writings, (New York: Library of 
America, 1999).
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the special assemblies elected in their respective home states to consider the 
Constitution, turning around hostile majorities led by powerful local figures to 
deliver ratification. In the course of this battle for a ‘yes’ vote, the pair 
collaborated on The Federalist Papers, a series of pseudonymous pamphlets 
published first in New York then more widely, setting out the catechism of 
arguments in favour of the Constitution. The judiciary and others have since used 
arguments contained therein as a window into the Founders’ intentions. In no 
small part, the rationale presented in the arguments of The Federalist was 
founded in ideological propositions concerning foreign policy and the 
international system. More specifically, the Union’s architects argued for it as a 
means of avoiding the replication of Europe’s balance of power system in 
America
The Union as a means of excluding the balance ofpower system
Rightly or wrongly, the Founders considered the wars that had afflicted North 
America prior to independence to be something inflicted upon them by British 
rule: the tie to Britain, they argued, had dragged them into the workings of 
European power rivalry, contrary to Americans’ own interests.74 Independence 
was a chance to be free of this kind of warfare, but attaining that objective would 
require keeping the states together. If the dysfunctional order provided by the 
Articles faltered, the states might fragment into regional confederacies.
Hamilton, Madison and their fellow ‘federalist’ campaigners held up the spectre 
of this outcome as the likely consequence of rejecting the proposed new Union. 
Co-existence of separate confederacies, they argued, would inevitably generate 
conflict. Just as in Europe, rivalries over commerce and power would sow 
discord, which politicians might then inflame into war. Further, a divided 
America could be manipulated by outside powers, worsening instability. Thus, 
the failure of the Union would result in the replication, in even more unstable 
form, of the European balance of power.
74 See Kagan, Dangerous Nation, pp.7-38 for dissent from this national self-image.
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Jefferson missed the Philadelphia convention due to a diplomatic posting in 
Paris, but in later reflection he provided a neat summary of the case for Union. 
The Articles, he said, had been “found insufficient, as treaties of alliance 
generally are, to enforce compliance”. But if the wartime bond were to expire 
and “each state to become sovereign and independent in all things”, he argued,
“it could not but occur to everyone that these separate independencies, like the 
petty States of Greece, would be eternally at war with each other, & would 
become at length the mere partisans and satellites of the leading powers of 
Europe.”75
Jefferson’s retrospective analysis matched what Hamilton was arguing even 
before independence was won. In 1781, still only in his mid-20s, Hamilton was 
warning in newspapers of internecine strife in the absence of strong union. 
“Political societies, in close neighbourhood, must either be strongly united under 
one government, or there will infallibly exist emulations and quarrels,” he 
argued, a fact which flowed from “human nature”. As some American states 
grew “populous, rich and powerful”, he noted, this would “inspire ambition and 
nourish ideas of separation and independence”. Though it would be “their true 
interest to preserve the union”, they would likely be led by “vanity and self- 
importance” to “place themselves at the head of particular confederacies 
independent of the general one”:
A schism once introduced, competitions o f  boundary and rivalships o f  commerce 
will easily afford pretexts for war. European powers may have inducements for 
fomenting these divisions and playing us o ff against each other... The particular 
confederacies, leaguing themselves with rival nations, will naturally be involved in 
their disputes; into which they will be the more readily tempted by the hope o f  
making acquisitions upon each other, and upon the colonies o f  the powers with 
whom they are respectively at enmity.76
75 The Anas, 1791-1806, Feb 4, 1818, in Thomas Jefferson, Writings, (New York: Library of 
America, 1984), p.663.
76 The Continentalist No. Ill, Aug 9, 1781, Hamilton, pp. 101-2.
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Madison expressed such anxieties similarly early. Without an empowered central 
government, he told the Continental Congress in 1783, relations between the 
states would be poisonous. Minutes record his ominous prediction of how events 
would then unfold:
.. .The consequence would be a rupture o f the Confederacy. The Eastern States 
would at sea be powerful & rapacious, the South opulent and weak... Reprisals 
would be instituted. Foreign aid would be called in first by the weaker, then by 
the stronger side; & finally both made subservient to the wars & politics of 
Europe.77
Both Hamilton and Madison hoped for a time that the existing Congress might be 
successfully exhorted to show the requisite energy, but soon concluded that the 
structural barriers to strong central action were insurmountable so long as the 
Articles remained in force. “[T]he present system neither has nor deserves 
advocates,” Madison concluded, “and if some very strong props are not applied 
will quickly tumble to the ground.” Unless something was done soon, he warned: 
“The bulk of the people will probably prefer.. .a partition of the Union into three 
more practicable and energetic Governments”. Though “a lesser evil” than 
monarchy, he wrote, fragmentation was “so great a one that I hope the danger of 
it will rouse all the real friends of the Revolution to exert themselves in favour of 
such an organisation of the Confederacy, as will perpetuate the Union, and
no
redeem the honor of the Republican name.”
At Philadelphia, he touched again on the theme of inevitable destructive rivalry 
between the states if independent. Seeking to convince the representatives of 
smaller states that their interests would be safer under a strong union, he warned 
them that under an anarchical order they would likely be caught in the crossfire 
of large-state rivalries:
Among individuals o f superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships [are] 
much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent nations, pre-eminent
77 Continental Congress, Feb 21, 1783, Madison, pp.19-20, footnote.
78 To Edmund Pendleton, Feb 24, 1787, Madison, pp.62-3.
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over their neighbours, the same remark [is] verified. Carthage and Rome tore one 
another to pieces instead o f uniting their forces to devour the weaker nations o f  
the earth. The Houses o f Austria & France were hostile as long as they remained 
the greatest powers o f Europe. England & France have succeeded to the pre­
eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we perhaps owe our liberty.. .79
These arguments reveal realist assumptions on the part of both Madison and 
Hamilton, regarding international behaviour.80 Both were sceptical as to the 
possibility of peaceful cooperation between nations in the absence of some 
higher authority. Only through Union could America’s states coexist peacefully. 
The alternative was a balance of power analogous to Europe’s, and that, history 
taught, meant regular war.
In the campaign for ratification, Hamilton used several early Federalist Papers to 
make this realist case for the Union. Striking a pessimistic moral tone, he 
attributed the inevitability of clash between disunited states to the fundamental 
drives of men and nations, incapable of living peacefully side-by-side without a 
higher power to maintain order. A man would have to be “far gone in Utopian 
speculations,” he noted, to doubt that a disunited America in “partial 
confederacies”, would see “frequent and violent contests”:
To presume a want o f motives for such contests as an argument against their
existence would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.
To look for a continuation o f harmony between a number o f independent
unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to
disregard the uniform course o f human events, and to set at defiance the
81accumulated experience o f ages.
“The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable,” he argued, including 
“the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion -  the jealousy of 
power, or the desire of equality and safety” as well as “the rivalships and
79 Federal Convention, 1787, Madison, pp.l 13-14.
80 Indeed, Morgenthau quotes Hamilton approvingly and at length in his seminal realist critique 
of US foreign policy. See Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy, pp. 14-18.
81 FederalistNo.6, Nov 14, 1787, Hamilton, pp. 176-77.
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competitions of commerce between commercial nations” and “others... which 
take their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, 
interests, hopes and fears of leading individuals of the communities of which
o 9
they are members.” Thus, the “inducements” for American states to make war 
would be “precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, 
deluged in blood all the nations of the world.”83
Thus, Hamilton’s case to the voting public was that relying on reason and 
goodwill to guarantee peace was dangerous. His darker vision did not suggest 
that nations, or indeed people, were necessarily inherently malevolent, but that 
they were jealous guards of their power, and would seek opportunities to expand 
it. While there was “nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or 
alliance between independent nations”, such ties were “subject to the usual 
vicissitudes of war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or 
passions of the contracting powers dictate.” Though such arrangements had 
periodically sprung up in Europe, the “fondly hoped for benefits.. .were never 
realised”. Despite the complex multiple alliances Europeans formed with “a 
view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the 
world”, he observed, “they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving 
an instructive lesson to mankind about how little dependence is to be placed on 
treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith; and 
which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any 
immediate interest and passion.”84
One could also point, he noted, to America’s own experience with the Articles of 
Confederacy. Optimists had predicted that there would be compliance with 
federal authority because “a sense of common interest would preside over the 
conduct of the respective members”. Yet the Articles’ ineffectuality in practice 
had shown that such optimism “betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by 
which human conduct is actuated”. The reason for domestic government was that 
“the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,
82 Ibid.
83 FederalistNo.7, Nov 17, 1787, Hamilton, p i83.
84 Federalist No. 15, Dec 1, 1787, Hamilton, p.221-2.
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without constraint.” “Has it been found that bodies of men act with more 
rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? .. .The contrary of this has 
been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind.”:
There is in the nature o f sovereign power an impatience o f control, that disposes
those who are invested with the exercise o f it, to look with an evil eye upon all
external attempts to restrain or direct its operations.... [I]n every political
association which is formed upon the principle o f uniting in a common interest a
number o f lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind o f excentric tendency
. . .  Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy o f that
85power by which it is controlled and abridged.
Such ruminations on the nature of men and states offered ample basis for 
pessimism. But the clinching factor was the strategic presence of Europe. These 
hostile and potent states stood ready to foster discord between the Americans as a 
means of advancing their own interests. “America, if not connected at all, or only 
by the feeble tie of a simple league offensive and defensive,” Hamilton argued, 
“would by the operation of.. .opposite and jarring alliances be gradually 
entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars... Divide
O /L
et impera must be the motto of every nation that either hates, or fears us.”
Thus, disunion would bring ruin to America’s interests. Secure union, on the 
other hand, offered America unique opportunities given its geographical 
advantages. “If we are wise enough to preserve the Union,” he predicted
.. .we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that o f an insulated situation. 
Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity are too much 
disproportioned in strength, to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. 
Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our 
security.87
85 Federalist No. 15, Dec 1, 1787, Hamilton, pp.223,224
86 Federalist No. 7, Nov 17, 1787, Hamilton, p. 189
87 Federalist No. 8, Nov 20, 1787, Hamilton, p. 194-5
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Madison echoed this thought when he argued in Federalist 41 that the United 
States, distant from “the powerful nations of the world”, could enjoy the same 
“happy security” Britain had from Europe by virtue of being an island. Without 
union, however, it would suffer both “the miseries springing from her internal 
jealousies”, and also “plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that 
relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other 
quarter of the earth bears to Europe.”88
Madison and Hamilton were both nationalists, and as such there was also a 
strong strain of concern for national dignity in their writings, reflecting their fear 
that without union the disorganised confederacy of states risked contempt in the 
eyes of foreigners. In 1778, Hamilton wrote a letter of remarkable self- 
confidence -  he was in his early twenties and a mere lieutenant colonel in the 
Continental army -  to Governor George Clinton of New York to lambaste him 
and his fellow governors for damaging America’s reputation abroad through their 
disregard for the orders of Congress. “Realize to yourself,” he implored sharply, 
“the consequences of having a Congress despised at home and abroad”:
. . .  How can we hope for success in our European negotiations, if  the nations of 
Europe have no confidence in the wisdom and vigor, o f the great Continental 
Government? This is the object on which their eyes are fixed, hence it is America 
will derive importance or insignificance, in their estimation.”89
In his pamphleteering after leaving active service, he revisited the theme more 
publicly. “There is something noble and magnificent in the perspective of a great 
Federal Republic, closely linked in the pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and 
prosperous at home, respectable abroad,” he observed, “but there is something 
proportionally diminutive and contemptible in the prospect of a number of petty 
states, with only the appearance of union, jarring, jealous and perverse, without 
any determined-direction, fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and 
insignificant by their dissentions, in the eyes of other nations.”90
88 Federalist No. 41, Jan 19, 1788, Madison, p.229.
89 Letter to George Clinton, Feb 13, 1778, Hamilton, p.50.
90 The Continentalist No. VI, July 4, 1782, Hamilton, p. 118.
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Like many Americans of the time, Hamilton resented European attitudes towards 
his adopted homeland, and he aspired in the long run to force reconsideration on 
their part:
The superiority [Europe] has long maintained, has tempted her to plume herself 
as the Mistress o f the W orld... It belongs to us to vindicate the honor o f the 
human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation... Let Americans 
disdain to be the instruments o f European greatness! Let the thirteen States, 
bound together in a strict and indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great 
American system, superior to the control o f all trans-Atlantic force or influence, 
and be able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new 
world. 91
The significance of what has been said in this section for the overall argument of 
the thesis is twofold. First, the foundation of the Union was based to a significant 
extent upon a realistic approach to international relations. Presupposing states to 
be motivated by power and interest, it was concluded that war between 
Americans would be inevitable if a European-style balance of power between 
separate confederacies were allowed to take shape. It would also prove 
impossible under such circumstances to force Europeans to respect America, a 
source of concern to nationalist sentiment. Second, the solution derived from this 
analysis was that a firm Union was necessary. There was no other means of 
overcoming the problems of international anarchy to produce peace. Thus, the 
creation of the United States was brought about partly as a result of Americans’ 
conscious rejection of the balance of power as a desirable form of international 
order.
91 Federalist No. 11, Nov 28, 1787, Hamilton, p.208
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Trapped between titans: a divided America’s vulnerability to European power 
politics
Once the Union had been established, the leaders of the nation had to decide how 
the newly cohesive entity they had created would relate to the international 
system. There were three key interconnected issues to be addressed, each of 
which generated intense disagreement at the highest level of US politics. The 
first was the relationship with Britain, proprietor of the empire from which 
Americans had just broken away. The second was how to respond to the French 
Revolution. The third was navigating a course through the global war between 
Britain and France that dominated the quarter century from 1789.
As had been universally assumed during the Constitution’s drafting and 
ratification, the unifying figure of George Washington was unanimously elected 
as the first president, taking office in 1789. Hamilton, who had carefully 
cultivated his relationship with his former commander since leaving the army, 
was appointed Secretary of the Treasury with a brief to repair the national 
finances and erect new economic architecture. Madison, also close to the new 
president, went to the House of Representatives, where he began his push for the 
Bill of Rights, having conceded the necessity of one during the ratification 
debate. Jefferson returned from France in 1789 to discover, not altogether to his 
pleasure, that he had been nominated to serve as Secretary of State. Still, he 
accepted the position. Tensions between Jefferson and Hamilton would come to 
define the first Washington term. It would end with Madison and Hamilton 
thoroughly alienated from one another, and Jefferson and Madison constructing 
with increasing openness a party of opposition to Washington’s administration.
92 His Farewell Address notwithstanding, Washington’s own ideas are not as much of a focus in 
this chapter as those of Hamilton, Madison and Jefferson, though of course the events of his 
administration are under scrutiny. Biographical sources consulted include James Thomas Flexner, 
Washington: The Indispensable Man (London: Purnell Book Services, 1976); Joseph J. Ellis, His 
Excellency: George Washington, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004). This playing down of 
Washington’s role as a thinker is not intended to diminish his importance as a political actor: he 
was crucial in steering the ship of state in its first years. His chief ideological contribution was to 
moderate policy, denying controlling sway to either Jefferson or Hamilton, the most politically 
forceful members of his Cabinet.
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Jefferson was a figure of political weight before he took the Secretary of State’s 
office, famous as the man who had drafted the Declaration of Independence.93 
He had previously been governor of Virginia, in which capacity he was generally 
admired for a legacy of liberal legislation in spite of question marks over his 
leadership during wartime crises. Like Washington and Madison he was bom to 
a Virginian inheritance of land and slaves. Possessed of a range of cultural and 
scientific interests, he cultivated the aura of a Renaissance man, gifted and 
learned across the board. Critical of the aristocratic extravagances of European 
elites, his dismissive attitude regarding formality revealed in its own way a sense 
of easy entitlement to his place in the upper tier of American society.94
Even before they differed on policy, it was easy to predict that Jefferson’s 
persona might mb Hamilton the wrong way. His profile was that of the 
effortlessly cultured yet humble face of inherited privilege. Having beaten grim 
odds to become a self-made success, the brittle dandy Hamilton was 
psychologically primed to find the image of a wine-loving, slave-owning landed 
gent turned populist hero less sincere and more irritating than the straightforward 
aristocratic bearing of someone like Washington. As they fell out over policy, he 
duly came to view ‘the Sage of Monticello’ as a dangerously ambitious visionary 
and hypocrite.
i) British antagonism
First among the pressing issues facing the new government was that of 
commercial relations with the former motherland. After a brief flirtation with 
conciliation, the British government under Pitt the Younger had taken to 
squeezing US shipping, refusing to permit it freedoms it had previously enjoyed
93 For sources on Jefferson, see Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Max Lemer, Thomas Jefferson: America’s Philosopher- 
King, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996; Lawrence S. Kaplan, Jefferson and 
France: An Essay on Politics and Political Ideas, Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: (New York: 
Vintage, 1998). For primary sources, see Thomas Jefferson, Writings, (New York: Library of 
America, 1984).
94 Examples of his bree2y indifference to expectations of formality would include the abolition of 
formal seating plans at presidential dinners and on at least one occasion meeting with a business 
caller to the White House while wearing carpet slippers.
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in trading with British territories. American production was oriented towards 
agriculture and natural resources, and dependent on British manufactured goods 
paid for with export revenues. This meant salvaging this commercial relationship 
was an obvious priority.
Adding further to the importance of British trade, Hamilton immediately 
persuaded Congress to use the government’s new powers under the Constitution 
to levy a federal tariff on imports. This revenue stream was used to fund the 
national debt, which had been assumed from the individual states by the federal 
government and refinanced with fresh loans from abroad. This measure, 
combined with the controversial establishment of a national bank, served to 
increase the liquidity of the US economy and restore the credibility of American 
credit, but it also made the continuity of revenue from imports essential to the 
nation’s economic health.95 At this stage Madison shared Hamilton’s conviction 
that trade was economically essential, and also his anticipation that in the longer 
term a move might be made to assist industrialisation through government tariffs 
and subsidies.96
Jefferson, however was not convinced of the merits mercantilism. If it were 
possible, he wished that the US might “practise neither commerce nor 
navigation, but to stand with respect to Europe precisely on the footing of China. 
We should thus avoid wars...” But he accepted that this was “theory only”, 
because public opinion’s “decided taste for navigation and commerce” made
07government action to curtail trade politically impossible. Hence, though 
ideologically out of sympathy with the commercial imperative, Jefferson 
accepted the need to fight for America’s commercial rights and interests. Though 
in an ideal world, “we might indulge ourselves in speculating whether commerce 
contributes to the happiness of mankind”, he wrote in a 1784 letter to
95 It was these measures -  the bank and funding of the wartime debt at face value -  that sparked 
the first conflict between Hamilton and Jefferson. Jefferson believed the former to be 
unconstitutional and the latter to be a gift to speculators, who had already hoovered up debt 
certificates at bargain prices from their original holders.
96 To Edmund Randolph, May 1783, Madison, p.21. Hamilton later developed such ideas in his 
legislatively ignored but politically seminal Report on Manufactures, Dec 5, 1791, Hamilton, 
pp.647-734
To John Banister Jr. ,Oct 15, 1785, Jefferson, pp.836-7.
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Washington, in the real world America was obliged to “endeavour to share as
QA
large a portion as we can of this modem source of wealth & power.”
The task before the first US Government was thus to pressure the British to grant 
more rights to American commerce, but without provoking a ruinous trade war. 
Part of the point of empowering the new federal government had been to open 
the possibility forcing concessions from Britain." Yet the US depended
i
sufficiently on British trade that if the confrontation escalated then the damage to 
the emergent American economy could be catastrophic.100 Hamilton, as architect 
of the import-dependent financial system, was especially sensitive to the latter 
risk, and tried to steer the administration away from commercial retaliation. 
Jefferson, less concerned about the threat to Hamilton’s fiscal and monetary 
house of cards, and with Madison as an ally in Congress, pushed for tough 
retaliatory tariffs, which he optimistically argued would make Britain climb 
down. One of the final acts of his troubled tenure as Secretary of State was to 
submit a report to Congress openly advocating commercial tit-for-tat, arguing 
that:
Free commerce and navigation are not to be given in exchange for restrictions and 
vexations... It is not to the moderation and justice o f  others we are to trust for 
fair and equal access to the market with our productions...  but to our own means 
o f  independence, and the firm will to use them.101
This was one of a number of major splits in the administration in a period in 
which the Secretaries of State and the Treasury took to denouncing one another 
through newspaper proxies. The row over British commerce was a symbolic 
issue representative of broader disagreement over America’s social direction and 
therefore the merits of Hamilton’s financial system. This period also saw the
98 To George Washington, Jefferson, Mar 15, 1784, pp.788-89.
99 See Madison’s Letter to James Monroe, Aug 7, 1785, Madison, p.37
100 These issues are discussed in Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Battleground o f the Founding 
Fathers, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970) and Charles S. Campbell, From 
Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900, (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1974).
101 Report on the Privileges and Restrictions on the Commerce o f the United States in Foreign 
Countries, Dec. 16, 1793, Jefferson, pp. 445, 447.
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final break between Hamilton and Madison, their earlier quarrels over the Bank 
and the federal assumption of war debts hardening into fundamental opposition 
on Madison’s part to the central thrust of Hamiltonian policy.102
Though successful in assembling the nucleus of an opposition movement, 
Jefferson and Madison were thwarted on anti-British tariffs by Hamilton’s 
powerful influence over Congress and the weight of Washington’s reputation. 
Further, Hamilton undermined Jefferson’s authority as Secretary of State by 
establishing his own back-channel relations with George Beckwith, an unofficial
■I
representative of Britain in America, to ensure the avoidance of a breach. 
Reassuring the British through this channel that talk of sanctions would come to 
nothing, Hamilton minimised the risk of a diplomatic crisis. By Beckwith’s 
account, Hamilton explained to him that Madison, the public driver of a 
confrontational policy, was “very little acquainted with the world... [H]e has the 
same end in view that I have, and so have those gentlemen who act with him, but 
their mode of attaining it is very different.”104
The first major point of disagreement between America’s early leaders was thus 
whether to approach the relationship with Britain chiefly through confrontation 
or appeasement. Hamilton favoured the latter course, and in the 1790s was 
largely victorious.
ii) The French Revolution
Friction with Britain was a foreseeable consequence of American independence. 
Less predictable was the cataclysmic international context unleashed by the 
French Revolution. This had begun to unfold in 1789, while Jefferson was still in
102 Hamilton was upset -  and surprised -  by what he saw as Madison’s political abandonment of 
him. See To Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792, Hamilton p.745
103 There is debate over how accurately Hamilton represented Washington’s views as opposed to 
serving his own agenda in these undeniably devious back-channel negotiations. For discussion of 
the issue see Harper, American Machiavelli, pp. 49-87; Julian Boyd, Number 7: Alexander 
Hamilton’s Secret Efforts to Control American Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1964). Harper rejects Boyd’s analysis that Hamilton’s actions amounted to treason.
104 Memorandum by George Beckwith on a Conversation with Hamilton, Oct 1789, Hamilton, 
p.527
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Paris. By the time the Washington administration was up and running it had 
gathered pace, and it entered its radical republican phase in 1792. The following 
year King Louis was executed by the revolutionary government and war broke 
out between France and most of the other states of Europe, including Britain. 
France’s turmoil presented difficult choices to America’s new leaders. Of most 
immediate significance was the fact that the United States still had a treaty 
obligation left over from the War of Independence calling for wartime support of 
France. Was this still binding even though ‘France’ was no longer the same 
political entity with which the Americans had agreed the alliance? Even more 
profound, there was the strategic, ideological and moral question of whether the 
cause of France’s republicans, now pitched in existential combat against hostile 
monarchies, represented an international extension of Americans’ own fight for 
liberty.
These questions divided the Cabinet. Hamilton, sceptical of the Revolution itself, 
sought to convince the president that the treaty alliance had been rendered void 
by the change of regime. Jefferson, more sympathetic to the revolutionaries’ 
cause, argued that both the “tribunal of our consciences” and “the opinion of the 
world” obliged America to consider the alliance still binding..105 He sought to 
play down the consequences of such a position, suggesting that America’s only 
obligation might be assisting in the defence of France’s West Indian colonies, 
and that it was not clear that the French were asking even for that.
Present in France at the first outbreak of Revolution, Jefferson had a declared 
sympathy with its aims. Before his departure for home, he was optimistic 
regarding the events unfolding before him:
I have so much confidence [in] the good sense o f man, and his qualifications for 
self-government, that I am never afraid o f the issue where reason is left free to 
exert her force; and I will agree to be stoned as a false prophet if  all does not end
105Opinion on the French Treaties, April 28, 1793, Jefferson, p.423
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well in this country. Nor will it end with this country. Hers is but the first 
chapter o f the history o f European liberty.106
Equating the revolutionary cause with that of liberty, and seeing historical forces 
at work that would lead to a wave of liberation in Europe, Jefferson saw 
America’s interests as entwined with this cause, and therefore with France’s. 
Taking up his position as Secretary of State, he wrote to a French friend that 
among “the circumstances which reconcile me to my new position.. .the most 
powerful is the opportunities it will give me of cementing the friendship between 
our two nations.”107
As a result of his deep sympathy for the underlying principles of the revolution, 
at least as he perceived them, he was prone to intemperate statements of support 
even as the political atmosphere in France shifted from reformism to radicalism 
and finally to bloody ferment. As war was breaking out across Europe, he wrote 
to an associate to defend the Revolution in spite of the trend towards 
demagoguery and political execution that ultimately culminated in the Reign of 
Terror. “The liberty of the whole earth”, he wrote, was “depending on the issue 
of the contest”:
.. .and was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own
affections have been deeply wounded by some martyrs to this cause, but rather
than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there
but an Adam & an Eve left in every country, & left free, it would be better than as 
108it is now.
This was not a momentary aberration on Jefferson’s part. Late in his life, though 
by that stage well aware of what had followed for France in the form of terror, 
coup and empire, he stood by his early support for the Revolution. In his 
Autobiography, he excused the misjudgements of the revolutionaries, or at least
106 To Diodati, Aug 3, 1789, Jefferson, p.958.
107 To Madame d ’Enville, April 2 1790, Jefferson p.965
108 To William Short, Jan 3, 1793, Jefferson, p. 1004; phrases such as this seem to justify 
Madison’s later observation of “a habit in Mr Jefferson as in others o f great genius of expressing 
in strong and round terms, impressions of the moment.” To Nicholas P. Trist, Madison, p.860.
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those who had launched the first wave of revolution: “They were unconscious of 
(for who could foresee?) the melancholy sequel of their well-meant 
perseverance.” Still he identified the early Revolution’s cause with America’s, 
stating that it represented an “appeal to the rights of man, which had been made 
in the U.S. [and] was taken up by France, first of the European nations.” He 
stood by his prediction that the cause of liberty was “irresistible” and that “the 
condition of man thro’ the civilized world will be finally and greatly 
ameliorated” by its spread.109 In 1823 as in 1793, he was at ease with the human 
cost of liberty’s progress. Writing to the sceptically conservative John Adams, he 
told him that in his view “rivers of blood must yet flow, and years of desolation 
pass over. Yet the object is worth rivers of blood, and years of desolation for 
what inheritance so valuable can man leave to his posterity?”110
Hamilton, as well as others within the administration at the time of the 
Revolution, differed from this view, to put it mildly. Contrary to what Jefferson 
implied, they saw potential for tragedy in France’s political upheaval early, and 
expressed those fears aloud. In 1789, Hamilton wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette 
ln , alongside whom he had served in the War of Independence, that he viewed 
events in France “with a mixture of pleasure and apprehension”.
As a friend to mankind and liberty I rejoice in the efforts which you are making 
to establish it, while I fear much for the final success o f the attempts... I dread 
the vehement character o f your people, whom I fear you may find it more easy to 
bring on than to keep within Proper bounds, once you have put them in motion; 
I dread the interested refractoriness of your nobles, who cannot all be gratified 
and who may be unwilling to submit to the requisite sacrifices. And I dread the 
reveries o f your Philosophic politicians.. .who being mere speculatists may aim at 
more refinement than suits either with human nature or the composition o f your 
Nation.112
109 The Autobiography, Jan 6, 1821, Jefferson, pp.85-86, 97
110 To John Adams, Sep 4 1823, Jefferson, p. 1478.
111 Lafayette was involved in the reformism of the early Revolution, and would suffer at its hands 
-  though not fatally -  in its more radical phase.
112 To Lafayette, Oct 6, 1789, Hamilton, p.521. We can see in this what Michael Hunt describes 
as a conservative anti-revolutionary strain in American thought. Of course, this case challenges
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This divergence in levels of enthusiasm for the Revolution made Hamilton and 
his supporters suspicious of Jefferson’s enthusiasm for the French cause. By 
inference from his views on that topic, they feared that the Secretary of State 
might draw America into the war in Europe out of ideological sympathy with 
France -  in effect, go to war to advance the cause of global ‘liberty’. As the 
unpleasant reality of the Terror unfolded, the Hamiltonians, increasingly known 
as the ‘Federalist’ party, were unnerved by the solidarity shown by a sizeable 
body of Americans for the French cause. In the 1790s ‘Democratic’ clubs and 
societies sprang up throughout the country and looked to Jefferson to represent 
pro-French sentiment in public life. These societies overlapped with the informal 
machinery of the ‘Republican’ party of opposition assembled steadily by 
Madison, acting as Jefferson’s right hand.
Already resentful after clashes over the domestic agenda, Hamilton became 
convinced that Jefferson’s faction represented a dangerously pro-French fifth 
column in the foreign policy debate. Their views on foreign policy, he wrote 
excitably, were “unsound & dangerous. They have a womanish attachment to 
France and a womanish resentment against Great Britain.” If “left to pursue 
their own course”, he proclaimed, the pair would produce “in less than six 
months an open War between the U States and Great Britain.” Insisting that he 
had “a due sense” of America’s debt to the French nation for its previous aid, 
there was, he argued “a wide difference between this an implicating ourselves in 
all her politics; between bearing good will to her, & hating and wrangling with 
all those whom she hates.” Jefferson, he said, had come into the Cabinet 
“electrified.. .with attachment to France and with the project of knitting the two 
countries in the closest political bands”. 113
In a 1794 memo, Hamilton complained that “the effect of Experience has been... 
much less than could reasonably have been expected” with regard to popular 
views of France. The “predilection” for the Revolution, he lamented, was still
the supposition that such instincts are always inappropriate. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign 
Policy.
113 To Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792, Hamilton, p.746. The italics is Hamilton’s.
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“extensive and ardent”, and continued to attract those in a position to know 
better. “The error entertained is not on a mere speculative question,” he warned. 
“The French Revolution is a political convulsion that in a great or less degree 
shakes the whole civilized world and it is of real consequence to the principles 
and of course to the happiness of a Nation to estimate it rightly.”114 He had 
earlier argued, in favour of a policy of neutrality, that “gratitude” for assistance 
in the War of Independence offered no better a basis for signing up to France’s 
wars than ideological sympathy. France, he noted with realist cold blood, “in 
assisting us was and ought to have been influenced by considerations relative to 
its own interest.”115
Though Washington accepted Jefferson’s argument that the treaty of alliance was 
still binding in spite of the change of regime in Paris, Hamilton did convince 
him, after heated debate with Jefferson in Cabinet, to issue a Proclamation of 
Neutrality.116 As well as declaring neutrality, the proclamation threatened 
prosecution for Americans who independently sought to involve themselves in 
the conflict on either side. Jefferson and Madison opposed the measure, arguing 
that the pronouncement overstepped the president’s constitutional limits, 
usurping Congressional authority to declare any state of war or, by implication,
117 •peace. The administration’s policy enraged pro-French forces in the country at 
large, who regarded the official line as the product of elitist, pro-British 
sentiment.
In analysing this period, it is important not to overreach as one sets up the 
dichotomy of positions within the Cabinet. Jefferson served as Secretary of State 
in the very administrations his incipient party criticised, and never committed
•  i  i  o
himself to US war entry in support of France. Warier than some of his
114 Memorandum on the French Revolution, 1794, Hamilton, pp.834, 836
115 Draft o f a Defense o f the Neutrality Proclamation, c. May, 1793, Hamilton ,p.797p.798
116 To George Washington, Aug 18, 1792, Hamilton, p.761,
117 To Jefferson, June 13, 1793, Madison, pp.534-7. Hamilton offered a rebuttal of their 
arguments in his Draft o f a Defense o f the Neutrality Proclamation, c. May, 1793, Hamilton 
,p.797
118 He denied to Washington that his efforts to impose commercial sanctions on Britain reflected 
a pro-French or anti-British bias: “[M]y system was to give some satisfactory distinctions to 
[France], of little cost to us, in return for the solid advantages yielded us by them; & to have met
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supporters of the consequences of an actual war, the farthest he went was 
advocacy of the much vaguer notion of somehow tilting neutrality so as to make 
it favourable to the French (as the US would do in later wars), perhaps through 
sympathetic access to US ports.119 Meanwhile, neither administration policy nor 
even Hamilton personally was quite as pro-British as portrayed in Republican 
propaganda. While Hamilton certainly doubted the French Revolution’s virtues, 
his aversion to clashing with Britain was chiefly pragmatic in motive rather than 
the product of deep Anglophilia.120 Thus, while both leaders had an evident bias 
towards cultivating good relations with their favoured power, both were 
sufficiently pragmatic to see the limits placed on either strategy by the brute fact 
that war would entail gross military, economic and political costs. As such, a 
course deliberately targeted at war was in truth the policy of neither Hamilton 
nor Jefferson, though some of their supporters were less restrained.
Nevertheless, the second challenge facing the nation was clear: to decide whether 
the interpret the French Revolution, and the wars that flowed from it, represented 
a sound reason for the United States to take sides in European conflict. In short, 
did the American national interest encompass the cause of France, its friend in 
the War of Independence and now its brother in ‘liberty’?
Hi) Neutral rights in wartime
The fact that international system was on a war footing made it especially 
difficult to tread a middle course between Britain and France. The US parties’ 
rival desires to tilt towards either the commercially important monarchy or the
the English with some restrictions which might induce them to abate their severities against our 
commerce.” To GW, May 23, 1792, Jefferson, p. 995
119 The limits of Jefferson’s position were brought into focus when Edmond Genet, representative 
to the US appointed by the Girondist regime in Paris, embarrassed the Secretary of State by 
presuming his support for exhorting private American naval operations against the British. 
Jefferson faced a difficult balancing act to keep the Frenchman under control without alienating 
his own pro-French supporters.
l20Like Jefferson, Hamilton always denied bias, and he painted himself as the champion of the 
national interest against an irresponsibly pro-French faction, though one can question this as 
readily as one might query Jefferson’s self-perception. In any case, his version of the national 
interest clearly lay in good relations with Britain at almost any price. See Letter Concerning John 
Adams, Oct 24, 1800, Hamilton, p.936.
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ideologically sympathetic republic led to controversy over how to assert 
America’s commercial rights as a neutral in the middle of a global war. US 
policy was thus poised at the centre point of a seesaw of rival antagonisms, a 
posture that pleased neither of the belligerent great powers. The British navy 
being pre-eminent upon the oceans, the French were unable to transport goods 
freely under their own flag. As a result, they sought to use US shipping to keep 
supply lines open by granting Americans the right to ship goods between France 
and its colonies. The British, unimpressed by such efforts to circumvent of their 
squeeze of the enemy through embargo, began to waylay American ships plying 
this new trade and seize their cargoes. Predictably, such seizures prompted vocal 
outrage among pro-French Republicans in the United States. Invoking the 
principle of ‘free ships, free goods’, they insisted that America had an inviolable 
right as a neutral to trade with whomever it saw fit.
Jefferson and Madison, the leaders of the incipient Republican faction, had
foreseen the likelihood of this scenario some years before the actual European 
101war broke out. When American ships began to be interfered with, public anger
at British behaviour put wind in the sails of their movement for commercial
sanctions against Britain. Temperamentally averse to war, Jefferson had fostered
the theory that economic sanctions could serve as an alternative. The war in the
1790s, he told Madison, could be a test case, furnishing “a happy opportunity of
setting another example to the world, by showing that nations may be brought to
do justice by appeals to their interests as well as by appeals to arms.” The use of
economic sanctions, he anticipated, “would work well in many ways, safely in
all, & introduce between nations another umpire than arms. It would relieve us
1 00too from the risks & the horrors of cutting throats.”
Hamilton, on the other hand, thought this prediction delusional, and potentially 
dangerous. Britain, he was convinced, would never back down as Jefferson 
assumed it would. Worse, the imposition of economic sanctions in wartime
121 Both were clear when writing in the mid-1780s that conducting commerce overseas inherently 
risked war, and that only a strong America could hope to defend its neutral rights. See Madison, 
Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 11 1788, Madison, pp.367-68. See also 
Jefferson, To John Jay, Aug 23, 1785, Jefferson p.819.
122 To James Madison, March 24, 1793, Jefferson, p.1006-7
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would in all likelihood provoke a hot war too, for which America was ill 
prepared. Faced with rising war fever in the country, Hamilton therefore sought 
to steer the president away from the Republicans’ preferred course. War, he 
warned Washington, was in danger of breaking out as a result of “angry and 
perverse passions” rather than “cool calculations of Interest”. He believed that 
the Republican faction was looking to manipulate the situation in order to 
engineer “a more complete and permanent alienation from Great Britain and a 
more close approximation to France.” Even if their leaders, such as Jefferson, 
didn’t support war outright, he argued, they considered it “a less evil than a 
thorough and sincere accommodation with Great Britain”.123
The theory that Britain would simply agree to American demands if faced with 
sanctions was a “folly.. .too great to be seriously entertained by the discerning 
part of those who affect to believe the position”:
She cannot do it without renouncing her pride and her dignity, without losing 
her consequence and weight in the scale o f Nations — and consequently it is 
morally certain that she will not do it. A proper estimate o f the operation of  
human passions must satisfy us that she would be less disposed to receive the law 
from us than from any other nation — a people recently become a nation, not 
long since one o f her dependencies, and as yet, if  a Hercules — a Hercules in the 
cradle.124
Americans needed to be honest with themselves -  as the Republicans were not 
being, Hamilton thought -  and accept that their position was defined by
weakness rather than strength. Sound policy, therefore, was to avoid conflict,
\
even if that meant enduring shoddy treatment. “Tis our error to overrate 
ourselves and underrate Great Britain,” he warned, “We forget how little we can 
annoy and how much we may be annoyed... To precipitate a great conflict of any
19Ssort is utterly unsuited to our condition, to our strength and to our resources.” 
Hamilton was more easily reconciled to such a position because he in any case
123 To George Washington, April 1794, Hamilton, p.813.
124 Ibid, pp.816-7.
125 Ibid, p.820.
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lacked the underlying sympathy for the French war effort that added fuel to the 
Republican argument.
While the Federalists held sway in the 1790s, the Hamiltonian position won the 
day. He convinced Washington, in the face of popular opposition, to despatch 
John Jay to London, where he negotiated a soft treaty laying the ground rules for 
peace with Britain. Though Jay’s 1794 treaty offered some limited but 
worthwhile concessions, there was no acceptance of the principle of American 
neutral shipping rights. This, combined with various concessions made to the 
British, caused fury in the country when the treaty became public. Motivated by 
the logic that almost anything was better than war, however, Washington and 
Hamilton rammed ratification through the Senate at speed, achieving victory by a 
single vote. But the country was left deeply divided by the deal. The 
administration was increasingly viewed as a creature of a pro-British Federalist 
party while the Republican opposition mobilised irritation in the country at large 
into a solid base of support.126
The Federalists knew it was not only American Republicans who would be 
enraged by Jay’s treaty.127 In the zero-sum mindset of the Revolutionary Wars, 
France regarded the treaty as an American realignment behind Britain, 
jettisoning the Franco-American alliance. This perception was worsened by the 
presence of James Monroe, a Republican ultra, as the US representative in Paris, 
where he fanned the flames of France’s perceived grievance instead of fighting 
them. He was ultimately recalled by Washington amid much rancour. Thus, the 
price of Hamilton’s peace with Britain was breakdown in relations with France 
that would reach its nadir under the administration of Washington’s immediate 
successor Adams, when an undeclared naval ‘quasi-war’ erupted between the 
two nations. These hostilities, inflamed by a botched attempt at negotiation 
involving charges of dishonour and corruption, held the US on the precipice of
126 For discussion of the treaty and its political context, see Combs, The Jay Treaty,; Samuel Flagg 
Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A study in commerce and diplomacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1962)
127 See The Defence, No.l, July 2, 1795, Hamilton, p.845.
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full war for an extended period.128 The Adams administration even went so far as 
to raise an army to stand ready in the event of invasion.
The Farewell Address and the emergence of the non-alignment consensus
It was in the context of these acrimonious political divisions that Washington, 
already making history with his decision to relinquish power voluntarily in 1797, 
further deepened his presidency’s historical impact with the publication of his 
‘Farewell Address’. Despite the title, the Address was published via newspapers 
rather than delivered as a speech. Its purpose was twofold: Its first aim was to 
defend the Federalist/Hamiltonian policies of the administration. Its second was 
to craft a potentially partisan message in such a way as to avoid the appearance 
of partisanship. When first contemplating the address, the president was disposed 
to include some defensive passages with a rather bitter and divisive feel. But in 
collaboration with Hamilton, he ultimately produced a document that adopted a 
tone of unity-seeking centrism while still defending the essentials of Federalist 
policy.129 In adopting this moderated approach, America’s ruling class took the 
first major step towards creating an ideological framework for the consensus on 
foreign policy that was the ultimate product of the Founders’ Era.130
The Address’s first substantive passage attacked the ‘spirit of party’, a message 
that served simultaneously as a veiled stab at Jefferson’s faction and also as an 
entreaty to Americans to consider the prevalence of political division unhealthy. 
The residual strength of Washington’s popular reputation aided the plausibility of
128 The scandal surrounding these negotiations, known as the XYZ affair, involved French 
foreign minister Talleyrand’s representatives demanding bribes from America’s envoys. Though 
apparently such practices were not altogether unusual in Europe in this period, public reporting of 
the event outraged American opinion and generated an anti-French backlash that gave the 
Federalist party its last surge in national popularity before its fall from power in 1800.
129 For analysis of the farewell address, see the cited biographies of Washington and Hamilton, 
and also Ellis, Founding Brothers, pp. 120-161; Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas o f  
Early American Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). For Hamilton’s 
draft of the Address, somewhat different in language from Washington’s final draft but evidently 
the core of the final text, see Hamilton, To George Washington (enclosing draft o f the Farewell 
Address), July 20, 1796, Hamilton, p.856
130 For the Address as finalised by Washington, see ‘The Farewell Address’ in the George 
Washington papers, http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/farewell/transcript.html. [accessed 
19/06/08]
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striking this pose of non-partisan patriotism. The address then turned to its 
primary topic: foreign policy. First, it underlined the foundational Federalist 
argument, dating from the push for the Constitution, that the great benefit of 
Union and unity at home was to exclude balance of power politics from America. 
That being the case, the US should regard it as imperative to avoid subjecting 
itself to the evils of that system via embroilment in European conflicts. 
Regardless of the ideological appeal of France or the commercial imperative for 
good relations with Britain, aligning with either politically would be disastrous. 
Unlike other nations, the Address noted, a united America was gifted with 
geographical advantages that made non-alignment genuinely viable.
The Address sought to portray its position as founded on cool reason and a sound 
grasp of the national interest. Neither “permanent, inveterate antipathies” nor 
“passionate attachments” for other states, it said, should form the basis of 
sensible policy. “The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred 
or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave,” it warned, with either of these 
“sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest”. It was important, it 
emphasised, to know that it was not only grudges against others that could harm 
the national interest. Favouritism -  “a passionate attachment of one nation” -  
also risked it:
Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion o f an imaginary 
common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into 
one the enmities o f the other, betrays the former into a participation in the 
quarrels and wars o f the latter without adequate inducement or justification...
This was a clear if not explicitly targeted warning of the danger presented by the 
Republican faction’s fondness for France. Such “attachment of a small or weak, 
towards a great and powerful nation,” Washington warned, “dooms the former to 
be the satellite of the latter.” Thus basing its case on the need for autonomous 
pursuit of the US interest, the Address set forth a doctrine of strict non-alignment 
in dealings with the European powers. The United States, it argued, should seek 
to “extend” its “commercial relations”, but its “great rule” should be that in doing 
so it must “have with them as little political connection as possible.”
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In justifying this maxim, the address argued that the interests of European 
nations were neither concurrent with those of America, nor necessarily opposed 
to them. Rather, they were essentially separate, concerned with fundamentally 
different issues, in a geographically distant place:
Europe has a set o f primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote 
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes o f  
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise 
in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes o f her 
politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions o f her friendships or 
enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us tp pursue a 
different course.
The United States, the address argued, was on a trajectory of growth in its power. 
So long as the Union held, the time was “not far o ff’, when it might be strong 
enough to shrug off “external annoyance”, compel others to respect its neutrality 
and ultimately “choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall 
counsel”. To risk war now, as some wished, would be to “forgo the advantages” 
of America’s “peculiar... situation” and “entangle our peace and prosperity in 
the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice”. This was 
not a position of ideologically rigid resistance to any cooperation with European 
states. The address explicitly referred to the permissibility of “temporary 
alliances for extraordinary emergencies”. But its central principle was that the 
United States’ “true policy” was to “steer clear of permanent alliances with any 
portion of the foreign world”.
Assuredly, the address was on one level a party political document: in its 
advocacy of neutrality it implied that this was what administration policy sought, 
while suggesting its opponents were straining to enlist as belligerent France’s 
ally. Jefferson and his supporters no doubt thought that analysis disingenuous, 
feeling the Hamiltonians had tilted towards Britain. That fact notwithstanding, 
the address was notable for its efforts to reach out through moderate language 
rather than deepen division. It was neither a sharp-edged intellectual tract like
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The Federalist Papers, nor shrill propaganda of the sort the parties had 
exchanged in the press. Rather, it was a document aimed at mass opinion, 
making an explicit ideological move to generate consensus around the central 
principle of non-alignment, and thus reaching out beyond the Federalist base. 
Absent was any detailed defence of the more controversial elements of the 
Federalist programme: this was an effort at mobilisation of public opinion 
through the formulation of a new foundation for strategic consensus.
The argument made by the address was pragmatic and interest-oriented, based on 
national and international circumstances. Yet it was also ideologically 
significant. It focused on the idea that European nations had “primary interests” 
that were separate from the United States, with which, advantaged by geography, 
the US need not deeply concern itself. This analysis implicitly dismissed 
potential alternative readings of the American interest. For one, it rejected the 
idea, embraced by some at the time, that France was fighting a war in defence of 
liberty and that the US must support such a conflict as a moral duty.
Transnational ideological causes that might justify war were thus ‘defined out’ of 
the US national interest. Likewise, it was restrained and long-term in its 
projections. Even setting aside the question of shared ideology, short-term 
calculation might have led policymakers to think it worthwhile to side with one 
of the major European powers against the other in the hope of some territorial or 
other strategic gain. Instead, the Address took the view that the potential gains of 
any such strategy were outweighed by the risks, and that the long-term trend of 
US power growth in the absence of war made a policy of neutrality and 
avoidance of war wise. This was not an inevitable choice. It was based on a 
particular, realistic reading of America’s circumstances and how best to seek 
advantage within them.
The address was intended to be a strategic guide based on the prevailing national 
and international context. Though intended to be of lasting value, it was not to be 
a proclamation of eternal verities. Nevertheless, the manner in which it expressed 
itself -  in the pursuit of a wide base of political support -  lent itself to being read 
as an ideological text of lasting resonance. Rather than locating the United States 
within the international balance of power and describing a path of maximal
\
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advantage within that context, it justified American non-alignment by 
emphasising America’s “detached” situation, and the essentially separate 
character of its interests from those pursued within the rest of the Europe- 
dominated international system. Such choices of terminology and ideological 
tone would come to matter. Though created by the operation of the balance of 
power, and in practice obliged to work within it by circumstances, the United 
States developed in the Farewell Address the basis for a tradition locating the US 
intellectually ‘outside’ the balance of power system. Europeans pursued their 
interests in that system, self-destructively as the Americans saw it, but 
geographical circumstance, in Washington’s phrase, “invited and enabled” the 
United States to think of itself as separate: strategically, in terms of its interests, 
and morally.
Consensus emerges: Jefferson’s embrace of Washington’s doctrine
Hopes for the consensual spirit of the Farewell Address’s text seemed precarious 
during the grimly confrontational one-term Adams presidency that followed 
Washington. These last four years of Federalist administration witnessed the 
naval4quasi-war’ against France as well as draconian sedition laws (at least by 
American standards) targeted at the Republicans. Jefferson and Madison, 
meanwhile, reacted to being squeezed by federal authoritarianism by 
encouraging state legislatures to threaten nullification of federal laws. The end of 
the crisis with France, however -  thanks to Adams’s decision to break with 
hardliners and seek a deal with Paris -  brought on the implosion of the Federalist 
party in an orgy of internal rancour. This, as well as the superior grassroots 
machine assembled by Madison over the preceding decade, allowed the 
Republicans to triumph in the election of 1800, and, after some last-minute 
uncertainty, Jefferson to accede to the presidency. This ‘revolution’ of 1800 as 
Jefferson termed it, gave the Republicans control of foreign policy for the first 
time, creating a good deal of suspense in the country given their history of pro- 
French advocacy.
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By 1801, however, circumstances had moved on from the debates of the 
Washington era. The wars of the French Revolution had elevated a dictatorial 
general to power in Paris: Napoleon Bonaparte was now First Consul of France 
under a constitution of his own design. Within a few years he would declare 
himself emperor for life. The imagined fraternal bond of political values between 
the American and French Revolutions, central to the Democratic Societies’ 
activism in the 1790s, had been broken. Jefferson himself had moved on too, 
perhaps chastened by the looming responsibility of government as well as events 
in Paris. The steady degeneration of France’s republicanism, which culminated in 
Bonaparte’s coup of 1799, was already apparent by the time of the Farewell 
Address. During Jefferson’s term as a hostile Vice President in the Adams 
administration, he had already begun to edge away from his prior identification 
with the French cause, and to advocate an even-handed neutrality rather than one 
tilted towards France.131 “Better to keep together as we are,” he wrote to one 
associate, “hawl off from Europe as soon as we can, & from any attachments to 
any portions of it. And if we feel their power just sufficiently to hoop us together, 
it will be the happiest situation in which we can exist.”132 During the crisis over 
the XYZ affair, not long before Bonaparte’s coup, Jefferson wrote to a friend 
insisting that he now favoured complete detachment from European wars. 
Foreshadowing the words of his first inaugural address, he wrote that
111“[cjommerce with all nations, alliance with none, should be our motto”.
In that first inaugural, of March 1801, Jefferson sought to revive the spirit of the 
Farewell Address by minimising partisanship. Now in power, he wanted to heal 
the political divisions he had helped foster in the 1790s, and calm fears he would 
implement a recklessly anti-British policy.134 To that end, he used phraseology so
131 Ellis notes a shift in Jefferson away from connecting the French cause with that of global 
liberty, quoting him as observing in 1800 that “It is very important for... [the American people] to 
be made sensible that their own character and situation are very different from the French, and 
that whatever may be the fate of republicanism there, we are able to preserve it inviolate here.” 
Ellis, Founding Brothers, p.202.
132 To John Taylor, June 4, 1798, Jefferson, p. 1050. Jefferson rationalised this stance as the 
continuation of a long-standing wish on his part for true neutrality. His hard line against Britain, 
he insisted, had been aimed merely at inducing the British to accept such even-handedness. See. 
To Elbridge Gerry, May 13, 1797, Jefferson, p.1042, 1043-44
133 To Thomas Lomax, Mar 12, 1799, Jefferson, p. 1063.
134 The speech is remembered for his declaration that “We are all republicans, we are all 
federalists.”
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precisely emulating Washington’s strategic proposition that one of the key 
phrases -  “entangling alliances” -  is often attributed incorrectly to the Farewell 
Address itself. America, Jefferson declared, was a “rising nation”. Re-treading 
Washington’s steps, he noted that it was “kindly separated by nature and a wide 
ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe”, “too high 
minded to endure the degradations of others”. It was in many ways “a chosen 
country” The correct policy was thus clear: to seize on its advantages by 
pursuing “peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling 
alliances with none.” 135
Omitting reference to his own pro-French disposition in the decade gone before, 
now-President Jefferson later celebrated the wisdom of America’s having refused 
to entangle itself in the war across the ocean. “[L]et us bow with gratitude,” he 
said in his third annual message, “to that kind Providence which... guarded us 
from hastily entering into the sanguinary contest, and left us only to look on and 
pity its ravages.”136 Happily America was “separated by a wide ocean from the 
nations of Europe, and from the political interests which entangle them together”. 
“[I]t is our duty,” he told Americans, “to look on the bloody arena spread before
137us with commiseration indeed, but with no other wish than to see it closed...”
It did not matter to America who beat whom in European wars, only that the 
United States should stay out.
This beginning of the Jefferson presidency was, more so than the Farewell 
Address itself, the key to embedding the principle of ‘detachment’ from Europe 
in US foreign policy. Washington had crafted a potentially unifying ideological 
text preaching the separateness of American and European interests and the basis 
in rational interest of a policy of strict non-alignment. But it was Jefferson’s 
decision to echo these tenets that signalled the moment when the Founders 
reached a basic intellectual consensus on America’s world role.
135 First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801. Jefferson, pp.492,494
136 Third Annual Message, Oct 17, 1803, Jefferson, p. 515.
137 Ibid, p. 516.
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The emergence of consensus was aided by circumstances, not least the changed 
nature of the European scene, where conflict was now transparently between 
rival empires rather than rival ideals. It was also aided by the sudden death of 
Washington in 1799, which allowed his posthumous re-establishment as a non­
partisan figurehead and facilitated the invocation of his ideas as transcendent 
principles rather than party political positions. After a decade of heated 
disagreement over the fundamentals of America’s strategy in foreign affairs, the 
entwined, mutually supportive pronouncements of the departing Washington and 
the ‘arriving’ Jefferson crafted consensus around a version of the American 
national interest and how to pursue it that would guide the nation throughout the 
19th Century.
“Our hemisphere,..of freedom99: the Monroe Doctrine as logical endpoint of 
the Founders9 Era consensus
In the messy world of practice, there was still turbulence in foreign affairs under 
the Democratic-Republican governments of Jefferson and Madison that opened 
the 19th Century. This included a tense standoff with France ended only by the 
1803 Louisiana Purchase, finally terminating French influence in North America. 
There was also Jefferson’s economically and politically disastrous imposition of 
an embargo on all US trade in response to an exchange of blockade and counter­
blockade between Britain and France during the continuation of their long war. 
Jefferson’s Embargo (1807-09) was a strategic failure, and also the beginning of 
a chain of events leading to an ill-planned and ultimately stalemated armed clash 
with Britain in 1812. Nevertheless, through all this instability, the core essence of 
American strategy remained the Washington-Jefferson consensus of remaining 
neutral between the European powers, shoring up the Union at home, and 
seeking to minimise foreign influence in America.
By 1815, the autonomy and viability of the United States had been firmly 
established, as had its unwillingness to play a role in the European balance of 
power system. Much as US leaders might wish otherwise, however, the Old 
World remained intimately involved in the New by means of its territorial
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holdings there, particularly the vast South American colonies. This presence 
undermined the reality of the United States’ desired to exclusion of the balance 
of power from America and its ability to refrain from dealings with Europe other 
than the commercial.
tfiThe collapse of Spanish imperial power in the early decades of the 19 Century 
was a tipping point in resolving this tension between America’s hemispheric 
ambitions and reality. By the 1820s, long-smouldering independence struggles 
throughout the region appeared destined for success. The vanquishing of 
Napoleon’s empire at Waterloo in 1815, however, had extinguished one threat to 
American security but potentially created another. By the 1820s, the ‘Holy 
Alliance’ of European monarchies -  Russia, Austria and Prussia -  in league with 
a rehabilitated France, threatened to re-impose European power on Latin 
America. This was the international problem with which James Monroe, the last 
president of the founding generation contended.138 In collaboration with his 
Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, he ultimately crafted in response the 
Doctrine that now bears his name.139
The Monroe Doctrine came in the form of a proclamation by the president before 
Congress on December 2, 1823. Its more important targets, however, were 
foreign governments rather than American legislators. Having planned the 
statement in collaboration with Adams, Monroe set out a series of interlocking 
principles designed to prevent the re-subjugation of the Americas to European 
power, and to form the spine of American policy into the foreseeable future.
They were: (1) No new European colonisation in the Americas would be 
permissible. (2) No existing colonies in the Americas should transfer between the 
hands of European nations. (3) Finally, and more generally, Europeans should 
refrain from interference in the affairs of American nations outside the strict 
confines of their own remaining colonial holdings. Any violation of these 
principles would be considered a trespass against vital US interests.
138 For an excellent historian’s analysis of the Monroe Doctrine’s conception and context, see 
Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations o f American Foreign Policy, 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), esp. pp. 363-408
139 The label ‘Monroe Doctrine’ itself was not applied until the 1850s, but I use the term here for 
simplicity’s sake.
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The message took as its starting point the consensus within the United States on 
non-intervention in Europe: the US, it made clear, had explicitly set aside any 
thought of a global push to spread any particular form of government. American 
policy towards Europe, Monroe asserted, was “not to interfere in the internal 
concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the 
legitimate government for us”. In reciprocity for this blanket disengagement 
from political judgment, he explained, the US expected Europeans to refrain 
from interfering with the politics of American nations. In the Americas, 
circumstances were “eminently and conspicuously different” than elsewhere, he 
said. It was “impossible” that the European monarchies “should extend their 
political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace 
and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if  left to 
themselves, would adopt it of their own accord.”140
Adams, as Bemis characterises his view, thought that there were “two separate 
systems, two spheres” in operation.141 The purpose of Monroe’s message, he 
felt, should be to assert American principles, and
.. .while disclaiming all intention of attempting to propagate them by force, and 
all interference with the political affairs o f Europe, to declare an expectation and 
hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread 
their principles in the American hemisphere.. ,142
Compared with the hegemonic charter that the Monroe Doctrine would 
ultimately become (later in the 19th Century), the pronouncement itself was mild. 
It was accompanied by no military mobilisation of the sort necessary to enforce 
the sweeping prohibitions it purported to declare.143 In another of the ironies
140 James Monroe, Address to Congress, (Dec 2, 1823), in Richard Maidment and Michael 
Dawson (eds), The United States in the Twentieth Century: Key Documents, 2nd ed. (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton Educational, 1999), pp.301-2. Quotation from p.302
141 Bemis, JQA, p.364
142 Ibid. p.387
143 In this respect the early Monroe Doctrine resembled the later ‘Open Door’ policy towards 
China, rebuked by realist thinkers for its universal scope and non-existent practical follow- 
through. See Kennan, American Diplomacy.
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pertaining to America’s intellectual aversion to the European balance of power, 
Monroe’s strategy depended for implementation on a coincidence of interests 
with Britain: It was Britain’s control of the seas, and its ability to apply pressure 
in Europe, that gave practical effect to America’s ‘hands o ff  proclamation. 
Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine was a significant ideological pronouncement. 
Later, it would provide the political basis for a raft of regional police actions. 
More immediately, it rounded out the logic of the Washington-Jefferson 
consensus on foreign policy.
The Monroe Doctrine announced a spheres-of-influence arrangement of sorts 
with Europe, a realistic attempt to maximise benefits to the United States given 
its capabilities and the international context. However, like Washington’s and 
Jefferson’s pronouncements, it formulated the strategy in such as way as to 
intellectually ‘remove’ the United States from the broader international system, 
and the European the balance of power. The US portrayed itself as different from 
the European nations, who fought for their interests in an inescapable and 
competitive system of rival states. Instead, it extended Washington’s formulation 
of ‘separateness’ to imply that in the Americas a new system of states was 
coming into existence, and that the members of this system had interests that 
were not so much in conflict with those of European nations as, in some abstract 
sense, separate or detached from them.
As one of Washington’s ministers abroad, Adams had concluded that “it is our 
duty to remain the peaceful and silent, though sorrowful, spectators of the 
European scene”.144 This agreement with the emerging dominant philosophy of 
detachment stayed with him as he rose politically, ultimately captured in his 
epigrammatic contribution to US strategic thought to the effect that “America is 
the well wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and 
vindicator only of her own.”145 In line with the prevailing consensus, he took the 
view that the “political system of the United States is .. .extra-European... [F]or 
the repose of Europe, as well as of America, the European and American
144 ‘Marcellus’ letter, cited in Bemis, JQA, p.364
145 Speech, July 4, 1821, Ibid, pp.364-65
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political systems should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as 
possible.”146
The Adams/Monroe expansion of the US sphere was a development of national 
strategy based on changing national circumstances. The economic strength, 
geographical size and geopolitical weight of the US were all increasing, while 
the ability of Europeans to project power in Latin America was constrained by 
internal division. The Monroe Doctrine was thus an attempt to raise the 
ideological horizons of the United States to the hemispheric level, as realism 
would predict in such circumstances, while also developing the parallel 
ideological dimension of separation. In 1825, Adams, now president himself, 
explained how he had sought to locate the strategy as a steady evolution from 
Washington’s Farewell:
.. .[T]he period which he predicted as then not far off has arrived... America has 
a set o f primary interests which have none or a remote relation to Europe,
.. .[and] the interference o f Europe, therefore, in those concerns should be 
spontaneously withheld by her upon the same principles that we have never 
interfered with hers... [I]f she should interfere.. .we might be called . . .  to take 
an attitude which would cause our own neutrality to be respected, and choose 
peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, should counsel.147
Interestingly, as they looked ahead to a future in which the Americas would be 
populated by a multiplicity of independent states, US leaders did not reprise the 
arguments of their own constitutional debate in the 1780s to infer that an 
American balance of power system, and therefore a new insecurity, might loom 
as a result. Instead, the overwhelming power-predominance that the US enjoyed 
within the Western Hemisphere convinced them that a benign and cooperative 
‘American system’ would emerge, distinct in character from that of Europe. 
Exclusion of Europeans was required in order to prevent the emergence of 
countervailing power centres that could threaten this assumption of benign US
146 Instructions to Henry Middleton, minister to Russia, Ibid, p.365
147 Special message to the House requesting appointment of ministers to Panama convention, 
March 15, 1826, Ibid, p. 554-55
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hegemony, and also corrupt the system with the values of European power 
politics. The assertion of unchallengeable US primacy in its own environs, 
always implicit even in the first arguments in favour of Union, had now emerged 
as an entirely explicit feature of the ideological consensus. Both Adams and his 
Secretary of State Henry Clay used the phrase ‘American System’ to describe the 
interrelation of states in the Western Hemisphere. It was intended to 
communicate the idea of a separate sphere of international relations operating on 
somehow distinctively ‘American’ principles, i.e. without the compulsive war of 
the European balance of power.
The aging Jefferson approved of this new hemispheric scope for US policy. In 
retirement in 1813 he wrote of his doubts concerning how well democracy might 
flower in Latin American nations, but nevertheless felt that their proximity to US 
influence and the exclusion of European interference would maintain the 
separation between American and European affairs:
In whatever governments they end, they will be American governments, no longer 
to be involved in the never-ceasing broils o f Europe. The European nations 
constitute a separate division o f the globe; their localities make them part o f a 
distinct system; they have a set o f interests o f their own in which it is our 
business never to engage ourselves. America has a hemisphere to itself. It must 
have its separate system of interests, which must not be subordinated to those o f  
Europe. The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent, 
should so far avail it that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters o f the 
globe should be wafted across the wide oceans which separate us from them. And 
it will be so.148
In a letter to his former acolyte Monroe, towards the end of his life, Jefferson 
endorsed the principles of the doctrine the president would shortly be 
proclaiming to the world:
148 To Alexander von Humboldt, Dec 6, 1813, Jefferson, p. 1312.
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Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the 
broils o f Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis- 
Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set o f interests distinct from 
those o f Europe, and peculiarly her own, separate and apart from that o f Europe. 
While the last is labouring to become the domicile o f despotism, our endeavour 
should be, to make our hemisphere that o f freedom.149
The political journey made by Jefferson and his party is illustrated by his easy 
acceptance by this period of the British role in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine.
By 1823 the former devotee of the French Revolution could observe with 
pleasure that Britain was a highly useful ally in preserving America’s 
separateness, and was a nation with which America “should most sedulously 
cherish a cordial friendship.”150 If Hamilton had lived, he would no doubt have 
appreciated the irony.151
Conclusion
This detailed study of what American leaders thought and said during the 
emergence of what I have termed the Founders’ Era consensus tells us that 
American strategy in this period was, on the whole, realistic in character. The 
creation of the Union itself was the conscious product of realist thinking about 
international order, and was an effort to avoid the replication of the European 
balance of power in America. Showing a sound awareness of America’s 
capabilities after Union, and seizing on the unique advantages conferred upon the 
US by geography, the Founders ultimately judged that the new nation’s interests 
would best be served by the pursuit of a strict policy of non-interference in 
European affairs in order to avoid war. As the nation grew stronger, they built on 
this foundational consensus by seeking to exclude powerful outsiders from the 
Western Hemisphere and to establish a hegemonic role for the US in the region.
149 To James Monroe, Oct 24, 1823, Jefferson, p. 1481-2.
150 Ibid p. 1482.
151 Hamilton died in 1804, shot in illegal duel with Jefferson’s Vice-President, Aaron Burr. This 
was considered only slightly less outrageous an occurrence at the time than it would be today, 
and Burr became a fugitive as a result.
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These were not inevitable choices: the rejection of the 1787 Constitution, or US 
entry into Europe’s wars in the hope of material gain or ideological gratification, 
represented serious alternatives to the choices actually made by US leaders. 
Nevertheless, American policy can be explained as the pursuit of a coherent 
vision of the national interest.
The strategy pursued in this period, however, also had ideological consequences 
for the longer term. Americans faced two issues entering the Founders’ Era: 
relations between the American states themselves, and relations between the 
states collectively and Europe. The former was resolved not by a scheme for the 
coexistence of sovereign equals in a competitive balance of power, but by a 
Union averting the prospect of such a system in America. The latter was resolved 
not by the acceptance of a role for the United States competing in the global 
balance of power with Europeans, but again by rejection of the ‘balance of 
power’ system: Washington, Jefferson and their successors agued that geography 
and political circumstance afforded the US the opportunity to separate and 
insulate itself from global balance of power politics. The language with which 
America’s leaders crafted their consensus did not facilitate thinking of America’s 
national interest in terms of a competitive global balance of power. Instead it 
encouraged the belief that the balance of power was a European system from 
which the United States could remain detached. The United States did not have 
interests in competition with Europeans; rather, its interests existed in a 
conceptually separate geopolitical space. The US refused to engage with political 
and military issues in Europe, and sought to exclude Europeans -  the dominant 
powers in the global system -  from the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. The 
‘American system’ was to be a separate domain, one of cooperation, dominated 
by the United States.
It cannot be denied that in reality the destiny of the US was much affected by the 
international balance of power. Americans achieved independence through the 
operation of the European balance of power, and pursued Union because they 
were aware of the nature of that system. In their pursuit of neutrality and their 
management of relations with Europe during its extended wars, America’s 
leaders displayed a good deal of realism and intelligence in their efforts to seek
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national advantage in a challenging international environment shaped by brutal 
competition for power. Ultimately, the strategy that they pursued successfully 
achieved a spheres-of-influence division of the world.
Crucially, however, amid all of this realist practice, they did not lay the 
intellectual ground for America to conceive of itself as operating within a 
balance of power system, pursuing its national interests in competition with 
others. Instead, their discourse of separateness encouraged a perception of 
American detachment, of existence in a sphere of interests unconnected with the 
European/global system. This ideological legacy of the Founders’ Era provided 
the basis of the foreign policy perspective often simplified in analysis as 
‘isolationism’. When national and international circumstances changed -  when 
growing American power and events in the international system called for 
increased American involvement beyond the Western Hemisphere -  US leaders 
thus had to contend with an established ideological consensus that conceived of 
the United States not as an interested participant in the global balance of power 
system, but as a morally superior outsider. This would have significant 
consequences for the nature of American internationalism.
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3. Theodore Roosevelt
‘The nation that has dared to be great’ 152
Introduction
The United States had come a long way by the turn of the 20th Century.
Territorial expansion had given it possession of land stretching from the Eastern 
Seaboard to the Pacific Ocean, encompassing a vast swath of North America. 
Immigration and fertility had taken its population from 4 million in 1790 to 76.2
1 Omillion in 1900. The expansion of industry and commerce had transformed the 
primarily agricultural nation of 1787 into one of the economic powerhouses of 
the developed world. All the ingredients were in place for the United States to 
play a major role in the global balance of power.
This chapter and the next, covering the presidencies and ideas of Theodore 
Roosevelt (1901-09) and Woodrow Wilson (1913-21), which in terms of the 
thesis argument form an interlinked pair, discuss American leaders’ eventual 
translation of this potential for power into actual global influence. Realist 
analysis tells us that the huge growth in US power capabilities by 1900 
predictably led it to expand the scope of its definition of the national interest.154 
Structural analysis of events in America’s international environment in this 
period, especially during Wilson’s presidency, also illustrates the pressures for 
increased US activism brought to bear by the international system. The 
destructive operation of the European balance of power, which once again 
brought about global war, created circumstances in which US leaders felt pushed 
to pursue a more globally engaged foreign policy.
152 Phrase quoted in Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex, (New York: Random House, 2001) p.24.
153 US censuses for the relevant years at http://www. 1930census.eom/l 790 census.nhn. [accessed 
19/06/08]
154 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, offers such an analysis and argues that the process was well 
underway by the turn of the century.
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The thesis argues for the importance of a parallel ideological dimension to 
events. Roosevelt and Wilson did not exist in a political vacuum, free to change 
the established course of US foreign policy through fiat. They needed to offer 
coherent strategic explanation of the need for a change in national course. In 
doing so, they were significantly constrained by the established ideological 
tradition of US foreign policy. In other words, they needed to contend, even as 
they broke new ground, with the deeply rooted consensus dating from the 
Founders’ Era. To paraphrase a later president, they needed to build a bridge to 
the 20 Century. These chapters seek to argue that the nature of the American 
internationalism constructed in this period was significantly shaped by this need 
to build an ideological bridge from the prior tradition of ‘non-entangled’ aversion 
to the balance-of-power system to the new necessity of engaging with the global 
international system.
The result -  as set out in detail in the body of this chapter and the next -  was an 
American internationalism that emphasised liberal universalism, concerned itself 
inextricably with the internal politics of other states, and considered the price of 
US engagement to be the pursuit of a cooperative new order among nations. The 
‘road not taken’ was a self-conscious realist strategic perspective, conceiving of 
the United States as a regular participant of a global balance of power and 
seeking to advance its interests, narrowly defined, in competitive coexistence 
with the system’s other states. Even Theodore Roosevelt -  the focus of this 
chapter -  who was among the most ‘realistic’ of America’s historical leaders, 
characterised the expansion of America’s international role in moralistic terms, 
justifying a new militarism and internationalism by reference to the progress of 
‘civilisation’ and liberal imperialist assumptions regarding relations with most 
other nations.
The chapter first describes the national and international context in which 
America was operating in this tum-of-the-century period. It then sets out over 
several sections the ways in which Roosevelt’s bold internationalist ideology 
sought to push the limits imposed by the inherited tradition of detachment to 
produce a more globally active US policy. In the course of doing so, it 
acknowledges the realist aspect of his thought, but also emphasises the equal if
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not greater importance of the elements of moralism and liberal imperialism in his 
contribution to American political ideology. Further, it shows how his deepening 
of the Monroe Doctrine, combined with his civilisational imperialism, prefigured 
Wilsonianism in laying a template for the universalist and interventionist 
American internationalism of later decades. The importance attributed by 
Roosevelt to military strength even in peacetime is also highlighted. This was out 
of step with the traditions of American thought prior to, and indeed during, 
Roosevelt’s time, but his views would become established as mainstream after 
World War II.
In providing this detailed portrayed of Rooseveltian thinking on foreign policy, 
the aim of the chapter is to show that even as the shifting circumstances of the 
nation, internal and external, pushed it towards a new global engagement, the 
ideology that began to take shape was not balance-of-power realism, but 
something more liberal and universalist, perhaps even imperialist, in character. In 
the past, the realism of American leaders had led them, based on their reading of 
America’s capabilities and circumstances, to shun the global balance of power. 
Now that the imperative was instead to engage with the global system, America’s 
embedded ideology of detachment faced a challenge. The ideological visions that 
contended to displace the Founders’ Era consensus, however, were themselves 
inheritors of that era’s aversion to balance-of-power thinking, and the result 
would be a new American internationalism significantly at odds with realism’s 
prescribed attitude to international relations.
National and international context
The watershed event symbolising the United States’ arrival as a global power 
was the Spanish-American war of 1898. That conflict was prompted by Spain’s 
weakening grip on Cuba, its last remaining possession of significance in the 
Americas. The US saw opportunity in the crisis not merely to do a good turn for 
the Cubans, who had risen up in rebellion and faced harsh Spanish 
countermeasures, but also to further its own project of US dominion in the 
Western Hemisphere. Theodore Roosevelt, serving during the build-up to war as
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Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and a vocal advocate of war, summed up its 
justification as follows: “[F]irst, the advisability on the grounds of both humanity 
and self-interest of interfering on behalf of the Cubans, and of taking one more 
step toward the complete freeing of America from European dominion; second, 
the benefit done our people by giving them something to think about which isn’t 
material gain, and especially the benefit done our military forces by trying both 
the Navy and Army in actual practice.” 155
The incumbent administration of William McKinley was not especially devoted 
to foreign policy. It had won power in 1896 chiefly for domestic reasons, 
because the populist railing of the Democrats’ William Jennings Bryan against 
plutocracy and the gold standard had terrified the conservative Gilded Age 
establishment. But the growing underlying strength of the United States in terms 
of men and money had already done enough to turn some minds to the nation’s 
untapped potential as an international actor, and Spain’s problems on its doorstep 
presented a very public opportunity. Pressure for action was thus already intense 
when the actual spark for war arrived: an explosion on the American battleship 
Maine in Havana harbour, sinking the vessel along with more than 250 of its 
crew. Though no Spanish involvement could be demonstrated, in the tense 
context it gave American hawks enough to launch their first war with a European 
power since 1812.156
Though possessed only of relatively small armed forces with limited equipment 
and training, the Americans triumphed against sclerotic Spain, a well-chosen 
enemy. In the space of a few months, American forces occupied Cuba, as well as 
Puerto Rico. In the Pacific, in accordance with secret Navy Department plans, 
pre-positioned ships pulverised the Spanish fleet at Manila, adding the 
Philippines to the haul. Adding further to the expansionists’ satisfaction,
155 To John Davis Long, Nov. 19, 1897, in Theodore Roosevelt, Letters and Speeches, (New 
York: Library of America, 2004), pp. 122-3.
156 Despite enquiries, there has never been a definitive explanation of the Maine's fate. But 
Roosevelt summed up the prevailing attitude of the time when he wrote:: “It may be impossible 
to ever settle definitively whether or not the Maine was destroyed through some treachery upon 
the part of the Spanish. The coincidence of her destruction with her being anchored off Havana 
by an accident such as has never before happened, is unpleasant enough to seriously increase the 
many existing difficulties between ourselves and Spain.” Letter to John Davis Long, Jan. 14,
1898, L&S, p. 136.
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Congress took advantage of the exuberance of wartime to annex the islands of 
Hawaii via a joint resolution, a project that had been stalled in the machinery of 
government for years. It was, as Ambassador to England and soon-to-be
1 57Secretary of State John Hay jauntily observed, “a splendid little war”. The 
national and international context of the United States in this period, then, was 
defined by strength and confidence, in stark contrast to the Founders’ Era. 
America’s underlying basis -  in wealth, territory and population -  for projecting 
power had reached unprecedented levels. Abroad, it had announced this reality 
by dealing the deathblow to a sickly European empire, and confirmed the 
unchallengeable supremacy of the Monroe Doctrine in the West.
The world at this time was, as a hundred years before, dominated by European 
states. Britain had recovered from the loss of America to build a vast global 
empire. France, after many experiments, had adopted constitutional democracy, 
and rivalled Britain in its pursuit of imperial possessions around the globe. At the 
heart of Europe, the state of Germany had been united by Prussian diplomacy 
and conquest, placing a rising new power of great potential at the continent’s 
centre. Russia still struggled with the economic and political primitivism of its 
huge territory, but its sophisticated ruling class could still leverage its sheer scale 
to sustain great power status.
Through colonialism and the evolution of an increasingly sophisticated 
international economic system, the world had become more thoroughly 
‘Europeanised’ than ever before. The modem bureaucratic states evolved in 
Europe, and the balance of power in which they vied with one another, had 
become de facto the global system. Asia had become an increasingly important 
arena, for two reasons. First, Japan’s successful emulation of Western methods 
had set it on track to be the first non-Westem member of the modem great power 
state system. Second, the fragile Chinese state, simultaneously preserved and 
dominated by the great powers, had become a theatre for the pursuit of economic 
and political rivalry between them.158 In this period, the United States needed to
157 Quoted in Jones, Limits, p.401.
158 For a survey of the world in this period see William R. Key lor, The Twentieth Century World: 
An International History, 4th ed., (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp.3-39
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envision a strategic role for itself. Its power capabilities enabled it to join this 
‘Europeanised’ world as a great power; indeed, the scale of its power rendered 
non-involvement extremely difficult. Yet its foreign policy tradition encouraged 
non-entanglement in the balance of power between Europeans. It would be 
difficult, but ultimately necessary, to reconcile these facts.
The *strenuous life’ and the pursuit of national greatness159
The celebrated seizure of the Philippines was partly thanks to Theodore 
Roosevelt’s tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Secretary of the Navy 
Long being out of Washington, Roosevelt was “misguiding the Department in his 
absence” and ordered the pre-positioning of the necessary ships.160 That plan in 
motion, he promptly resigned his post and took to the Cuban battlefield, where 
he saw heavily publicized action with a volunteer cavalry regiment, the so-called 
‘Rough Riders’. Prominent association with a short, triumphant war made him a 
national hero almost overnight. This he used as a springboard to political office, 
capturing the governorship of New York as a front man for party boss Thomas C. 
Platt.
159 Biographical information originates mainly from Morris, Theodore Rex and The Rise o f  
Theodore Roosevelt, (New York, Random House, 2001). Direct Roosevelt quotations come 
chiefly from Theodore Roosevelt, Letters and Speeches, (New York: Library of America, 2004, 
ed. by Louis Auchincloss), and Theodore Roosevelt, The Man in the Arena: Selected Writings o f  
Theodore Roosevelt, (New York: Forge, 2003, ed. by Brian M. Thomsen), hereafter labelled 
‘L&S’ and ‘MIA’ respectively. More specific references accompany each quotation. The TR 
literature, like the man himself, is often gripped by the colourful story of the man’s life and by 
questions of individual psychology and image projection e.g. Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: 
A Life, (Harper Perennial, 1994), or, noting and attempting to buck this trend with a more critical 
approach, Kathleen Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life, (Knopf, 2002). Specifically 
on his foreign policy, Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise o f America to World 
Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956) was the standard work, presenting arguments 
regarding his assertion of the Monroe Doctrine and imperialist mindset with which this chapter 
large agrees and arguments concerning his balance-of-power attitude to broader policy which it 
seeks to qualify somewhat. Taking a thematic approach and placing significant emphasis on 
morality and idealism as drivers is Frederick W. Marks III, Velvet on Iron: the Diplomacy o f 
Theodore Roosevelt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979). A biographical account 
usefully aimed at comparison and contrast with Woodrow Wilson is John Milton Cooper, The 
Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, (Harvard University Press, 
1985).
160 To RudyardKipling, Jan 1898, L&S, p. 130. See also Orders to the Asiatic Squadron, Feb 25, 
1898, ibid, p. 141.
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Within two years he was bounced upstairs to the vice presidency after proving 
too independent for the comfort of his backroom sponsor. The elevation at first 
appeared of dubious benefit to a man of ambition; Roosevelt only accepted 
because he felt he had little choice, and was soon uttering the complaints of 
alienation from power familiar to many holders of the office. “The man who 
occupies it may at any moment be everything,” he lamented, “but meanwhile he 
is practically nothing.” 161 Fortunately for Roosevelt, though not for his 
immediate superior, the meanwhile did not in this case last long. Shot and 
mortally wounded by an anarchist after a speech in September 1901, McKinley 
yielded to ‘Tecumseh’s Curse’ and the presidency fell to his turbulent 
understudy. Or as Senator Mark Hanna, the Republican fixer behind McKinley’s 
successes, put it despairingly: “Now look -  that damned cowboy is President of 
the United States.” 162 He was 42.
Such was Roosevelt’s exuberance that he appeared to many a larger-than-life,
even cartoonish character. Playing tennis in rain or shine, indulging in boxing
and martial arts to unwind (with a predictably long list of injuries) and notorious
for forcing lunch guests, foreign dignitaries included, to accompany him on
arduous outward-bound treks, he was by some distance America’s most
physically adventurous president. His company could also be overpowering
verbally: guests were “overwhelmed in a torrent of oratory” which even his
friend Henry Adams sometimes found “mortifying beyond even drunkenness.
The worst of it is that it is mere cerebral excitement, of normal, or at least
habitual, nature. It has not the excuse of champagne, the wild talk about
everything.. .belonged not to the bar-room but the asylum... When I was let out
and got to bed, I was a broken man.” “Theodore is never sober,” he observed on
1 61another occasion, “only he is drunk with himself and not with rum.” It was not’ 
difficult to see why one recipient of the Roosevelt treatment advised visitors, 
tongue in cheek, that “you must always remember that the president is about
161 To Leonard Wood, April 17, 1901, L&S, p. 225.
162 Quoted in Morris, Theodore Rex, p. 30.
163 Adams quoted in Morris, p. 307, p. 82.
164 Quotation from Cecil Spring-Rice. For discussion of TR’s extraordinary range of activities see 
Morris, pp.81, 108, 246, 376, 532
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The compulsive dynamism was the product of a philosophy of self-improvement 
through incessant activity. TR was committed to, even obsessed by, the idea that 
to be good a man had to embrace the path of action; to “be the man who is 
actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood”. Win or 
lose, such a man was superior to the “cold and timid souls who know neither 
victory nor defeat”.165 Leon Bazalgette, who wrote the first biography of TR, 
noted that: “To live, for him, has no meaning other than to drive oneself, to act 
with all one’s strength. An existence without stress, without struggle, without 
growth has always struck him as mindless. Those who remain on the sidelines he 
sees as cowards, and consequently his personal enemies.”166
Crucial to understanding Roosevelt’s foreign policy thinking is appreciating that 
he considered the same philosophy to apply to nations as to men. Acutely 
conscious that the United States had risen to potential great power status, he 
made it his work to exhort, cajole and scold the American people and their 
representatives until they embraced the role and responsibilities this entailed. As 
governor of New York, he expressed his expectations by means of aggressive 
rhetorical enquiry: “Is America a weakling to shrink from the world work of the 
great world powers?” The answer, he declared, must be “No.”167
Indeed, the purpose of the ‘Strenuous Life’ speech, which famously set out his 
personal ethos, was to draw this link between how each American should live 
and how America as a whole should carry itself. “As it is with the individual, so 
it is with the nation,” he proclaimed. “ .. .Far better it is to dare mighty things, to 
win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to take rank with 
those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in 
the gray twilight that knows not victory nor defeat.”168 The country most to be 
admired was that prepared to “boldly face the life of strife... provided we are 
certain that the strife is justified, for it is only through strife, through hard and
165 ‘Citizenship in a Republic’, Address at the Sorbonne, Paris, April 23, 1910, L&S, p. 783.
166 Quoted in Morris p. 420-21.
167 Ibid., p. 8.
168 Roosevelt, ‘The Strenuous Life’, Speech to the Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899, L&S, 
pp. 755-66, L&S, pp. 756-7.
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dangerous endeavour, that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national 
greatness.”169
In advancing such views, TR signalled himself as the first top-tier political leader 
to openly confront the mindset of the Founders’ Era consensus and argue the 
case for a bold new global role. America’s tradition of shunning involvement in 
non-American affairs was, to his mind, in danger of becoming dangerously 
outmoded. “There is scant room in the world at large for the nation with mighty 
thews that dares not to be great,” he had told an audience in 1901, and he would 
not rest until the American people had been persuaded that modem conditions 
demanded a more active foreign policy.170 Having resoundingly defeated the 
colourless Democrat Alton Parker in 1904 to win a term in his own right, 
Roosevelt used his Inaugural Address to remind the nation that:
Much has been given us, and much will rightfully be expected from us. .. We 
have become a great nation, forced by the fact o f its greatness into relations with 
the other nations o f the earth, and we must behave as beseems a people with such 
responsibilities.171
Perhaps thinking of Jefferson’s expressed ideal of emulating China’s relation to 
the world, TR more than once cited China as an example of repugnantly passive 
foreign policy, lambasting those politicians he believed sought to “Chinafy” the 
nation. “We cannot, if we would, play the part of China,” he expounded, “and be 
content to rot by inches in ignoble ease within our borders, taking no interest in 
what goes on beyond them, sunk in a scrambling commercialism; heedless of the 
higher life, the life of aspiration, of toil and risk .172 If the United States opted to 
pursue this policy, it would eventually “go down before other nations that have
169 Ibid, p 765-6
170 ‘National Duties’, Speech at the Minnesota State Fair, St Paul, September 2, 1901, L&S, p. 
768.
171 Inaugural Address, March 4, 1905,
http://www.homeofheroes.com/presidents/inaugural/26 teddv.html. [accessed 19/06/08]. Parker 
had declared in the campaign that “I protest against the feeling, now far too prevalent, that by 
reason of the commanding position we have assumed in the world we must take part in the 
disputes and broils of foreign countries.” Quoted in Morris, p.350.
172 The word “Chinafy” is from Letter to Hugo Munsterberg, L&S, p.693; Longer quotation from 
‘The Strenuous Life’, L&S, p.757.
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not lost the manly and adventurous qualities”.173 A published historian, TR 
identified himself with the pro-army, strong state ethos of the Federalists and had 
a marked dislike of Jefferson, whom he described as “perhaps the most incapable 
executive that ever filled the national chair; being almost purely a visionary, he 
was utterly unable to grapple with the slightest actual danger.” 174
Opting out of the ‘responsibility’ of the United States to act as a global power, 
TR was insistent, was simply impermissible, as a matter of both prudence and 
ethics. Drawing a parallel with the individual’s responsibilities to both family 
and society he argued that “ .. .a nation’s first duty is within its own borders, [but] 
it is not thereby absolved from facing its duties in the world as a whole; and if it 
refuses to do so, it merely forfeits its right to struggle for a place among the 
peoples that shape the destiny of mankind.”175 The attainment of this historical 
‘place’ was essential to Roosevelt, and underlay his determination that the US 
should make its mark on the development of what he termed ‘civilisation’. This 
was his ultimate test of national success, and by passing it American might 
achieve a kind of notional immortality. Nations, like men, were transient, but 
“the nation that has dared to be great, that has had the will and the power to 
change the destiny of the ages... really continues, though in a changed form, to 
live forevermore.”176
In making such claims Roosevelt drew parallels with the historical legacies built 
by Rome and Britain.177 The embrace of imperialism inherent in such 
comparisons was not out of character. Especially in pre-presidential days -  the 
practicalities of running the likes of the Philippines later dimmed his ardour- 
Roosevelt was explicitly and proudly imperialist in his outlook, albeit his was 
imperialism that nodded to the liberal principle that subject peoples should be 
beneficiaries of the process. As Britain had done in Egypt and India, he mused in
173 Ibid, pp.757-8
174 ‘1815: The Battle o f New Orleans’, MIA, p.85.
175 To Munsterberg., L&S p.763.
176 Quoted in Morris p.24.
177 See Morris, p.229; To Henry Cabot Lodge, L&S p. 186
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his ‘Strenuous Life’ address, “we will play our part in the great work of uplifting 
mankind”.178
Military strength, restraint and the ‘soldierly virtues*
A key step towards the embrace of global ‘responsibilities’, in Roosevelt’s mind, 
was expansion of the military, one of the most significant areas in which he used 
his leadership to challenge the existing consensus. Indeed, enlarging, 
strengthening and modernising the armed forces, particularly the navy, was the 
single most prominent concrete end sought by all his political pronouncements. 
The first address of importance he made in national office, to the Naval War 
College in 1897, was on the theme of ‘Washington’s Forgotten Maxim’, i.e. the 
old epigram that “to be prepared for war is the most effectual way to promote
170peace.” The prevailing attitude, however, in the tradition of Jeffersonian 
republicanism, was that a large military establishment would be the prelude to 
foreign wars and a threat to liberty at home. Roosevelt sought to turn the tables, 
arguing that weakness invited slights from other powers that could force the 
nation into conflicts for which it was ill prepared. There was “not the slightest 
danger of an over-development of warlike spirit” in America, he declared.180 On 
the contrary, the true danger lay in its underdevelopment. Paper guarantees of 
peace offered by the arbitration treaties popular in this period had their place, he 
felt; as president he engaged with efforts at an international regime for arbitration 
of disputes. But they were insufficient. “Arbitration is an excellent thing,” he 
insisted, “but ultimately those who wish to see this country at peace with foreign 
nations will be wise if they place reliance upon a first-class fleet of battleships 
rather than on any arbitration treaty which the wit of man can devise.”181 Far 
from undermining domestic liberty, Roosevelt believed that armed strength was 
key to preserving it:
178 ‘The Strenuous Life’, L&S, p.765.
179 ‘Washington’s Forgotten Maxim’, MIA, pp.315-31. The thought was hardly unique to 
Washington, of course.
180 Ibid, p.315.-
181 Ibid, p.316.
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It may be that at some time in the dim future.. .the need for war will vanish. But 
that time is yet ages distant. As yet no nation can hold its place in the world, or 
can do any work really worth doing, unless it stands ready to guard its rights with 
an armed hand. That orderly liberty which is both the foundation and the 
capstone o f our civilization can be gained and kept only by men who are willing 
to fight for an ideal.182
His view of the European great powers was unsentimental but probably accurate 
when he warned that “we shall keep the respect of each of them just so long as 
we are thoroughly able to hold our own, and no longer”. “If we got into trouble, 
there is not one of them whose friendship we could count on to get us out; what 
we shall need to count upon is the efficiency of our own fighting men and 
particularly of our navy.”183 “I have fought,” he wrote to the English diplomat 
Cecil Spring-Rice in 1907 “.. .to make our people understand that unless freedom 
shows itself compatible with military strength, with national efficiency, it will 
ultimately have to go to the wall.”184
As well as ships, national preparedness meant something less tangible: the 
inculcation fighting spirit in the people. “[T]he nation,” he insisted, “should have 
physical no less than moral courage.”185 Without this, it would be the prey of 
tougher powers. Americans had to “secure peace by being ready to fight for it”, 
and this necessitated holding onto “those most valuable of all qualities, the 
soldierly virtues”, “fighting qualities for the lack of which in a nation, as in an 
individual, no refinement, no culture, no wealth, no material prosperity can 
atone.”186 To Spring-Rice he wrote: “I abhor and despise that pseudo- 
humanitarianism which treats advance in civilization as necessarily and rightfully 
implying a weakening of the fighting spirit and which therefore invites
187destruction of the advanced civilization by some less-advanced type.”
182 ‘Washington’s Forgotten Maxim’, MIA p. 318
183 To Finley Peter Dunne, Nov 23, 1904, L&S, p. 366,
184 To Cecil Spring-Rice, Dec. 21, 1907, L&S, p. 544.
185 ‘Washington’s Forgotten Maxim’, MIA p. 318
186 Ibid, p.316.
187 To Cecil Spring-Rice, Dec. 21, 1907, L&S, p. 544.
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He posited a virtuous chain of intertwined goods. A proper navy and army would 
prepare the nation to face external threats. This would enrich the national 
character with martial virtues and manly self-respect. With both physical and 
spiritual strength thus in place, America would be placed to stake its claim to 
national greatness. The alternative was denial regarding the necessity of 
translating America’s size and status into global engagement: immersion instead 
in base materialism or, worse, ideological pacifism, bringing both vulnerability 
to external threats and moral degeneration. This was the world-view that gave 
rise to a plethora of ‘Rooseveltian’ maxims: “A nation that cannot fight is not 
worth its salt”; “Mere bigness, if it is also mere flabbiness, means nothing but 
disgrace”; “An unmanly desire to avoid a quarrel is often the surest way to 
precipitate one”. 188
Yet despite his militarism, and a fixation on ‘manliness’ that it would not tax 
gender theorists overly to deconstruct, Roosevelt did not see himself as an 
advocate of international aggression. Clearly -  irrefutably, indeed -  he had a 
deep emotional and intellectual attachment to an idealised notion of war. In spirit 
he always remained the man who told the Naval War College that “no triumph of 
peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war.”189 But his ideals of 
manly virtue, importantly, also encompassed a kind of moral restraint. Military 
strength might enable aggression abroad, but it could not justify it any more than 
individual power justified being a bully. And the bully was a species Roosevelt 
insisted he despised. “I am as intolerant of brutality and cruelty to the weak,” he 
insisted, “as I am intolerant of weakness and effeminacy.”190
Roosevelt’s most famous sentence on foreign policy illustrates this desire that the 
wielding of hard power be understated, though it is not always interpreted in this 
way. Borrowing what he alleged was a West African proverb, he summed up his 
prescribed ethos for policy in the Western Hemisphere thus: “Speak softly and
188 To Granville Stanley Hall, L&S, p. 183; To Elihu Root, L&S, p.315; ‘Washington’s Forgotten 
Maxim’, MIA, p.329. The sentiment behind this phrase is perhaps notable for its similarity to 
Donald Rumsfeld’s mantra that “weakness is provocative”. See ‘Secretary Rumsfeld Interview 
with the New York Times’, May 24, 2001,
http://www.defenselink.rn il/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcrintid:r= 1127. [accessed 19/06/08]
189 Ibid., p.318.
190 To Edwin Kirby Whitehead, Jan 13, 1899, L&S, p. 163.
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carry a big stick: you will go fa r . If the American nation will speak softly, and 
yet build, and keep at a pitch of the highest training, a thoroughly efficient navy, 
the Monroe Doctrine will go far.”191 Reaction to this remark, both 
contemporaneous and later, tended to emphasise the eye-catching stick. But it 
sits better with what Roosevelt was trying to achieve at the time -  to persuade a 
war-averse political class of the benefits of military spending -  and with a wider 
reading of his thought, to conclude that he intended the two elements of the 
proverb, strength and restraint, to share equal importance. The need for balance 
between underlying power and diplomatic caution was spelled out in a prior 
observation on the theme: “If a man continually blusters, if he lacks civility, a big 
stick will not save him from trouble; but neither will speaking softly avail, if
1QOback of the softness there does not lie strength, power.”
This aversion to “bluster” was not purely theoretical. When Admiral Dewey, the 
darling of the nation’s hawks after the triumph at Manila, later made public 
statements playing up America’s role in forcing Germany to pull back from an 
intervention in Venezuela, Roosevelt warned him sharply against such talk in 
public: “Say nothing that can be taken hold of by those anxious to foment trouble 
between ourselves and any foreign power... We are too big a people to be able to
» 1Q3 •  •be careless in what we say.” With power came the need for circumspection. 
Realism in Roosevelt
Roosevelt has won more approval from realist analysts than many American 
presidents. Kissinger argues that he “commands a unique position in America’s 
approach to international relations. No other president defined America’s role so 
completely in terms of the national interest, or identified the national interest so 
comprehensively with the balance of power.” Highlighting his appreciation of 
the limits international law and his emphasis on the value of military power,
191 Quoted in Morris, p. 215.
192 Quoted in Morris, p. 185. He may have had the German Kaiser in mind as he made this 
observation; Germany’s manner in international dealings in this period was widely perceived as 
dangerously abrasive.
193 Quoted in Morris, p.210.
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Kissinger suggests that TR “taught an especially stem doctrine for a people 
brought up in the belief that peace is the normal condition among nations, that 
there is no difference between personal and public morality, and that America 
was safely insulated from the upheavals affecting the rest of the world.” His 
willingness to accept the idea of regional control of the weak by the strong in a 
spheres-of-influence system shows him to be possessed of “European-style 
views”, according to Kissinger: “He approached the global balance of power 
with a sophistication matched by no other American president.”194
There is truth to this. It is certainly correct that Roosevelt was closer to the realist 
perspective than his near-contemporary Wilson, who has always been loathed by 
realists for his perceived embodiment of a high-flown liberal idealism 
underappreciative of reality’s limits. If realism is defined by its focus on the 
national interest, then certainly key events in Roosevelt’s presidency lend weight 
to his credentials. His grandest project was realising the longstanding scheme to 
link the Caribbean to the Pacific with a canal. This was made possible by 
Roosevelt’s apparent involvement, in 1903, in the Panamanian conspiracy to 
secede from Colombia, after the Colombian Senate had rejected a canal deal 
previously agreed with the US.195 An immense strategic gain -  an isthmian canal 
under American control -  was thus achieved by means of a covert plan that 
undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation. “I have no 
use for a government that would do what that government has done,” Roosevelt 
observed dismissively of the authorities in Bogota upon learning of their 
rejection of the original deal.196
In dealing with weightier powers he was similarly hard-nosed. The 
reinvigoration of the Monroe Doctrine, which purported to exclude European
197powers from Latin America, was a notable feature of Roosevelt’s presidency.
In one notable instance, he apparently used back-channel threats to fend off
194 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Touchstone, 1995), p.39, pp. 39-40, p.40, p.41. 
Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, also gives credence to the idea of TR as a follower of balance of 
power thinking, albeit with the greater subtlety allowed by much greater space devoted to the 
topic.
l9i Morris, pp.272-306.
196Quoted in Morris, p.275.
197 See the relevant section below.
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Germany’s desire to exploit Venezuelan debts and establish a colonial foothold 
in the Americas.198 Thus, he successfully defended the US sphere of influence 
through willingness to raise the threat of force, secretly and diplomatically but 
evidently with the necessary firmness.199
One of Roosevelt’s most celebrated diplomatic achievements, ultimately 
rewarded with the Nobel Prize for Peace, was convening successful talks to close 
the Russo-Japanese War. TR was generally pleased at the bloody nose delivered 
to Russian expansionism, but knew that even though they had won the fighting 
the Japanese needed a formal peace before their limited resources ran out.200 In 
negotiating a peace, he hoped to leave the two powers “locked in a clinch, 
counterweighing one another, and both kept weak by the effort”. The deal 
struck at Portsmouth, New Hampshire achieved something resembling that. In 
pursuit of the settlement, Roosevelt was prepared to endorse Japanese control 
over Korea, and thus to engage in realpolitik at the expense of professed 
American commitments to the territorial integrity of China and self- 
determination.202 This new degree of initiative and involvement in global great 
power affairs, manipulating a regional balance of power to American advantage, 
is perhaps the clearest example in support of the realist portrayal of Roosevelt; 
Kissinger predictably underlines it.203 Of the Portsmouth deal, Roosevelt 
observed: “It’s a might good thing for Russia, and a mighty good thing for 
Japan... [and] a mighty good thing for me too.”204
Finally, we might note Roosevelt’s cautious involvement in the 1906 Algeciras 
Conference on the control of Morocco. American participation was a sign of the 
nation’s rising global esteem, but also a breach of the non-entanglement 
consensus. As such the president was obliged to be careful, and kept American 
involvement to a reserved minimum. The United States agreed to attend the talks, 
but resisted weighing in on matters of substance, disappointing Germany’s hope
198 Morris, pp. 177-91.
199 He was aided by Britain’s lack of enthusiasm for supporting the German position.
2°° j ,q fheociore Roosevelt Jr, Feb 16, 1904, L&S, p.313.
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202 For an account of the Portsmouth peace talks, see Morris, pp. 402-14.
203 Kissinger, pp.41-42.
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that the US should boldly assert the principle of the ‘Open Door’ in such a way 
as to favour the German case in Morocco.205
In each of these instances, Roosevelt appeared comfortable treating the 
international system as a competitive arena in which states battled for their 
interests. This was not out of tune with his pre-presidential philosophy. During 
his time in the Navy Department he expressed the view that resisting German 
interference in Latin America was not a matter of abstract law and justice, but 
merely of conflicting interests:
. . .  [T]wo nations with violently conflicting interests may each be entirely right 
from its own standpoint... [A]s a German, I should be delighted.. .to defy the 
Americans and their Monroe Doctrine in South America... As an American I 
should advocate.. .keeping our Navy at a pitch that will enable us to interfere 
promptly if  Germany ventures to touch a foot o f American soil. I would not go 
into the abstract rights and wrongs o f it; I would simply say that we did not 
intend to have Germans on this continent.. .and if  Germany intended to extend 
her empire here she would have to whip us first... I should adopt [this course] 
without in the least feeling that the Germans who advocated German colonial 
expansion were doing anything save what was right and proper from the 
standpoint o f their own people. Nations may, and often must, have conflicting
interests, and in the present age patriotism stands a good deal ahead of
• 206 cosmopolitanism.
Moralism in Roosevelt
Kissinger suggests that Roosevelt offered a “stem doctrine” that sought to correct 
the American people’s wrong-headed assumption “that there is no difference 
between personal and public morality.”207 While the elements of realism in 
Roosevelt must be acknowledged, this particular argument is misleading, and
205 Morris, pp.432-33; 440-42 The ‘Open Door’ meant equal commercial rights for all powers; it 
was a term coined by Secretary of State John Hay to apply to China.
206 To Cecil Spring-Rice, Aug. 13, 1897, L&S, p. 108-9.
207 Kissinger, pp.39-40.
123
difficult to reconcile with Roosevelt’s stated beliefs. While his geopolitical 
sensibility was indeed strong, TR also had a potent moralistic dimension to his 
foreign policy thought. In one of his most important messages on foreign affairs, 
he declared that “a nation has no more right to do injustice to another nation, 
strong or weak, than an individual... ; that the same moral law applies in one 
case as in the other.”208 And in a high-profile address in 1910 he pronounced 
that: “I do not for one moment admit that political morality is different from 
private morality... I do not for one moment admit that a nation should treat other 
nations in a different spirit from that in which an honorable man would treat 
other men.”209
The determined sceptic might argue that such rhetoric concealed contrary beliefs. 
Yet one must then wonder why Roosevelt would bring the matter up in such 
terms at all if he did not sincerely believe his own statements; he was not, after 
all, under enquiry as to whether he bore realist sympathies. Certainly, such ideas 
fit the broader pattern of his thought. In contrast to Kissinger’s observation, it is 
striking the degree to which Roosevelt’s view of optimal foreign policy was an 
outgrowth of his moralistic standpoint regarding social life more generally. It has 
already been noted that his advocacy of ‘the strenuous life’ served to draw a 
parallel between the good life for an individual and for a nation. Similarly, in his 
distaste for bluster and bluffing he was apt to draw parallels with individual life. 
In a statement to Congress condemning declarations without proper backing, his 
choice of phrase was that the practice was “contemptible, for a nation, as for an 
individual”.210
The upshot of Roosevelt’s analogies between what the good man and the good 
nation ought to do was usually to recommend balance between insisting on 
American rights and respecting those of others. This was not crusading in tone, 
but it was certainly framed in moral terms, and often linked to the idea that the 
only really acceptable peace was a ‘righteous’ one:
208 Speech to Congress, Dec 6, 1904,
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[JQustice and generosity in a nation, as in an individual, count most when shown
not by the weak but by the strong. While ever careful to refrain from wronging
others, we must be no less insistent that we are not wronged ourselves. We wish
peace, but we wish the peace o f justice, the peace o f righteousness. We wish it
because we think it is right and not because we are afraid. N o  weak nation that
acts manfully and justly should ever have cause to fear us, and no strong power
211should ever be able to single us out as a subject for insolent aggression.
His programme of military strength and self-reliance was not justified simply by 
reference to the narrow national interest. The argument was broader: that 
America had a duty to contribute to civilisation -  through struggle, risk and 
sacrifice -  and that only the strong could fulfil such a duty. This was, in essence, 
the ‘moral case’ for a more militarised United States, and Roosevelt used it to 
justify his programme of naval expansion:
The little powers o f Europe, although in many cases they lead honorable and self-
respecting national lives, are powerless to accomplish any good in foreign
affairs.. .because they lack the element o f force behind their good wishes. We on
the contrary have been able to do so much... because, and only because, together
with the purpose to be just and to keep the peace we possess a navy which makes
it evident that we will not tamely submit to injustice, or tamely acquiesce in 
212breaking the peace.
There was nothing especially moral about peace per se, Roosevelt believed -  he 
was vocal about his loathing for pacifists -  and certainly nothing inherently 
immoral about war, which was often necessaiy to preserve or advance justice.
Yet some of his thoughts on the question of righteous war and ultimate peace 
look more like precursors of Wilsonianism than a realpolitik counterpoint to it.
In his foreign policy address to Congress in 1904, for example, TR pointed an 
accusing finger at tyrannical governments and seemed to imply that only a grand 
reshaping of the political order might bring the ultimate world peace founded on 
just principles:
211 Inaugural Address, op. cit..
212 To Theodore Elijah Burton, Feb, 23, 1904, L&S, p.318.
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There are kinds o f peace which are highly undesirable, which are in the long run 
as destructive as any war. Tyrants and oppressors have many times made a 
wilderness and called it peace... The peace o f tyrannous terror, the peace o f  
craven weakness, the peace o f injustice, all these should be shunned as we shun 
unrighteous war The goal to set before us as a nation, the goal which should be 
set before all mankind, is the attainment o f the peace o f justice, o f the peace 
which comes when each nation is not merely safe-guarded in its own rights, but 
scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty toward others. Generally peace tells 
for righteousness; but if  there is conflict between the two, then our fealty is due 
first to the cause o f righteousness.213
These were views in which he would find himself coinciding with Wilson after 
American entry into the Great War in 1917. During the neutrality that preceded 
that intervention, however, he criticised the president in harsh moral terms for his 
desperate efforts to stay out of the conflict. Roosevelt convinced himself that 
Wilson’s clinging to neutrality signalled him as either a coward or a cynical 
political operator manipulating anti-war sentiment for advantage. To his son 
Kermit he wrote in 1915: “I agree with all that you say about German brutality 
and ruthlessness. But after all, a brute is not any worse than a coward. Wilson is 
at heart an abject coward; or else he has a heart so cold and selfish that he is 
entirely willing to sacrifice the honor and the interest of his country to his own 
political advancement.”214 It was a charge he was happy to repeat to his political 
friends, and which he continued to make up until the eve of war.215
It is thus clear that designation of Roosevelt as a realist must be qualified by the 
observation that he was also fervently moralistic in the way that he thought about 
foreign policy, and self-aware about that fact. He argued that America should 
translate its wealth into military strength, not for the simple advancement of self- 
interest but as a weapon for use in the service of “righteousness”. That 
righteousness certainly included the solid defence of the nation’s interests, but
213 Speech to Congress Dec 6, 1904, op.cit..
214 To Kermit Roosevelt, Aug. 28, 1915, L&S, p.698.
215 See To Henry Cabot Lodge, Feb 20, 1917, L&S, p.718-9.
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there was also a broader agenda: The nation’s duty to arm itself was not merely 
prudential, but also a moral imperative. As he prepared to leave the White House 
in 1908, Roosevelt -  not at that time foreseeing the European war -  observed that 
his departure was probably timed right, because politics was turning more and 
more towards technocratic economic problems. Of such problems, he observed,
“I am not deeply interested in them: my problems are moral problems and my 
teaching has been plain morality.”216 Though certainly a militarist, who desired 
American participation in the arena of global power politics, there was a moral 
and civilisational dimension to Roosevelt’s ideology that should not lightly be 
dismissed.
The ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ and American quasi-imperialism
During Roosevelt’s presidency the United States still held back from full 
engagement with the strategic balance between the European powers, despite the 
president’s general enthusiasm for an active foreign policy. This was because, in 
the absence of a great external upheaval of the sort that would face Wilson in his 
second term, Roosevelt was still significantly constrained by the non­
entanglement consensus that had held sway for the previous century. Despite 
this, however, his ideas regarding increased national self-assertion and a 
civilising mission could still be expressed in other arenas, most especially the 
Western Hemisphere. Here the ideological and practical basis for US hegemony 
already existed thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, and Roosevelt sought to build on 
it.
In the aftermath of the German-Venezuelan crisis, Roosevelt was keenly aware 
that a blanket US guarantee to protect Latin American nations from European 
intervention had created moral hazard. If shielded by their northern neighbour 
from any threat of retribution, these states might run up bad debts with impunity. 
This dilemma provided the inspiration for Roosevelt’s famous ‘corollary’ to the 
Monroe Doctrine, which expanded the doctrine into its modem form. The
216 Quoted in Morris, p. 528.
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Corollary stated that if the US was to defend Latin American states in a crisis, 
then it was justly entitled to act against any wrongdoing on the part of those 
states that might provoke such a turn of events. This ideological tit-for-tat served 
-  from the US perspective, at least -  to legitimise ‘temporary’ seizure of parts of 
the Venezuelan fiscal apparatus to ensure sound management. This was the first 
instalment in a wide and deep pattern of regional interventionism that would 
unfold under Roosevelt and his successors.
Roosevelt’s concept o f ‘civilisation’ was to the fore in constructing the imagined 
legitimacy of this framework for regional relations. The Corollary was based on 
the idea that civilised nations had a duty to monitor and re-educate those states 
where civilisation was less developed. Under conditions where “chronic 
wrongdoing, or... impotence... results in a general loosening of the ties of 
civilized society”, he argued, “intervention by some civilized nation” might be 
required. Within the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine this meant the 
“exercise of an international police power” by the United States, “however 
reluctantly”. He was naturally eager to disavow any “land hunger” on the part of 
the United States; the proposed interventionism was argued to be for the good of 
the nations in question, improving internal order and in ensuring that no 
European predations were justified. “All that this country desires is to see the
•  9 1 7neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous,” he professed.
Perhaps the single most important conceptual move in the ideological 
legitimisation of the Roosevelt Corollary was the assertion that “our interests and 
those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical”. This ideological 
conflation of US interests with those of others meant that even as the United 
States asserted the power to decide unilaterally when and where to intervene, it 
could also argue that the affected nations ought not to see US oversight as an 
intrusion based on an imposed hierarchy, but as a mutually beneficial process. 
This sort of thinking would later be central to Wilsonianism too. So long as “the 
reign of law and justice” held sway within their borders and they obeyed “the
217 Speech to Congress Dec 6, 1904, op.cit..
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primary laws of civilized society”, Latin American states need fear no
1^0
interference.
Here we find some shoots of ideological divergence from realist thinking 
regarding the state system. On one level, the Monroe Doctrine had always been a 
realist proposition: a spheres-of-influence arrangement dividing up the world’s 
regions and allocating them to the management of local great powers. At the 
same time, however, the United States’ management of the ‘American System’ 
within the Western Hemisphere had provided it with a laboratory within which to 
develop new ideas of international order that it would later seek -  via 
Wilsonianism -  to apply at a global level. These ideas concerning international
0 1Qorder are perhaps best described as liberal quasi-imperialism.
Within the American System, the United States considered itself to be engaged 
not in power balancing or outright exploitation, but in the management of an 
order based on (a) its own hegemony (b) a conception of ‘civilisation’ defined by 
the hegemon, and (c) an insistence that this civilised order was based on 
fundamentally harmonious, or identical, national interests. Though the point was 
never explicitly spelled out, it was a fundamental assumption that the prerogative 
of identifying and acting on the ‘common interest’ lay with the US alone. This 
unarticulated but central principle of unaccountable-yet-legitimate leadership 
was key to understanding the ideology of American interventionism that would 
follow, including Wilsonianism and its successor creeds. Without an 
understanding of the role of this ideological conviction, subsequent US policy 
appears cynically disingenuous. With it, it takes on the aspect of a well 
intentioned but deeply chauvinistic, even solipsistic, enterprise, and that is on 
balance a more accurate portrayal. Roosevelt’s thinking was liberal in the sense 
that it viewed freedom, development and self-government as the ideal for other 
nations, but also imperialistic in seeking to impose American parameters on the 
values and practices ‘free’ societies should adopt. “[E]very nation.. .which 
desires to maintain its freedom, its independence,” he argued, “must ultimately
218 Ibid.
219 ‘Quasi’ because it was based on hegemonic domination but not formal territorial conquest.
129
realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the 
responsibility of making good use of it.”220
Roosevelt is correctly associated, because of his writings and political lobbying, 
with the formal imperialism of the United States that followed the territorial 
acquisitions of 1898. By the time of his presidency, however, the nation had lost 
its enthusiasm for formal empire. Resistance from the subject peoples combined 
with prevailing attitudes regarding race served to convince most Americans that 
assimilation of the newly acquired populations into the domestic structures of US 
government would be impossible. Yet simple colonial rule would generate 
unwelcome contradictions within the ideological culture of American politics, 
which in principle opposed all unrepresentative government. The remaining 
option, therefore, was the ‘third way’: to pursue the ultimate liberation of the 
subject peoples and their ‘education’ in how to make “good use” of their 
freedom.221 This set of ideas, which was applied first and foremost to Cuba and 
the Philippines, came to have relevance to the whole of Latin American policy.
“Barbarism,” Roosevelt argued, could have “no place in a civilized world”. “It is 
our duty toward the people living in barbarism to see that they are freed from 
their chains, and we can free them only by destroying barbarism itself... We 
must raise others while we are benefiting ourselves.”223 In the Philippines, it was 
his view that: “We are not trying to subjugate a people; we are trying to develop 
them.”224 This meant the attempted instillation of American political values and 
practices in the hope they would ultimately become self-sustaining. As Morris 
observes: “Expansion to [Roosevelt] meant a hemispheric programme of 
acquisition, democratisation and liberation.”225
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Because he thought in these terms, Roosevelt did not, as others well might, 
perceive violence to repress Philippine rebels or the erection of an unstable 
quasi-independent state in Cuba as cynical power-grabs. Up to a point he was 
confident that it was possible to “rapidly teach the people of the Philippine 
Islands.. .how to make good use of their freedom,” but he thought it irresponsible 
to expect them to thrive if propelled directly into sovereignty without 
stewardship. Those who criticised America’s educative imperial role, he said, 
were “jack fools who seriously think that any group of pirates and head-hunters 
needs nothing but independence in order that it may be turned forthwith into a 
dark-hued New England town meeting.”226 This attitude was not limited to Latin 
America. In China, Roosevelt supported the other great powers in repressing the 
Boxer Rebellion and resisting Chinese demands for greater autonomy. This was 
likewise based on the imperialist logic that the Chinese were not equipped to 
survive with full sovereignty, and needed continued tutelage to protect them from 
doing themselves harm. There was a harsh circularity in Roosevelt’s thought: A 
people only deserved respect, he insisted, if they could demonstrate strength and 
independence, something for which he praised the ‘civilised’ Japanese; yet he 
accused those who pushed forcefully for more independence, as the Chinese did, 
of child-like irresponsible for doing so.
Like many imperialists, Roosevelt often thought of himself as the reactive party, 
compelled to intervene when really he would have preferred otherwise. He also 
considered his interventionist policies to be so self-evidently for the benefit of all 
as to merit compliance and gratitude. Faced with the absence of either, he was 
thus prone to disillusionment and anger. Forced (as he saw it) into renewed 
intervention to suppress disorder in ‘independent’ Cuba in 1906, he took on the 
rhetorical aspect of an enraged Caesar: “Just at the moment I am so angry with 
that infernal little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe its people off the face 
of the earth,” he fumed. “All that we wanted for them was that they would 
behave themselves and be prosperous and happy so we that we should not have 
to interfere.”228 When pressure mounted for the US to take the Dominican
226 Quoted in Morris, p.l 10; To RudyardKipling, Nov. 1, 1904, L&S, p.357.
227 On Roosevelt’s China policy see Beale, pp. 172-252
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Republic’s finances into receivership, he lamented: “I have about the same desire 
to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong 
end to.” Even in the case of Colombia, in whose dismemberment he conspired 
during the Panama affair, he maintained the line that “this country, so far from 
wronging Colombia, made every possible effort to persuade Colombia to allow 
herself to be benefited”.230 Even before he even proclaimed his Corollary, he had 
reached the view that “sooner or later it seems to me inevitable that the United 
States should assume an attitude of protection and regulation to all these little 
states in the neighbourhood of the Caribbean. I hope it will be deferred as long as 
possible, but I fear it is inevitable.”231
In effect, his view was that he was obliged to impose his own solutions on others 
because they could not see the truth: that their own interests lay in line with his 
prescriptions. To be sure, there was an element of rationalisation to this talk, of 
the sort practiced by liberal imperialists in other times and places, but this does 
not deflect from the fact that the ideas themselves were sincerely held. Roosevelt 
did, up to a point, believe in ‘self-determination’ for nations, but significantly 
qualified this with the insistence that certain developmental preconditions, 
including stability and political order, needed to be in place before independence 
could succeed, especially when it came to non-white peoples.
Beyond that, he also seemed to assume, in line with other American 
‘progressives’, that a free nation was in a sense defined as truly free by its 
choosing to become a particular kind of society, and that this meant adopting at 
least the most basic of American principles and practices. It might be 
acknowledged that in theory free societies could vary, but their differences had to 
be superficial: on central political and economic principles, they were expected 
to share the same values, paving the way for a network of essentially harmonious 
interests between nations and within them. In this way, ‘liberty’ was not viewed 
as a condition allowing for a multiplicity of alternative paths of development. 
Rather, ‘true’ liberty was taken to contain within it fixed social outcomes, or at
229 Quoted in Morris, p.319.
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least narrow parameters limiting acceptable outcomes, within which ‘free 
nations’ should develop. To put it bluntly, it was assumed by a great many 
American thinkers that liberty for  a state ought to produce liberalism within that 
state, for such was the meaning of ‘progress’ as they understood it. If this proved 
not to be the case, it was axiomatic that the nation in question had not truly 
become free, thus rendering further intervention to rectify the flaw legitimate.
This was the ideological basis of Roosevelt’s liberal quasi-imperialism in Latin 
America. In the Philippines, this meant restructuring the social order under 
occupation. In Cuba, it meant underwriting a brittle liberal order with the 
promise of US intervention should backsliding occur. In other states less 
completely within the United States’ administrative grasp, it meant preventing 
European intervention by policing behaviour, and intervening more deeply if 
crises arose. Under Roosevelt’s direction, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine 
realised its potential as an ‘American System’ of states under US hegemony. 
Based on an assumed right to assert common or identical interests as a basis, the 
US created an international order in the Western Hemisphere based not on a 
balance of power but on a universalistic progressive model of national 
development towards approved liberal values. This expanded version of the 
Monroe Doctrine would later serve as the basis for American ideas regarding the 
reform of the global system.
The First World War, progress and the moral case for arms
Roosevelt’s views on global affairs also had some Progressive features. He was 
aware of the potential for complex changes in technology and economic patterns 
-  what we today term ‘globalisation’ -  to impact upon international relations. 
Even well before the political rupture brought about by the First World War, he 
foresaw major reform of the international order. “As civilisation grows, warfare 
becomes less and less the normal condition of foreign relations,” he observed. 
“More and more the increasing interdependence and complexity of international 
political and economic relations renders it incumbent on all the civilized and
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orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world.”232 Where he fell out 
of step with much of the mainstream liberal internationalism of his time was in 
his belief that the process of ‘civilising’ international relations was in its early 
stages of development rather than on the brink of full realisation. Unlike those 
who seemed to think world peace just around the comer, he was cautiously 
sceptical. Perhaps some day war might be obsolete and the world’s nations co­
residents in a harmonious system, he thought, but for now the world was 
inhabited by a mixture of good, upstanding nations and others of dubious 
character. In such a world, it was imperative that the good, including the United 
States, develop their military strength.
The outbreak of the Great War in Europe in 1914 served to underline this 
necessity, he thought. During the three years of American neutrality that 
followed, he used the war as evidence that force was far from obsolete in 
international affairs. “We hope ultimately that the day will come on this earth 
when wars will cease. But at present the realization of that hope seems as far in 
the future as the realization of that other hope, that some day in the future all 
crime will cease,” he argued.233 It was clear to him that some kinds of great 
power were dangerous: their strength used to bully and their respect for the rights 
of others negligible. He saw Germany as one such threat. As the first wave of 
war consumed Europe, he criticised Germany in harsh terms for having 
precipitated the conflict with “no regard for anything except its own interest... 
For the last forty-three years Germany has spread out everywhere, and has 
menaced every nation where she thought it was to her advantage to do so”.234
His stand against Germany was not immediate. At the moment of the war’s 
outbreak, he hesitated, agreeing that Belgium had been wronged but suggesting 
that it was “eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral”. Indeed, 
he echoed Wilson’s position -  a position he would subsequently pillory -  in 
arguing that “neutrality may be of prime necessity in order.. .to conserve our
232 Quoted in Morris, p. 176.
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influence for helping toward the reestablishment of general peace when the time 
comes”. This phase, however, was fleeting. In the early stages of the war he 
wrote to Spring-Rice that had he been president, he would have led a multilateral 
effort to restore Belgian neutrality, which had been guaranteed under recent 
Hague treaties. It was not long before he became a vociferous convert to the 
cause of full American intervention, far earlier than most American politicians of 
either party.
The US had clear reason to be concerned about the outcome of the war in 
Europe. Any outcome that put control of the continent in the hands of a 
hegemonic power could represent a grave threat to American security. And as a 
century before, America’s commercial ties to the belligerents made its indirect 
involvement in their respective war efforts hard to avoid. Part of Roosevelt’s 
desire for US war entry was founded in the clear and present danger of Germany 
to US interests. If Germany came to dominate Europe and “smashed the English 
Fleet”, he predicted, “within a year or two she would insist upon taking the 
dominant position in South and Central America.” This was not a new 
realisation: years earlier he had noted America’s interest in preserving a balance 
of power in Europe:
[A]s long as England succeeds in keeping up the balance o f power in Europe, not 
in principle but in reality, well and good. Should she, however, for some reason 
or other fail in doing so, the United States would be obliged to step in, at least 
temporarily, in order to re-establish the balance o f power in Europe, never mind 
against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be 
directed..238
His preference for Britain over Germany as a dominant naval power was partly 
pragmatic as opposed to ethical or civilisational: he believed that the US-UK
235 Quoted in Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance o f Power, (Bloomington: 
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relationship could be managed more advantageously because “Canada is a 
hostage for her good behaviour.”239
Even taking all of this into account,, however, it is evident that Roosevelt 
projected a moral dimension onto the European conflict that went beyond simple 
conflict between national interests. It was also, for him, a war with implications 
for ‘civilisation’, and part of his concern in judging what the war demanded of 
America was assessing what would best advance the interests of ‘civilisation’ as 
a transnational concept. In making that judgement, he had some ambivalence: 
would crushing Germany open the door to “a great military danger in the future” 
from Russia? But on balance he decided that “there is no question where the 
interests of civilization lie at this moment”: in opposition to Germany. He even 
held out hope that “this war may see the dawn of the reaction against militarism 
and that Russia may tend to grow more civilized and more liberal”.240 In his later 
discussion of the war, the attribution of blame was important to him, and he was 
clear that it lay with Germany. The “most tremendous tragedy in the history of 
civilization”, he said, had been brought about by “the cynical treachery, brutality 
and barbarism and the conscienceless worshipping of revolting cunning and brute 
force which made the German people what it was in 1914 (and what, except that 
it is defeated, it is now)”.241
Though an earlier a convert to war than Wilson, Roosevelt was less millennial 
than Wilson ultimately became in stating the proper objectives of the war. 
America should fight, he argued, for a “peace of justice”
.. .based on ability to guard ourselves from injustice, and determination not to do 
injustice to others, a peace in which some step shall have been taken toward 
putting international force behind an international desire to secure at least a 
reasonable approximation toward justice and fair play. 242
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Such talk of a “reasonable approximation” of justice was more measured than 
Wilson’s contemporary visions of new world order, but it is nevertheless evident 
that he considered notions of righteousness, as opposed to mere power-balancing, 
important to his thinking about the post-war world. This was consistent with his 
longstanding argument that civilisation could be advanced only by the strong, 
and justice was sometimes a higher goal than peace.
Before American war entry, Roosevelt was quick to hold the “ultrapacifist” 
Wilson responsible for America’s failure to join the defence of civilisation. He 
blamed him for America’s military and political unreadiness for war, due to his 
“trusting to fantastic peace treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps 
of paper without any backing in efficient force” instead of armed preparedness.
243 In the planning for post-war order, they diverged again on the matter of the 
role of arms and force. Looking to the future order, Roosevelt did not call for the 
reinstitution of the old balance of power in Europe with a new role for America: 
he was broadly supportive of plans for a more cooperative order instead, with a 
role for some new global institution 244 But whereas Wilson’s plans included 
substantial disarmament even of the victorious Allies, Roosevelt thought this 
foolish. Such disarmament, he thought, would weaken the most civilised nations 
in the face of future threats.
The lesson of the events of 1914 for Roosevelt was that civilisation needed 
muscle to defend it, not just words. “We must recognise that to enter into foolish 
treaties which cannot be kept is as wicked as to break treaties which can and 
ought to be kept,” he argued. Instead what was needed was “an international 
agreement among the great civilized nations which shall put the full force of all 
of them back of any one of them, and of any well-behaved weak nation, which is 
wronged by any other power.” Until that was in place, however America had to 
be “ready.. .to back our fights with our strength.”245 “There is just one way in 
which to meet the upholders of the doctrine that might makes right,” he insisted.
243 To Hugo Munsterberg, Oct. 3, 1914, L&S p.693.
244 For deeper discussion of TR’s desired post-war order see Serge Ricard, ‘Anti-Wilsonian 
Internationalism: Theodore Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star’, in Daniela Rossini (ed), From 
Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy, 
(Keele: Rybum Publishing, Keele University Press, 1995)
245 ‘The Peace of Righteousness’, MIA, p.342.
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“To do so we must prove that right will make might, by backing right with 
might.”246 For Roosevelt, security, like charity, began at home, with America’s 
own military strength: “Until we make the world safe for America,” he observed 
in 1917, .it is empty rhetoric to talk of making the world safe for 
democracy.”247
He had spelled out his views on disarmament when resisting campaigns for it 
during his own presidency, and his opposition was only confirmed by the events 
of WWI. “To have the best nations, the free and civilized nations, disarm and 
leave the despotisms and barbarisms with great military force, would be a 
calamity compared to which the calamities caused by all the wars of the 
Nineteenth Century would be trivial,” he had warned in 1906.”248 Disarmament 
would only be safe, hypothetically, “if there was some system of international 
police; but there is now no such system.”249 Lesson might wisely be drawn from 
the past, he suggested in a letter in 1905, to the effect that peace usually only 
comes when “some strong and on the whole just power has by armed force, or 
the threat of armed force, put a stop to disorder.”250 The issue in 1918 remained 
the same: in an essentially ungovemed international environment, the civilised 
powers needed to be strong enough to protect themselves first if they were to go 
on to do good for others.
Perhaps the best summary statement of his Roosevelt’s views on the importance 
of armed strength as a tool of civilisation’s defence came in his 1904 
Congressional message on foreign policy:
When one nation wrongs another or wrongs many others, there is no tribunal 
before which the wrongdoer can be brought... Until some method is devised by 
which there shall be a degree o f international control over offending nations, it 
would be a wicked thing for the most civilized powers, for those with most sense 
o f international obligations and with keenest and most generous appreciation of
246 ‘The Peace of Righteousness’, MIA, p. 341.
247 Speech in Pittsburgh, July 1917, quoted in Buehrig, p. 162.
248 To CarlSchurz, Sep. 8, 1905, L&S, p.405-6.
249 To Andrew Carnegie, Aug 6, 1906, L&S, p.489
250 To CarlSchurz, Sep. 8, 1905, L&S, p. 405.
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the difference between right and wrong, to disarm. If the great civilized nations o f  
the present day should completely disarm, the result would mean an immediate 
recmdescence o f barbarism in one form or another...
[A] self-respecting, just, and far-seeing nation should on the one hand endeavor
by every means to aid in the development o f the various movements which tend
to provide substitutes for war, which tend to render nations in their actions
toward one another, and indeed toward their own peoples, more responsive to the
general sentiment o f humane and civilized mankind; and on the other hand.. .it
should keep prepared, while scrupulously avoiding wrongdoing itself, to repel any
wrong, and in exceptional cases to take action which in a more advanced stage o f
international relations would come under the head o f the exercise o f the
international police. A great free people owes it to itself and to all mankind not
251to sink into helplessness before the powers o f evil.
In other words, progressive reform of the international system might well be 
possible, and collective security arrangements desirable, but American armed 
strength was key to any such project.
Interestingly, Roosevelt’s belief in the ‘moral case’ for physical force even 
extended to what we might today term ‘humanitarian intervention’. A case in 
point was his attitude towards Turkey’s efforts to kill or displace its Armenian 
population during the war, which he described as “the greatest crime” of the 
conflict. For this he believed America should accept some responsibility, since 
its “failure to act against Turkey” served in effect “to condone” its actions. Once 
America had entered the war, Roosevelt argued it should also declare war on the 
Ottoman empire in order to live up to its principles: “[T]he failure to deal 
radically with the Turkish horror means that all talk of guaranteeing the future 
peace of the world is mischievous nonsense... [W]hen we now refuse to war with 
Turkey we show that our announcement that we meant to ‘make the world safe 
for democracy’ was insincere claptrap.”252
251 Speech to Congress, Dec 6, 1904, op.cit.
252 To Cleveland Dodge, May 11, 1918, L&S p.736.
139
He was also, to some degree, an advocate of the view later developed by 
Wilsonianism that tyrannous governments were inherently threatening to 
international order. Beyond the Armenian slaughter’s intrinsic horror, TR also 
argued that the presence of despotism of the Turkish sort in Europe was also a 
barrier to postwar peace and stability. “While the Turk is left in Europe and 
permitted to tyrannize over the subject peoples,” he wrote, “the world is 
thoroughly unsafe for democracy.”253 In previous years he had also been known 
to argue that the liberalisation of Russian politics would be necessary to allow 
that society and its environs to propser 254 “[D]own at bottom,” he told to the 
Harvard academic Hugo Munsterberg in 1916, “...the Russian is just like you or 
mg” 255 Thus, even as he displayed a cool realism in insisting on the continuing 
necessity, and moral righteousness, of armed power to secure the defence of 
nation and civilisation, Roosevelt displayed flashes of the liberal universalism 
that would establish itself as America’s dominant ideology in the years that 
followed.
Conclusion
Theodore Roosevelt did not have the opportunity to participate personally in the 
great debate over postwar order that followed Wilson’s return from the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919. Weakened by a tropical fever caught on an adventure 
in the Amazon jungle after his defeat (as a third-party candidate) in the 1912 
presidential election, his health had become shakier, though no one suspected he 
was mortally ill. It therefore shocked the nation when in January 1919 the 
ebullient exponent of the strenuous life passed away in his sleep at only 60 years 
of age, the victim of a coronary embolism.
His 20-year career at the highest level of politics had coincided with the United 
States’ emergence as a great power at the global level. Hugely significant 
increases in territorial size, economic scale and population since the foundation
253 To Henry Cabot Lodge, Oct. 24, 1918, L&S, p.744.
254 To Cecil Spring-Rice, Jun. 13, 1904, L&S, p.334.
255 To Hugo Munsterberg, Oct 3, 1914, L&S, p. 693.
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had elevated it to a higher level in the international hierarchy of strength. Before 
1898, however, America had not begun in earnest the process of translating its 
underlying potential strength into great power status in the global international 
system. One of the constraints on its doing so was the ideological dominance of 
the Founders’ Era consensus which stated that the United States should not 
entangle itself in the European balance of power. Europe’s great powers being 
the pre-eminent powers in the global system, and the European balance of power 
therefore overlapped mightily with the global balance, this prohibition severely 
limited America’s ability to participate in global affairs.
Thus, at the beginning of the 20th Century the United States was simultaneously 
being pushed towards greater international activism by its own growing strength, 
and held back by its ideological aversion to embroilment within the Europe- 
dominated order. The chapter that follows discusses how the implosion of the 
European order after 1914 provided the opportunity for a new American 
internationalism, seized upon by Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt, in contrast, was in 
the main obliged to govern within the ideological limitations he inherited -  
though he was inclined to test the boundaries -  because the international context 
was relatively stable during his time in office. Nevertheless, he did initiate the 
process of ideological transition on the part of the United States from the 
consensus on detachment from the global balance of power and towards a new 
internationalism.
The first key element of this transition was his consistent advocacy of increased 
military strength, which laid the ground for the nation to play a role later as a 
significant military power. Further, by tying military power into a narrative of 
national greatness and a historic mission to further civilisation, Roosevelt gave 
the acquisition of military strength a dimension that was moral and nationalistic, 
broadening its appeal to a suspicious body politic. His careful balancing of the 
need for strength against the distastefulness of excessive national self-assertion, 
and his argument that military power was essential to do useful service for the 
greater good would serve as the basis of a later generation’s case for 
unprecedented peacetime mobilisation. His conviction that peace depended upon 
the arming of ‘civilised’ powers in preparation to check aggression would in time
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become a dominant pillar of American thought, far more influential than 
Wilsonian theories of disarmament.
Roosevelt was, up to a point, a realist. He readily acknowledged the crucial role 
played by power and national self-interest in international politics. He 
successfully executed a number of diplomatic operations that displayed his 
comfort with pursuing the nation’s interests in a competitive international 
system, and cautiously enlarged the horizon of America’s diplomatic activities. 
At the same time, however, he was also strikingly -  even stridently -  moralistic, 
highlighting the importance of pursuing ‘righteousness’ even at the expense of 
peace, stability or wealth. This side of his thought, obsessively focused on virtue 
and manliness, must serve to qualify the realist tag, if that term is taken to imply 
a school of thought defined entirely by dispassionate focus on self-interest. In 
this regard, Roosevelt’s moralistic version of realism can be seen as the 
forerunner of later US policy more so than the European-style strain of realism 
advocated by, for example, Kissinger.
Though still operating under the Monroe Doctrine’s division of spheres, and thus 
not seriously engaged in European affairs, Roosevelt’s foreign policy expanded 
the scope of the doctrine, making it a charter for deeper and wider US 
intervention in the Western Hemisphere. As well as exercising a ‘police power’ 
to avoid malfeasance in international relations, the United States also adopted a 
quasi-imperial attitude of tutelage over the political and economic development 
of the region’s states. Operating in a strategic environment of US hegemony, 
Roosevelt argued that US interests were identical with those of Latin American 
states, that the US had the right to identify those interests unilaterally, and that it 
was a responsibility of the US to teach those within its sphere how to use their 
‘freedom’ appropriately. This liberal imperialist position evolved from the 
political indigestion caused by the territorial acquisitions of 1898, and was based 
on Progressive assumptions regarding fixed appropriate outcomes of national 
liberty and self-determination. Such progressivism asserted the justness of US 
intervention in the event that states should diverge from a baseline of prescribed 
political values. This expanded version of the Monroe Doctrine would serve as
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America’s ideological model for global order when the international system 
appeared to become open to radical reform during Wilson’s presidency.
Roosevelt did not succeed during his own career in implementing huge change in 
the relation of the United States to the world, though he certainly made 
incremental changes of significance. He did, however, make a substantial 
contribution to the ideological transition of the United States from the ideas of 
the Founder’s Era consensus of hemispheric detachment towards a policy of 
greater militarisation and global engagement. This Rooseveltian ideological 
contribution would become especially important in later years, especially when 
combined with Wilsonianism, its overlapping ideological contemporary.
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4. Woodrow Wilson
‘Conquest of the Spirits of Men’ 256
Introduction
This chapter forms a pair with that on Roosevelt, as the two overlap in the period
thcovered, i.e. the early 20 century emergence of the United States as a global 
power. It argues that national and international circumstances provided Woodrow 
Wilson with the necessity and the opportunity, even more so than in Roosevelt’s 
case, of radically increasing America’s level of international engagement. It 
further argues that that engagement was predicated intellectually upon the 
realisation of a set of interlocking liberal universalist principles, today often 
known in shorthand as ‘Wilsonian’, and that this was in part the consequence of 
Wilson’s need to manage the transition to internationalism within a political 
culture that rejected balance-of-power thinking about international order.
The chapter begins as the others do, with an outline of national and international 
circumstances. The sections that follow then outline in detail the components of 
Wilsonian thought and their significance. First, the moralistic and idealistic 
approach Wilson brought to his leadership is discussed, and some parallel with 
Roosevelt noted. The next section, covering the period before America’s 
embroilment in the First World War, describes how Wilson continued and 
extended Roosevelt’s pattern of expansion in US foreign policy, pursuing a 
hegemonic, imperialistic policy towards Latin America. This deepened Monroe 
Doctrine would serve as the model for his later proposals for international order 
more globally. The section which follows this discusses Wilson’s making of the 
case for US entry into the European war, predicating American entanglement on 
the prospect of a new world order following that war’s end. The remaining 
sections go on to set out the intellectual framework of that imagined new order, 
including a crucial distinction between governments and peoples, the posited
256 Phrase from speech at Omaha, Nebr., Sep.8, 1919, WP2 p.42 (see footnote 259)
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commonality of interests between peoples, the need for the universalisation of 
liberal government, and the assumption of American global leadership. Finally, 
the chapter notes the divergence between Wilson and Roosevelt with regard to 
the role of military strength in the new world order.
The chapter seeks to show that Wilson seized upon American participation in the 
war to make proposals that broke with the Founders’ Era consensus on 
hemispheric detachment that had constrained his predecessors. As part of the 
same process, however, the prior existence of that consensus’s prohibitions on 
entanglement in the European balance of power crucially shaped Wilson’s 
formulation of the ideological arguments for a new American internationalism. 
Rather than arguing that the US should join the existing global system, Wilson 
argued that America’s new global engagement was predicated upon the 
emergence of a new, cooperative international order, an argument founded in his 
own liberal universalist ideas and assumptions. The emergence of a new 
American internationalism during this period was partly the result, as a realist 
account tells us, of America’s increased strength and of substantial shifts in the 
international environment. Also extremely important, however, was the 
ideological dimension of Wilson’s leadership in reaction to those circumstances. 
This interaction between circumstance and ideology led to the emergence of a 
particular American internationalism that thought the nation’s new engagement 
with the world could be contingent on the pursuit of liberal reform of the global 
order and the states within it.
National and international context
At the beginning of Wilson’s term of office -  he was elected in 1912 -  the global 
order retained much of the character it had possessed at the turn of the century. 
The international system was centred on the European great powers -  especially 
Britain, France, Germany and Russia -  and their competition for advantage both 
in Europe itself and other theatres such as China. Japan’s increasing military 
strength and effectiveness had forced others to recognise it as a significant 
power, and that fact, in combination with the rise of the United States, signified a
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challenge to Europe as the sole locus of significant national power. Nevertheless, 
Europe remained the key power centre, and the balance between the Europeans 
more or less synonymous with the global balance of power.
The United States had its own sphere of hegemonic influence in the Western 
Hemisphere, from which it had been largely successful in excluding the 
Europeans. It had not by this time developed its military capability in proportion 
to its size and wealth, though it had expanded and modernised its navy somewhat 
thanks to Roosevelt’s determined efforts. If the US took an interest in affairs 
beyond this western sphere, its politicians feared, it would risk entanglement in 
European rivalries. Therefore it by and large avoided taking such an interest, 
with a few limited exceptions such as its involvement in the multi-power 
consortium dealing with China.
The First World War, which defined Wilson’s second term and led to the 
emergence of Wilsonianism as a global ideology, signalled the beginning of the 
end of this world. That war’s outbreak was the result of several convergent trends 
in European strategic affairs, including increasing rigidity in alliances, an 
uncontrolled arms race, and the development of military mobilisation plans that 
provided an incentive for early strikes and made reverses of course risky. The 
unprecedented cost and inconclusive nature of the violence that sprang from the 
war also reflected the development of technologies that favoured defence and 
increased terribly the price in lives of traditional tactics.
The breakdown of the existing international order brought about by WWI 
demanded that the United States take a new level of interest in European politics, 
and presented Americans with the opportunity to pursue radical reform of the 
ideological basis of the European and world orders. The Wilsonian policy and 
ideology that emerged was thus a reaction to international circumstances. The 
nature of that reaction, however, was shaped by pre-existing American 
ideological consensus, and the need to bridge the gap between the demands of 
the present and the embedded convictions of the past.
257 For detailed analysis of WWI, its causes and context see David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The 
History o f the First World War, (London: Penguin, 2005)
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Moralism and idealism in Wilsonian foreign policy
Like that of Roosevelt, Wilson’s rise to political power was a relatively sudden 
affair. An academic at the head of Princeton university, he mirrored TR in being 
spring-boarded to elected office as a state governor (of New Jersey) by party 
bosses and then swiftly propelled to the national level. His 1912 election made 
him the first Democratic president for a generation, thanks in great part to a split 
of the Republican vote between the incumbent president William Taft and 
Roosevelt, who had fallen out with his own chosen successor and run as a third- 
party candidate.258 It was the height of the Progressive Era, and most thought that 
the pressing issues of coming years would be domestic and economic rather than 
foreign and military. Wilson himself reportedly remarked that it “would be the
258 My chief primary source in conveying Wilson’s thinking on foreign affairs is Woodrow 
Wilson, War and Peace: Presidential Messages, Addresses and Public Papers, Volumes I and II, 
ed. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the 
Pacific, 2002; reprinted from 1927), hereafter referenced as WP1 and WP2. My chief secondary 
sources providing the basis for analysis of his biography, policies and though are: Lloyd E. 
Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy in American Foreign Relations, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) and Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic 
Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); 
Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance o f Power, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1955) and Buehrig (ed), Wilson’s Foreign Policy in Perspective, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1957); Anne R. Pierce Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission 
and Power in American Foreign Policy, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2003); 
Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy o f Woodrow Wilson, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1937); Arthur S. Link, The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and other essays, 
(Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1971); Kendrick A. Clements, The Presidency of 
Woodrow Wilson, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Sidney Bell, Righteous 
Conquest: Woodrow Wilson and the Evolution o f the New Diplomacy, (Port Washington, NY: 
National University Publications, Kennikat Press, 1972); Alan Dawley, Changing the World: 
American Progressives in War and Revolution, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2003); Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s 
Neutrality, 1914-1917 (Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press, 2007). These authors, 
naturally, vary in their emphasis. Bell especially looks to economic matters, albeit with attention 
to relevant ideological superstructure. Others such as Ambrosius and Dawley concentrate on 
social and political thought. Tucker emphasises Wilson’s regard for international law. There is 
also divergence between authors, such as Link, who on the whole sympathise with Wilson’s 
ideas/policies, and a majority that sees his goals as inherently unachievable and his approach to 
politics as fatally rigid. My own argument here does not set out to resolve many of these disputes: 
The purpose of this chapter is simply to support the point that Wilson fashioned a new American 
internationalism that was predicated on the abolition o f the balance of power system and 
resultantly the pursuit of liberal universalism. The wisdom of his fashioning such an approach is 
an argument for another place.
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irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs, for all
*ycQ
my preparation has been in domestic matters.”
Wilson and Roosevelt have often been set in contrast to one another, Wilson cast 
as ivory tower idealist and Roosevelt as robust action man -  a dichotomy that 
obscures the reality that outside of politics Roosevelt was an author and 
intellectual, and Wilson was a skilful politician who, at least before his health 
deteriorated, displayed a good deal of passion and dynamism. More importantly, 
they also had similarities in their thought.260 For all his fondness for abstract 
principles, Wilson too emphasised the merits of action over pure thought, and 
sentiment over cold reason. “We are not put into this world to sit still and know,” 
he wrote as a young man. “We are put into it to act.”261 In his historical writings, 
he joined Roosevelt in siding mostly with the Hamiltonian Federalist tendency 
towards ‘energetic’ government, and criticising Jefferson as excessively 
theoretical.262
Unlike in Roosevelt’s case, however, analysts have not downplayed the 
moralistic dimension to Wilson’s political thought; on the contrary, emphasis of 
this feature of his character pervades the literature. His most extensive and 
sympathetic biographer judges him to have been “primarily a Christian idealist” 
in foreign policy, who “almost always tended to judge policies on a basis of 
whether they were right... not whether they brought immediate material or 
strategic advantage.” He based policy on “the assumption that a nation as much 
as an individual should live according to the law of Christian love, and by a 
positive repudiation of the assumptions of the classical ‘realists’ about 
international behaviour.”263 Like Roosevelt, he saw moral uprightness on the part 
of citizen and nation as the necessary foundation of national greatness. “As the 
individual is the type of the nation,” he believed, “so the nation should embody
259 Quoted in Notter, p. 217. This remark notwithstanding, Notter makes a convincing case that it 
would be misleading to classify the Wilson of 1913 as a total foreign policy novice.
260 For comparison and contrast see Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest, and Henry Kissinger, 
Diplomacy, ch. 2, pp.29-55.
261 Ibid, p. 132
262 Notter, pp 122-132.
263 Link, Higher Realism, p. 129
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the highest individual ideals of civil perfection, in order to assert and maintain its 
honorable position in the world-family of commonwealth.”264
This mindset would in time be the basis of his thinking concerning post-WWI 
order. In April 1917 he told Congress that in the future order “it will be insisted 
that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be 
observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the 
individual citizens of civilised states.”265 Such commonality between Roosevelt 
and Wilson in equating the moral status of the nation and the individual should 
not surprise us: they were, after all, both American ‘progressives’, ideologically 
speaking. As Dawley, a historian of Progressivism, puts it:
[T]he itch to improve the world, whether the world wants it or not, did not stop 
at the border... [I]n combining moralism and realism in foreign policy — the itch 
to uplift and the itch to control — they were a perfect pair... As Christian 
moralists, both thought o f the US role overseas as morally redemptive. Both 
would have agreed with Albert Beveridge, a close associate o f Roosevelt, that the 
United States had a messianic mission as God’s chosen nation to lead in the 
regeneration o f the world.266
Complementing this moralism, Wilson was inclined towards an idealistic 
approach to foreign policy, downplaying the importance of material interests. In 
this he shared Roosevelt’s sense that the nation could better attain greatness 
through the pursuit of grand historic projects for the moral uplift of civilisation 
than pursuit of mere treasure. America was established, he asserted, “not to
7 A7create wealth.. .but to realize an ideal”. “America is not going to be immortal 
because she has immense wealth,” he admonished in 1919, but rather “ because 
of the ideas she has conceived.. .the purposes she has set herself to 
achieve.. .because she has seen visions that other nations have not seen” and
264 Telegram to Madame Bressovsky, Oct 18, 1917, WP1, p. 107
265 Address to Congress, April 2, 1917, WP1 p.l 1; see also Address at Mount Vemon, July 4, 
1918, WP1 p.234
266 Dawley, p.76, 79. Ambrosius draws similar links between Progressivism and Wilsonianism.
267 Quoted in Notter, p.75
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because it sought “the liberty of mankind.” 268 Economic strength was important, 
but as a means to an end. As Clements notes, Wilson’s “goals were more moral 
and political than economic, but he understood that the power that made the 
achievement of his goals conceivable rested upon economic strength and upon 
the military might that depended upon economic power.” Wilson would later 
cite America’s entry into the Great War as vindication of this rationale, arguing 
that America’s sacrifice would “show that we were not accumulating that wealth
a
selfishly, but were accumulating it for the service of mankind.”
Keen to elevate the tone of US policy after four years of so-called ‘dollar 
diplomacy’ under Taft, especially in Latin America, Wilson asserted that “our 
greatness is built upon our freedom -  is moral, not material.”271 The nation 
should therefore be “more concerned about human rights than about property 
rights” in dealings with weaker nations. America should “think of the progress of 
mankind rather than the progress of this or that investment, of the protection of 
American honor and the advancement of American ideals rather than always of 
American contracts”.272 He expressed similar concerns regarding the use of US
•  •  273power to further vested interests rather than moral ends in China.
Though idealistic, such statements did not betray a complete lack of self- 
awareness on Wilson’s part regarding the results of America’s policies. He 
acknowledged that in continuing to pursue the ‘Open Door’ into other 
economies, America was seeking “commercial conquest of the world”, a 
“righteous conquest of the world’s markets”.274 In a moment of almost Marxist 
analysis of his own policy, Wilson would tell Europeans that:
A country is owned and dominated by the capital that is invested in i t . .. In 
proportion as foreign capital comes in amongst you and takes its hold, in that
268 Los Angeles, Calif., Sep. 20, 1919, WP2 p.323
269 Clements, pp.xii-xiii
270 Washington, June 5, 1917, WP1, p.56
271 Quoted in Clements, p.93
272 Quoted in Notter, p. 194, 197
273 Ibid, pp. 234, 270, 543
274 Bell, p.36, 38
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proportion does foreign influence come in and take its hold. And therefore the 
processes o f capital are in a certain sense the processes o f conquest. 275
To some, this might give ethical pause, but any tension between Wilson’s 
enunciation of high principles and his acknowledgement of commercial 
imperialism remained largely invisible to him, because he assumed harmony 
between America’s interests and the fulfilment of its moral ideals. He could do 
this because he equated the civilised liberty that America’s ideals mandated it to 
spread with the advance in tandem of a brand of economic liberalism 
advantageous to American interests. American principles were thus “not 
incompatible with great material prosperity,” but in fact “indispensable to it”.276
When leading America through its involvement in the war and subsequent peace, 
Wilson was generally open in arguing that there was case to be made for US
• • • on •participation based on economic self-interest. But he always insisted on 
registering the view that that such a justification lowered the tone of the 
American debate, and exhorted the people to share that sense. When mentioning 
the commercial arguments for supporting the League of Nations, he swiftly 
followed with the observation that “I do not like to put it on that ground because 
that is not the American ground..”278 The economic argument was only “the 
lowest basis” on which to justify what was a more profound effort to “guarantee 
and underwrite civilization”.279
The expanded Monroe Doctrine as prototype of global Wilsonianism
Latin America served as the testing-ground for the American idea of a 
cooperative order of states progressing towards ‘civilisation’ under US 
hegemony. Wilson took up the liberal imperialist framework of the Roosevelt 
Corollary and expanded it still further, establishing a regime of wide-ranging
275 Turin, Jan 6, 1919, WP1, p.383.
276 Quoted in Clements, p. 93
277 See Des Moines, Iowa, Sep. 6, 1919, WP2, p.20; Bismarck, N. Dak., Sep. 10, 1919, WP2, 
p.93; Opera House, Helena, Mont., Sep. 11, 1919, WP2, p. 127
278 State Legislature. St Paul, Minn., Sep. 9, 1919, WP2, p.63
279 At Armory, Tacoma, Wash., Sep. 13, 1919, WP2, p.176
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interventionism in the United States’ sphere of influence. Though he disapproved 
of what he saw as the money-driven character of his predecessor’s policy, he had 
no qualms regarding interventionism per se. The United States’ task, as he saw it, 
was to set aside selfish considerations and help America’s neighbours develop 
more democratic, liberal, and constitutional political orders. In practice this 
meant more intrusion into others’ affairs, not less.
Wilson imagined the US could drive forward liberalisation of states in Latin 
America while also increasing stability, because the two were interrelated. The 
US should push nations towards free elections, and then seek to ensure the results 
were upheld if challenged by disgruntled political forces. Once proper order had 
been established in Latin nations, “interruptions of civil order” would thenceforth 
not be tolerated by the United States. In time, order and stability would become 
self-sustaining. “Each conspicuous instance in which usurpations... are 
prevented will render their recurrence less,” he predicted, eventually assuring 
“the peace of America and the untrammelled development of its economic and 
social relations with the rest of the world.”
His most substantial intervention came in neighbouring Mexico, where he sought 
to depose General Huerta, who had taken power in a bloody coup not long before 
Wilson’s inauguration. Wilson had previously professed wariness of the idea that 
liberty could be “handed down from above”, but he was insistent that Mexico did 
provide suitable soil for self-government. “When properly directed there is no 
people not fitted for self-government,” he said. The Mexicans might not be “at 
present as capable of self-government as other people -  our own, for example -  
but I do hold that the wide-spread sentiment that they never will be and never can 
be.. .is as wickedly false as it is palpably absurd.”281 By the time Wilson began 
to engage with Mexico, the nation was already in the throes of civil conflict. US 
policy went through phases of interference and retreat. At first the policy was one 
of ‘watchful waiting’, before 1914 saw direct intervention in the form of a 
sizeable US military incursion at Vera Cruz. This proved counterproductive, 
however, uniting all Mexican factions in opposition to foreign encroachment.
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That failure led Wilson to abandon plans for further military intervention against 
the Huerta government, which was soon toppled by its domestic opponents in 
any case. Still, however, he persisted in seeking to shape Mexico’s internal 
politics, supporting the Constitutionalist faction in the civil war. In 1916, he then 
repeated his earlier misjudgement by sending troops back into Mexico, this time 
in response to deliberately provocative cross-border incursions mounted by rebel 
leader Pancho Villa.
Throughout this extended episode, Wilson was driven by a paradoxical 
combination of objectives: insistence on Mexican ‘self-government’ sat side-by- 
side with his own liberal ideas limiting the form that government should take. 
Repeatedly he took an interest in the policies and intentions of the rival Mexican 
factions with a view to securing the ‘right’ kind of order there, a posture the 
Mexicans naturally found intrusive. Though professing to believe that the 
Mexicans should resolve their own affairs, underlying Wilson’s demands for 
‘good government’ was always the threat of intervention, whereby the US 
“would be constrained to decide what means should be employed.. .to help 
Mexico save herself and save her people.”282 As one critic has noted:
N o distinction seemed to exist in W ilson’s thinking between United States 
intervention and Mexican self-determination. He considered the legitimate 
objectives o f both nations to be identical. Intervention thus became no more than 
a means to expedite self-determination. 283
To his mind, intervention in Mexico was necessary to create the pre-conditions 
for the Mexicans to rule themselves. The success of US efforts thus meant not 
US domination, but “an enlargement of the field of self-government.” As Bell 
puts it, “intervention was not really intervention, because the intentions of the 
United States were for the best and the consequences would be beneficial to 
Mexico”. 285 It was the role of the US in the Western Hemisphere to provide the 
necessary guiding hand to other states: “helping them compose their differences,
282 Quoted in Notter, p.419
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starting them on the road to peace and prosperity, and leaving them to work out 
their own destiny, but watching them narrowly and insisting that they shall take 
help when help is needed.” As Notter notes, it was clear that “we [i.e.
Americans] were to judge that need”.286
Because he believed that his interventions favoured the spread of self- 
government and liberalism, Bell notes, it made sense to Wilson to think that “ an 
expanding American system was not only to be beneficial to the United States 
but beneficial to the rest of the world. If one believed this then one might assume 
that one had no special interest but that which is right. Those who opposed 
Wilson’s program could be regarded as being unrepresentative of the real
• 9 8 7aspirations of their own people.” Wilson, he argues “gradually reached a 
definition of America’s needs and interests, and this he defined as right... The 
coercion of Mexico by the United States was not in conflict with the principle of 
self-determination, because ‘real’ self-determination came from doing what 
Wilson thought should be done.”288
During his first term, Wilson also set in train highly interventionist policies in 
Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. These involved the 
deployment of US troops and American administrative ‘assistance’, and the 
creation of new constitutional systems. Sometimes, when those systems failed to 
sustain themselves, the process reached its logical conclusion with the institution 
of US military government to rescue basic order.289 As well as helping draft 
constitutions, these interventions established US control of substantial parts of 
the government revenue apparatus, effectively annexing chunks of national 
sovereignty. In each case the goal was to take weak, illiberal and insolvent states 
in hand and create something resembling constitutional market-oriented 
democracy. The usual result was a fragile state with shallow popular 
commitment to its institutions and a dependence on the US to underwrite the 
political order. In pursuing this strategy, Wilson applied the same ideological
286 Quoted in Notter p.292; Notter p.293
287 Bell p. 190
288 Bell, p.8
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jujitsu as in the Mexican case: he rationalised the expansion of the scope of US 
intervention within other sovereign states based upon the advance of the 
principle of self-determination. Even as US’s controlling role in Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, Panama and Nicaragua was reaching its peak, the president 
was telling Congress of a new footing of “genuine equality and unquestioned 
independency” in Latin America, which sprang from a “more vital community of 
interest”290
This interventionism made sense from a strategic perspective: it ensured US 
control of all the key potential launch-points for any hostile naval thrust at the 
Panama Canal. Under the logic of the Roosevelt Corollary, it also forestalled 
European interference against vulnerable states. No doubt the preservation of US 
investments in the countries in question also entered into consideration, though 
these were hardly enormous in the grander scheme of the US economy. More 
important in Wilson’s reasoning were political and ideological priorities. 
Clements sums up Wilson’s Latin American policy thus: “Security concerns and 
economic interests played only small parts...its main motive was genuine, albeit 
patronizing, benevolence. Its result was a dangerous, destructive, and ultimately 
unsuccessful moral imperialism”.291 As Wilson supposedly (perhaps 
apocryphally) summarised the project himself, he wanted to “teach the South
9Q9American Republics to elect good men”.
Wilson did not deliberately seek to imitate European colonialism; in the abstract 
he idealised the independence of Latin American nations. Although he embraced 
the Monroe Doctrine based on “the premise that American influence was 
liberating compared to the exploitative nature of European influence,” he was 
somewhat concerned about its one-sided nature.293 The Monroe Doctrine should 
be reconceived, he thought, as “a common guarantee... of political independence 
and territorial integrity.”294 His grand project for the region, never realised, was a
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‘Pan-American Pact’, to turn the unilateral doctrine into a mutual security
295agreement.
Like Roosevelt, Wilson spoke and acted as though there was an overlap, even an 
identity relationship, between the interests of the US and the Latin American 
nations. In seeking “the lasting interests of the people of the two continents”, he 
was sure that his policies would “redound to the profit of both and interfere with 
the rights and liberties of neither.” 296 His policy, he said, was “Pan- 
Americanism”, which had “none of the spirit of empire in it. It is the 
embodiment... of the spirit of law and independence and mutual service.”297 He 
was largely oblivious to the depth of suspicion with which the United States was 
regarded in Latin America, believing that people there welcomed US oversight 
because the United States -  as he saw it -  had a proven track record of 
disinterestedly aiding its neighbours. In 1919,21 years after the ‘liberation’ of 
Cuba in the war with Spain, Wilson felt confident in proclaiming that “we 
redeemed our honor to the utmost of our dealings with Cuba. She is weak but 
absolutely free; and it is her trust in us that makes her free. Weak peoples 
everywhere stand ready to give us any authority among them that will assure 
them a like friendly oversight and direction.”298
Wilson was even more deeply immersed than Roosevelt in the view that liberty 
and progress had to result in an approximation of liberalism in order to deserve 
those labels. All right-thinking people aimed towards the same universal 
progressive ends, he believed, noting that “throughout this hemisphere the same 
aspirations are everywhere being worked out, under diverse conditions but with 
the same impulse and ultimate object.”299 True freedom and independence meant 
the maintenance a liberal, democratic capitalist order. This belief served to 
justify substantial US intervention to ensure that a country did not drift away
295 For discussion of the Pan-American Pact, see Samuel Flagg Bemis, ‘Woodrow Wilson and 
Latin America’, in Edward H. Buehrig (ed.), Wilson’s Foreign Policy in Perspective 
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from the ‘correct’ developmental path and towards dictatorship, economic 
radicalism, or anarchy. His problems in achieving lasting success in Latin 
America were thus founded on what Bell terms an “inability to understand the 
nationalistic sentiments of other peoples”. This made him misguidedly confident 
that others must understand “that what was to the interest of the United States 
must work for the good of all others”, and doomed him to a struggle to “create an 
empire of good will” which in practice could only “generate disbelief and 
hostility”.300 The Wilsonian strategy was, at root, an extension of Roosevelt’s 
desire to ‘civilise’ Latin America.
These features of Wilson’s Latin American policy are important because they 
served as the ideological model for his later efforts to reform global order. After 
WWI had brought about entanglement in Europe, he consciously regarded his 
development of the Monroe Doctrine and his efforts at a Pan-American Pact as 
the template for America’s new global diplomacy. In 1919, he argued that 
under the proposed League of Nations the Monroe Doctrine would become “the 
doctrine of the world”. His assumption that other nations would gladly 
embrace this idea revealed his contentedly US-centric perspective on the nature 
of the Monroe Doctrine. For Wilson it did not have the connotations of US 
imposition with which others associated it. It simply affirmed, he said, that “no 
nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that 
every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of 
development.”303
Wilson’s justification of war entry and European entanglement
The collapse of the European balance of power into large-scale violence in 1914 
seemed to confirm most Americans’ worst suspicions regarding the degeneracy 
of the European system of order. At the outset Wilson responded by reaffirming 
the prevailing consensus that Europe was, geographically and politically, a world
300 Bell p. 114
301 See speech to Pan-American Peace Delegation, Paris, May 27, 1919, WP1 pp. 499, 499-500.
302 At Reno, Nev., Sep 22, 1919, WP2 p.331
303 Quoted in Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, p.41
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apart. The unfolding conflict was, he said, “a war with which we have nothing to 
do, whose causes cannot touch us.” 304 The United States would stay out. In 
practice, however, as the Founders had earlier discovered, neutrality amid a 
major European war could be difficult to sustain. US commerce was interrupted 
by a British naval blockade of the Central Powers, and then also by retaliatory 
German submarine attacks. With American ships and lives at risk thanks to the 
U-boat attacks, Wilson fretted presciently: “I am afraid something will happen on 
the high seas which will make it impossible for us to keep out of the war.”
The American journey to war was not a swift one. Even after 128 Americans 
died with the sinking of the unarmed British liner Lusitania in May 1915, Wilson 
sought to maintain a pacific course, telling the American people that there was 
“such a thing as a man being too proud to fight.. .a nation being so right that it 
does not need to convince others by force...”306 He was, however, prepared to 
send a diplomatic note to Germany threatening a breach unless its submarine 
policy was moderated. This was successful at first, but the crisis was reprised 
two years later when the Germans declared their intention to wage unrestricted 
submarine warfare on vessels entering an exclusion zone around Britain. As the 
final breach loomed, Wilson reversed his position on the conflict as a whole, 
implicitly dismissing his own earlier assertion that the war and its causes need 
not concern the United States. “The war inevitably set its mark from the 
first.. .upon our minds, our industries, our commerce and our social action,” he 
argued in 1917. “To be indifferent to it or independent of it was out of the 
question.”307 When Americans citizens began to be killed by the new German 
policy of unlimited strikes at sea, the matter came to a head and Congress 
declared war, at Wilson’s request, on April 6, 1917.308
Wilson, re-elected in 1916 as the candidate most likely to keep America out of 
the war, was now a war president. This departure, not only from his previous 
policy but also from the standing doctrine of non-involvement in European wars,
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demanded political justification. Despite its official status as casus belli, the issue 
of submarine strikes did not remain in the foreground for long. More important in 
Wilson’s political case for war was the argument that that aspect of German 
behaviour was simply a symptom of the deeper threat posed by that nation and its 
desire for domination of Europe. Speaking of the Kaiser’s plans for supremacy, 
Wilson warned the American people that if Germany were victorious “America 
will fall within the menace.” With Germany dominating Europe, America would 
be forced into heavy militarization in order to be “ready for the next step in their 
aggression”309 He still talked, as he had during neutrality, of ending the war with 
a peace uniting all sides, but now argued that the ground had first to be cleared 
by the defeat Germany and the destruction of its system of government. “The 
rulers of Germany”, he would later accuse, had sought to accomplish “purposes 
which would have permanently impaired and impeded every process of our 
national life and have put the fortunes of America at the mercy of the Imperial 
Government of Germany”. The US needed to join the war because German 
victory would mean rule “by sheer weight of arms, and the arbitrary choices of 
self-constituted masters, by the nation which can maintain the biggest armies and 
the most irresistible armaments... in the face of which political freedom must 
wither or perish.”310
Wilson faced a sizeable ideological challenge in seeking to justify war entry and 
subsequent global engagement. He needed to overcome over a century of 
tradition whereby America’s leaders had argued that the US interest lay in 
separation from the set of interests and values instantiated in the European 
balance of power. He accomplished the task in two stages. First, he cast the 
conflict as one concerning not merely narrow national interests, but a 
fundamental clash of political morality: a war between the ideals of liberal 
democracy and the warped values of militarist autocracy. Second, he argued that 
American intervention did not amount to what had heretofore been prohibited -  
the embroilment of the US in the European system -  but rather an opportunity to 
strike a blow demolishing that order. Despite their longstanding tradition of 
detachment, he argued, Americans including himself had become convinced that
309 Flag Day Address, June 14, 1917, WP1 p.65
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the war “was not a European struggle... [but] a struggle for the freedom of the 
world and the liberation of humanity.” 311 “It is not an accident or a matter of 
sudden choice that we are no longer isolated,” he later told the Senate, “.. .It was 
our duty to go in, if we were indeed the champions of liberty and of right.”
To create an ideological bridge away from the Founders’ Era consensus, Wilson 
advanced the ideological proposition that the United States would not be joining 
the system of international relations as it had operated before, but rather stepping 
in to finally destroy the European order and replace it with one based on 
American -  i.e. liberal and universally valid -  principles:
W e are provincials no longer. The tragical events o f the thirty months o f vital 
turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens o f the world. 
There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved, 
whether we would have it or n o t... And yet we are not the less American on that 
account. W e shall be the more American if  we but remain true to the principles 
in which we have been bred. They are not the principles o f a province or o f a 
single continent. W e have known and boasted all along that they were the 
principles o f a liberated mankind.313
Key among those principles was the tenet that “peace cannot securely or justly 
rest on an armed balance of power”.314
Conditional US engagement and the abolition of the balance ofpower
The old, Europe-centred order, as Wilson saw it, had been based on the theory of 
a competitive balance of power maintained between rival nations, heavily armed, 
pursuing mutually exclusive interests in perpetual contest. Despite 
acknowledging that the scale of the Great War in Europe had threatened US
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interests beyond the point of tenable neutrality, Wilson did not draw the 
conclusion that America had at last been forced into playing its part in this old 
order. Instead, he concluded that the war had presented an opportunity for the 
comprehensive reform of the international system in line with American ideals. 
The principles that had previously mandated America’s arms-length relationship 
with the global system could now, through their conquest of European minds, 
enable and justify a new international engagement on the part of the United 
States.
This idea entered public life in the months before US war entry, when, in January 
1917, Wilson told Congress that there must be “not a balance of power, but a 
community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common
*21 c m %
peace.” Thereafter, the rejection of the ‘balance of power’ as an organising 
concept was a leitmotif of his discussion of postwar order. During that American 
phase of the war, he rebuffed exploratory German inquiries suggestive of a 
negotiated peace on the grounds that they invited what he termed “the method of 
the Congress of Vienna”, by which he meant a conservative peace based on the 
balancing of armed great powers’ rival interests. What was needed, he said, was 
“a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and 
justice”, not a return to “the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance 
of power.” 316 This war was “much more than a war to alter the balance of power 
in Europe”, he insisted:317
Henceforth, alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against 
understanding, but there must be a common agreement for a common object and 
at the heart o f the common object must be the inviolable rights o f peoples and of 
mankind.318
In 1919, he would say of the Paris peace conference that the participants “were 
trying to make peace on an entirely new basis, and to establish a new order of
315 Quoted in Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, p. 27
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• • 0 1Qinternational relations.” This rejection of balance of power thinking has been 
highlighted by many of Wilson’s biographers. Pierce notes that “he saw the 
whole notion of basing peace on a balance of power as flawed”.320:
Wilson could not condone the balance o f power as a guide for foreign policy. He
saw the obsession with a geopolitical solution to the world’s problems as not only
contrary to the American way, but also as a major reason for the advent o f w ar...
The United States would shift the balance to the Allies’ favour only to render
321balance-of-power tactics obsolete.
Wilson told a London audience before the Paris conference that Allied and 
American soldiers had fought “to do away with an old order” the “center and 
character” of which was:
.. .that unstable thing which we used to call the ‘balance o f power’ — a thing in 
which the balance was determined by the sword which was thrown in the one side 
or the other; a balance which was determined by the unstable equilibrium of 
competitive interests; a balance which was maintained by jealous watchfulness and 
antagonism o f interests which, though it was generally latent, was always deep- 
seated.
The new order demanded “not a balance of power, not one powerful group of 
nations set off against another, but a single overwhelming, powerful group of 
nations who shall be the trustee of the peace of the world”.322 This was a 
reference to his plan to reform global order by the provision of ‘collective 
security’ through a League of Nations.323 Such a scheme could overcome 
American taboos against entanglement in Europe, because US engagement with 
a thoroughly reformed global order would no longer be ‘entangling’. There 
would not be an alliance with some states and against others, but rather 
American leadership of a universal cooperative effort to preserve order. Hence
319 Quoted in Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, p.45
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the commitment was asserted to be qualitatively different from those that the 
Founders’ Era consensus admonished US leaders to shun.
Thus Wilson felt he could claim to “read Washington’s immortal warning against 
‘entangling alliances’ with full comprehension and an answering purpose”, and 
at the same time endorse extensive commitments on America’s part to defend 
global order. This was because “only special and limited alliances entangle; and 
we recognise and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope 
for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the
'XOAworld for common understanding and the maintenance of common rights." In 
fact, he claimed, not only was his foreign policy tolerable in light of 
Washington’s injunction against alliances -  it was positively mandated by it:
[T]he thing [Washington] longed for was just what we are now about to supply;
an arrangement which will disentangle all the alliances in the world...  Nothing
entangles a nation, hampers it, binds it, except to enter into a combination with
325some other nation against the other nations o f  the world.
What Washington had opposed, on the other hand, was “exactly what [opponents 
of the League] want to lead us back to. The day we have left behind us was a day 
of alliances. It was a day of balances of power... The project of the League of 
Nations is a great process of disentanglement.”326
This was a bold argument by any standard. Wilson was suggesting that the US 
must become a guarantor of the global order, yet he cast this as a fulfilment 
rather than an abandonment of the Founders’ Era tradition because the new world
' I ' j n
order would be a cooperative one based on American principles. To further 
this case, he characterised America’s choice as one between two stark 
alternatives, and in the process cast opponents of his strategy, by implication, as 
supporters of US entanglement in the old order:
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W e must go forward with the concert o f nations or we must go back to the old 
arrangement, because the guarantees o f peace will not be sufficient without the 
US, and those who oppose this Covenant are driven to the necessity o f 
advocating the old order o f balances o f power. I f  you do not have this universal 
concert, you have what we have always avoided, necessary alignment with one or 
other nation or with some other group o f nations.328
“Our task,” he said, “is no less colossal than this, to set up a new international 
psychology.”329 His hope was that this would be rendered achievable by the 
spectacular failure of the old order, which would prompt Europeans to embrace 
change:
W e know that there cannot be another balance o f power. That has been tried and
found wanting . . .  [T]here must be something substituted for the balance o f
pow er... a thoroughly united league o f nations. W hat men once considered
330theoretical and idealistic now turns out to be practical and necessary.
In advancing his case thus, Wilson considered himself to be the true ‘realist’ 
among world statesmen, while any wanting a return to the old order were surely 
the impractical ones.331 “The old order is gone,” he intoned, “and nobody can 
build it up again.”332 “A war in which [the people have] been bled white to beat 
the terror that lay concealed in every Balance of Power must not end in a mere 
victory of arms and a new balance,” he told the American Senate. The causes of 
WWI, he argued, were the result of the structure of international order: the war 
was “the logical outcome of the process that had preceded it”. The purpose of 
Paris was to “destroy that system and substitute another.. .based upon an absolute 
reversal of the principles of the old...” 333
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In constructing an ideological bridge from past to present on this basis, Wilson’s 
argument in effect made American global internationalism conditional. Without 
the radical reform of global order that he projected, a return to the old strategy of 
detachment would be the appropriate response:
I f  the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right 
poise by a balance o f power, the United States would take no interest, because 
she will join no combination o f power which is not the combination o f all o f us. 
She is not interested merely in the peace o f Europe, but in the peace o f the world. 
Therefore it seems to me that in the settlement that is just ahead o f us is 
something more delicate and difficult than was ever attempted before is to be 
accomplished, a genuine concert o f mind and purpose.334
America had ‘entered’ the world not to join the pre-existing global order but to 
redeem it. Hence, other countries needed to meet America’s expectations of a 
new world order, or the US could legitimately retract its commitment. There was 
a ‘deal’ of sorts in operation: if ‘the world’, meaning Europeans most especially, 
failed to live up to its duty to reform, the United States would by implication be 
freed from its obligation to support the world order. Wilson was not shy about 
this conditionality:
In coming into this war, the United States never for a moment thought that she 
was intervening in the politics o f Europe... Her thought was that all the world 
had now become conscious that there was a single cause which turned upon the 
issue o f this war. That was the cause o f justice and o f liberty for men o f every 
kind and place. Therefore, the United States should feel that its part in this war 
had been played in vain if  there ensued upon it merely a body of European 
settlements. It would feel that it could not take part in guaranteeing those 
European settlements unless that guarantee involved the continuous
superintendence o f the peace o f the world by the associated nations o f the
t j  3 3 5  world.
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Wilson’s predication of the new American internationalism on the abolition of 
the balance of power and the institution of a grand new cooperative order has 
been criticised by several analysts of Wilsonianism.336 By tying American policy 
to the pursuit such high objectives, they argue, he rendered American 
internationalism brittle: primed for disillusion as a consequence of pursuing 
ideals beyond the nation’s power to achieve. Yet his reasons for constructing the 
new internationalism in this way are on reflection clearly understandable. 
America’s history had ill prepared it in terms of ideological and political culture 
for entry into the global system as an active great power, even if its size and 
strength had equipped it to play such a role. Wilson could only succeed in 
making the case that the established taboo against entanglement in the European 
balance of power had ceased to be relevant by arguing that the world order was 
changing to accommodate American principles.
Interests, ‘peoples* and international cooperation
Wilsonianism asserted, contrary to balance-of-power thinking, that the self- 
interested pursuit of rivalry need not prevail in international relations. If only 
states had the will, the international system could operate instead based on an 
underlying fundamental harmony to be found in states’ truer interests. In his 
pursuit of the Monroe Doctrine, Wilson had insisted that his goal was “to show 
our neighbours to the south.. .that their interests are identical with our 
interests.” When his policy turned to the European and global stages, he 
carried over the same approach. The League, the centrepiece of the new order, 
was intended to abolish the alliance system based on the old, narrow conception 
of national interests. Hereafter, Wilson claimed, no “special or separate interest 
of any single nation or group of nations” could be allowed to prevail which was 
not “consistent with the common interest of all”. There could be “no leagues or 
alliances or special covenants and understandings”338 The war meant that
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“national purposes have fallen more and more into the background”, replaced by 
“the common purpose of enlightened mankind”339 Nations would be “co-workers 
in tasks which, because they are common, will weave out of our sentiments a 
common conception of duty and a common conception of the rights of men of 
every race and of every clime”.340 This faith in a new cooperative order was 
founded in moral universalism:
.. .[W ]hen we are seeking peace, we are seeking nothing else than this, that men 
should think the same thoughts, govern their conduct by the same ideals, 
entertain the same purposes, love their own people, but also love humanity, and
above all else, love that great and indestructible thing which we call justice and
• u .341 right.
European leaders, he claimed, had been compelled to embrace this new 
perspective by the epoch-defining events of the war. “We sometimes think”, he 
noted on his return from Paris in 1919, “ .. .that the experienced statesmen of 
European nations are an unusually hardheaded set of men, by which we generally 
mean.. .they are a bit cynical.. .that they do not believe things can be settled upon 
an ideal basis... [I]f they used to be that way they are not that way now. They 
have been subdued.”342
Wilson’s confidence that nations would come to interpret their interests in the 
more cooperative way he desired was based on two important sub-claims: first, 
that there was a crucial distinction to be made between ‘peoples’ and 
governments; and second, that the trend towards peoples acquiring control of 
their states, i.e. the spread of democracy, meant those states would ipso facto 
subscribe to the Wilsonian agenda. This first claim was key to the Wilsonianism 
attitude to foreign policy because it allowed Wilson to question other 
governments’ assertions regarding their own national interests by claiming that 
their claims did not fit with ‘real’ interests, meaning those of ‘the people’. This 
limitation on Wilson’s respect for other governments’ legitimacy was on display
339 New York City, Sep. 27, 1919, WP1 p.259. See also To Congress, Nov. 11, 1918, WP1 p.300.
340 Paris, June 26, 1919, WP1 p.521
341 Quoted in Pierce, p. 101
342 New York City, March 4, 1919, WP1 p.452, WP1 p.450
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in his statement while on his pro-League speaking tour in America that the peace 
settlement he had designed appealed to “all statesmen who realised the real 
interests of their people”.343 Whatever their governments might say, Wilson was 
always certain that ‘the people’ were in tune with his liberal vision, and this 
fuelled his unflagging optimism regarding the new world order.
The people/government distinction was not an invention of 1919. It had already 
been nurtured in Wilson’s attitude towards Latin America. And in wartime, he 
invoked it as a central part of his narrative of the conflict with Germany. Even as 
he asked for a declaration of war, he made a point of declaring: “We have no 
quarrel with the German people... It was not upon their impulse that their 
government acted in entering this war.”344 Likewise, German espionage and 
intrigue during the United States’ neutrality, culminating in the controversy over 
the Zimmermann Telegram seeking an anti-American alliance with Mexico, was 
attributed not to ‘Germany’ as a totality, but to the clique who controlled it: “We 
knew that their sources lay not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German 
people towards us ... but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did 
what it pleased and told its people nothing.”345
As Wilson saw it, the German people were controlled by, not in control of, their 
government, and thus could not be held responsible for its actions. In seeking to 
destroy the German government and the system that underpinned it, the United 
States was therefore fighting also “for the liberation o f ... the German peoples” 
as well as others.346 It was, he argued, “a People’s War” for “freedom and justice 
and self-government among the nations of the world... the German people 
themselves included...”347 Once peoples were empowered, he believed, the new 
order could flower. Speaking in Boston after his return from the peace 
conference, he declared that: “[W]hen I speak of the nations of the world, I do 
not speak of the governments of the world. I speak of the peoples who constitute 
the nations of the world. They are in the saddle, and they are going to see to it
343 San Francisco, Calif., Sep. 17, 1919, WP2 p.234
344 To Congress, April 2, 1917, WP1 p.l 1
345 Ibid, p. 13
346 Ibid, p. 14.
347 Flag Day Address, June 14, 1917, WP1 p.66
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that if their present governments do not do their will some other governments 
shall.”348
Yet for all this talk of cooperation, it is nevertheless evident that Wilsonianism 
was based on an intellectual approach not much less nationalistic than those of 
the more overt imperialism of Roosevelt. Most notably, it shared the assumption 
that the United States alone was entitled to identify authoritatively what the 
‘common interest’ was, and what it mandated.349 His unshakeable conviction that 
states should be able to find mutually beneficial solutions to any conflict through 
reason and goodwill equipped Wilson poorly to deal with circumstances where 
other nations insisted that their interests clashed with those of others, or with 
American imperatives. When this happened, he was prepared to follow the logic 
of his ideological principles and tell other governments that they were simply 
mistaken in their reading of their own interests. Such was the case after the war 
when the administration argued Italian demands for Fiume were “contrary to 
Italy’s best interests”.350 Such arguments went down poorly with the relevant 
leaders, for obvious reasons.
Universal liberal democracy as a necessary condition of Wilsonian order
Wilson’s thinking about the new world order thus involved a series of 
interlocking, mutually supportive ideas, each crucial to the overall vision: (1)
The balance of power order was defective, morally and practically, and had to 
go. (2) It could and should be replaced by a more cooperative order. (3) Bringing 
about this new cooperative spirit required states to recognise that their most basic 
national interests were in harmony, not in conflict. (4) This recognition would be 
brought about because the world’s ‘peoples’, newly awakened, would oblige 
their governments to embrace the liberal Wilsonian agenda, because it was in 
line with their own values. The final link in the chain of ideas was the 
universalisation of liberal democracy within states, for only if this occurred could
348 Boston, Feb. 24, 1919, WP1 p.439
349 For a critique of this and of Wilson’s general tendency to conflate US interests with those of 
others, see Ambrosius, Wilson p.51; and Wilsonianism, p.33
350 “Three Cablegrams on the Adriatic Question”, WP2 p. 465
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peoples control their governments effectively enough to insist on the requisite 
cooperative foreign policy. ‘Self-determination’ is well known as a Wilsonian 
phrase referring to the right of peoples within fragmenting empires to form 
separate nation states, but the term also had meaning in reference to internal 
politics: the right of peoples to determine for themselves who should govern 
them.
In analysing the causes of WWI, Wilson blamed not only the balance-of-power
system as a whole, but also the nature of the German military autocracy, headed
1
by the Kaiser’s secretive, aristocratic establishment. In an open society, he 
thought, the events that launched the war could not have occurred, and in a fully 
democratic world they would not be repeated:
Cunningly contrived plans of deception and aggression.. .can be worked out and 
kept from the light only within the privacy o f courts or behind the carefully 
guarded conferences o f a narrow and privileged class. They are happily
impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information
f  352concerning all the nation’s affairs.
Autocratic government -  i.e. the absence of popular control -  was to blame for 
this and other wars, he argued: “I am convinced that only governments institute 
such wars as the present, and that they are never brought on by 
peoples... democracy is the best preventive of such jealousies and suspicions and
'\C'2
secret intrigues as produce wars...” Wilson was thus a subscriber to what 
would later be termed ‘liberal/democratic peace theory’, the idea that 
democratically constituted states do not fight one another. “Power cannot be used 
with concentrated force against free peoples if it is used by free people,” as he 
put it in 19 1 7.354 His longstanding belief was that “ .. .peace is going to come to 
the world only through Liberty.. .One republic must love another just as one 
body of human beings must understand and sympathize with another body of
351 Pierce notes convincingly that: “There is a premonition of the Cold War in Wilsonian tactics. 
The idea that the domestic political structure, in this case the German autocracy, is implicated 
when there is external aggression would recur in the 1940s.” Pierce, p.55
352 To Congress, April 2, 1917, WP1 p.12.
353 Quoted in Notter, p569
354 Buffalo, NY, November 12, 1917, WP1 p.l 19
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human beings” “Great Democracies,” he asserted, with the United States in mind 
as the supreme example, “are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire war... 
Conquest and dominion are not in our reckoning; or agreeable to our principles.”
355
From this he inferred that lasting peace could be achieved only through the 
absence of non-democratic states from the international system. As he urged the 
declaration of war in 1917, he told Congress: “a steadfast concert for peace can 
never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic 
government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.” The 
world, he would argue later, could not be safe, “so long as governments like that 
which... drew Austria and Germany into this war are permitted to control the 
destinies.. .of men and nations.”356 The First World War, as he conceived of it, 
was not a war against one rogue nation and its allies, but a war against a system 
of government, “a people’s war.. .waged against absolutism and militarism”, “not 
only a war between nations, but also a war between systems of culture.”357 In 
making the argument that democracy was causally linked to peace, and 
dictatorship to war and aggression, Wilson laid the basis for an American 
concern with the domestic systems of others that would recur for generations.
It was universally true, Wilson insisted, that “people have a right to live their 
own lives under the governments which they themselves choose to set up. That is 
the American principle and I was glad to fight for it.”358 Fusing democratic 
universalism and ‘Americanism’ thus, Wilson justified the war as an American 
struggle for universal liberty: “We wanted to destroy autocratic authority 
everywhere in the world.” “The object of the war was to destroy autocratic 
power... There must not be men anywhere in any private place who can plot the 
mastery of civilization.” “There are not going to be many other kinds of
Nations [than democracies] long, my fellow citizens,” he predicted. “The people
355 Quoted in Notter p.581, 460
356 Labor Day Message to the American People, Sep. 2, 1918, WP1 p.247
357 To Socialist Delegation, Paris, Dec. 16, 1918, WP1 p.326; University of Paris, Dec. 21, 1918, 
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of this world -  not merely the people of America, for they did the job long ago -  
have determined that there should be no more autocratic governments.361
Wilson’s objective, therefore, was not the creation of a new balance of power, 
but the alteration of the domestic systems of Germany and other states so as to 
allow a new liberal order. When armistice was agreed with Germany, it was on 
the condition that the Kaiser be deposed and his supporters expelled from the 
state apparatus. With that, Wilson told the American people, “everything for 
which America fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty
'Xffito assist.. .in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.” The 
universal righteousness of liberal principles was central to Wilson’s vision. He 
was certain that his ideas were in line with the progressive advance of history, 
reflecting not preoccupations particular to America but values of universal 
legitimacy. Of self-determination and government by consent, he declared:
These are American principles... [a]nd they are also the principles o f progressive,
forward-looking men and women everywhere, o f every modem nation, o f every
363enlightened community. They are the principles o f mankind and must prevail.
The values of liberty and democracy were ideologically contagious, Wilson 
explained: “It is not only in America that men want to govern themselves, it is 
not only in France that men mean to throw off this intolerable yoke. All men are 
of the same temper and of the same make and the same rights.”364 The war had 
been “a great cause which was not the peculiar cause of America but the cause of 
mankind and of civilization itself.”
361 At Auditorium, St Paul, Minn., Sep. 9, 1919, WP2 p.84
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*Leader and umpire both American primacy and destiny
One of the most important of Wilson’s numerous assumptions regarding future 
world order was that the United States would be pre-eminent. No less than 
“moral leadership” was being offered to the United States, he felt, and the nation 
had to decide “whether we .shall accept or reject the confidence of the world.” 
This was partly based on the raw fact of America’s vast power: “If we are 
partners, we predict we will be the senior partner,” he told Americans. “ .. .The
'Xf* 7other countries of the world are looking to us for leadership and direction.”
Yet he was reluctant to invoke the brute fact of America’s economic advantage 
or material strength as the primary driver of American primacy; rather, he 
wanted to claim moral superiority. It was more important that “the United States 
is the only nation in the world that has sufficient moral force with the rest of the 
world”. To his mind the “whole moral force of right in the world depends 
upon the United States rather than upon any other nation.”
Wilson’s intense focus on the themes of cooperation and common interests 
clearly identify him as an opponent of nationalism, at least of a certain kind. Yet 
his belief that it was America’s place to exercise moral, even spiritual, leadership 
lent a nationalistic quality to his vision of the new world order that echoed 
Roosevelt’s ambition to win a place for America in the history of the ages. Of 
the “distinction drawn between nationalism and internationalism,” he observed:
The greatest nationalist is the man who wants his nation to be the greatest nation, 
and the greatest nation is the nation which penetrates to the heart o f its duty and 
mission among the nations o f the world... [T]he nation that has that vision is 
elevated to a place o f influence and power which it cannot get by arms, which it 
cannot get by commercial rivalry, which it can get by no other way than by that
366 Address to Soldiers and Sailors on the After Hatch of the USS “George Washington”, July 4, 
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spiritual leadership which comes from a profound understanding o f the problems 
of humanity.371
This was the kind of leadership that he claimed was on offer to the United States, 
and he sought to insist that the rest of the US body politic embrace it. Whereas if 
the America took up the baton of leadership and entered the League, he argued, it 
would be “the determining factor in the development of civilization,” he argued, 
if it did not then: “the world would experience one of those reversals of 
sentiment, one of those penetrating chills of reaction, which would lead to a 
universal cynicism, for if America goes back upon mankind, mankind has no 
other place to turn.”372
The assumption of American primacy helped Wilson sustain his assumption that 
the institutions and norms of the new cooperative, multilateral new world order 
would not clash with the interests or wishes of the United States, or force it into 
policies it would not otherwise adopt. In the same way as he had done in 
conceptualising the Monroe Doctrine, he conflated the interests of the United 
States with the ‘true’ interests of other nations, and thus foresaw that the likely 
wishes of the United States and the collective will of the free world would 
perennially coincide. Universal democracy and cooperative international 
institutions would of themselves bring other nations in line with American 
positions on important matters, removing any foreseeable basis for clash. 
Ambrosius picks up on this theme in Wilson’s thinking, noting that: “Implicit in 
his conception of a league, as in the Monroe Doctrine, was the assumption that 
the United States would decide whether to guarantee the status quo or require
•  • ' X l ' Xchanges. His approach to foreign policy was at once unilateral and universal.”
The kind of progress Wilson foresaw was towards general recognition an 
objective ‘right’ into which the United States already had insight, while 
American global ‘leadership’ would allow the US a degree of control in
371 St Louis, Mo., Sep. 5, 1919, WP1 p.621
372 Des Moines, Iowa, Sep. 6, 1919, WP2 p.26; Sioux Falls, S. Dak., Sep. 8,1919, WP2 p.52
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managing that process. In the “game” of managing the new world order, Wilson 
told Americans they would be “trusted as leader and umpire both.”374
It did not seem conceivable to Wilson that the United States might in future find 
itself in conflict with the new order of international institutions and law that he 
had planned, because he conceived of the new order as the universalisation of the 
standards of the United States. Axiomatically, therefore, America would be in the 
right; the purpose of new system was to bring others into line with the United 
States, not vice versa. This underlying assumption was made explicit in Wilson’s 
rejoinder to Senatorial critics who quibbled about the terms provided for 
voluntary withdrawal from the League:
I am inclined to ask: ‘W hat are you worried about? Are you afraid that we will
not have fulfilled our international obligations?’ I am too proud an American to
believe anything o f the kind. W e never have failed to fulfil our international
obligations, and we never will, and our international obligations will always look
toward the fulfilment o f the highest purposes o f civilization... W e have served
mankind and we shall continue to serve mankind, for I believe, my fellow men,
375that we are the flower o f mankind so far as civilization is concerned.
Likewise, he had no fear that the provisions of the League for subjecting US 
decisions to outside scrutiny would ever lead to justified criticism:
There is only one conceivable reason for not liking [such provisions].. .and to me
as an American it is not a conceivable reason; that is that we should wish to do
some nation some great wrong. If  there is any nation in the world that can afford
376to submit its purposes to discussion, it is the American Nation.
Imagining that perceived American failure to meet international obligations 
could only arise from ethical deviancy, Wilson did not concern himself with the 
prospect. That accusation of wrongdoing might result not from conscious
374 Ibid., p. 57
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malevolence but simply from differing national perceptions of obligation and 
interest did not, apparently, occur to him. He dismissed as unpatriotic those who 
raised the spectre of the US being the recipient of critical judgments from any 
new international bodies. League judgments could only be made against the US 
over its veto, he reminded them, if the US itself were party to the case under 
consideration. In that case, he asked: “A party to what? A party to seizing 
somebody else’s territory? A party to infringing some other country’s political 
independence? Is any man willing to stand on this platform and say that the 
United States is likely to do either of these things?”377 The Wilsonian worldview 
did not admit of the idea that judgments of international right and wrong might 
be subjective, likely to vary from nation to nation in accordance with interest and 
politics. Instead, it took it as read that America’s intention to live up to its own 
standards would be sure to protect it from charges of malfeasance, because 
American standards themselves could be treated as the measure of objective 
right.
In making his case for the assumption of global leadership, Wilson also projected 
a sense of national destiny. America’s “isolation”, he said, had ended “not 
because we chose to go into the politics of the world, but because by the sheer 
genius of this people and the growth of our power we have become the 
determining factor in the history of mankind.” As a result, the nation no longer 
had a choice because its influence was too decisive. Isolation had been ended,
7^0
and thus the new internationalism brought about, by “the processes of history”. 
The emergence of the new order was “a fulfilment of the destiny of the United 
States”:
At last.. .the world has come to the vision that [America] had in that far year of  
1776. Men in Europe laughed.. .at this little handful o f dreamers.. .who talked
dogmatically about liberty, and since then that fire which they started on that
* 379little coast has consumed every autocratic government in the world...
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378 Des Moines, Iowa, Sep. 6, 1919, WP2 p. 18-19
379 Reno, Nev., Sep 22, 1919, WP2 p.344
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Now the only question left for America was “Shall we keep the primacy of the 
world or shall we abandon it?380 Even when it became apparent that he would 
have trouble securing the ratification of his peace plan at home, Wilson 
continued to frame his defence of it in the language of inevitability. Speaking to 
a sceptical Senate, he invoked divine imagery:
The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan o f our
choosing, but by the hand o f God who led us into this way. We cannot turn
back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the
vision. It was o f this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show
381the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.
Wilson’s divergence from Roosevelt: ‘moral forcef and the role of arms
Because he was convinced that his optimism regarding universal liberty would 
be vindicated, Wilson felt sure that the role of arms in international relations 
would greatly diminish under the new world order. This did not have its origins 
in outright pacifism, however, for Wilson was assuredly no subscriber to that 
school. Once he finally gave up on neutrality in 1917, he exhorted the American 
people towards an almost orgiastic embrace of righteous violence:
Germany has.. .said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and
peace shall reign in the affairs o f men... There is, therefore, but one response
possible from us: Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the
righteous and triumphant force which shall make Right the law o f the world, and
382cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.
But though he argued that a decisive fight with Germany was needed to clear the 
ground for righteous peace, he anticipated that in the postwar order there could 
be significant global disarmament, and far less need for violence as a means of
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resolving international disputes. Disarmament was a key point of all his 
proposals for peace during the war, and he advocated the nationalisation of arms 
production to avoid the existence of commercial incentives for war.
The key support for maintaining the new order, he forecast, would not come 
from arms, but from the mobilisation of international opinion behind the 
Wilsonian worldview. “It will be our high privilege,” he told an audience at 
Buckingham Palace in 1918, “ ...to organise the moral force of the world to 
preserve [the forthcoming] settlements, to steady the forces of mankind and make 
the right and justice ... the predominant controlling force of the world.” The
Allied nations, “temporarily together in a combination of physical force”, would 
now be combined in exercising “moral force that is irresistible.” The new order 
would place “the conscience of the world.. .upon the throne...”. He thus
encouraged reliance, in effect, on moral peer pressure between nations as the 
ultimate guarantor of security. “[W]e are depending primarily upon one great 
force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world,” he 
confessed with pride.385 When he came to sell the League of Nations to 
Americans, he refused to acknowledge openly that a commitment to the use of 
armed force was required. Instead, he told Americans, the new order would 
ensure that “instead of war there shall be arbitration.. .discussion.. .the closure of 
intercourse.. .the irresistible pressure of the opinion of mankind.”
Critics did challenge Wilson, noting that his Paris treaties appeared to commit 
the US to open-ended military intervention abroad. But he dismissed them with 
the paradoxical gambit that clear US commitment to act, as provided by the 
collective security pledge in Article X of the League Covenant, would in fact 
avert the need for future action. America could “go into the great adventure of 
liberating hundreds of millions of human beings from the threat of foreign 
power,” Wilson argued “ .. .without shedding a drop of human blood.” “If you are 
squeamish,” he reassured Americans, “I will tell you you will not have to fight.
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The only force that outlasts all others and is finally triumphant is the moral 
judgment of mankind.”387 The League was not a trap for America leading to war, 
but through its deterrent power was “a definite guarantee by word against 
aggression.”388 The critics, he suggested, “know physical force and do not 
understand moral force. Moral force is a great deal more powerful than physical
• 'lO Q
force. Govern the sentiments of mankind and you govern mankind.”
Wilson argued that it was in fact his opponents who were making military 
demands of Americans, claiming that his plan for League membership paved the 
way for minimal armament while rejection of it would necessitate a sizeable 
military establishment to survive in a world collapsed back into balance-of- 
power rivalry.390 This was therefore an area of clear divergence between Wilson 
and Roosevelt. Whereas TR felt pride and hope at the prospect of American 
physical might and devoted a good deal of his public life to the cause of 
increased military appropriations, Wilson located himself in the opposite 
tradition, suspicious of efforts to make the US a military titan. Their perspectives 
on postwar order differed accordingly: Roosevelt viewed the retention of armed 
strength by the US and its allies as key to the defence of ‘civilisation’; Wilson 
was confident that the power of moral force, with little role for arms, could make 
the new order work.
Mortality, personal and political
Wilson’s peace settlement faced a swell of domestic opposition even before the 
Paris talks were concluded. Critics in the Republican-led Senate objected 
especially to the potentially open-ended commitment through Article X to defend 
all League members. Some, most famously Idaho’s William Borah, were so- 
called ‘irreconcilables’, opposed to any movement away from the Founders’ Era 
consensus. More numerous were centrist Republicans such as Henry Cabot 
Lodge and Elihu Root, who inherited status as the Republicans’ weightiest
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spokesmen on foreign affairs when Roosevelt died. This group was willing to 
accept a watered-down League treaty, but insisted that a series of ‘reservations’ 
be attached diluting America’s promises. But Wilson refused to compromise 
with the ‘reservationists’. Accusing them of partisan opportunism, he noted 
bitterly that internationalist Republicans like Roosevelt and Lodge had supported 
the idea of a League only a few years before.391
For Wilson, amputating Article X from the treaty to gain ratification was 
unacceptable; it was “the very backbone of the whole Covenant.”392 His rationale 
for the end of American ‘isolation’ was the replacement of the balance-of-power 
alliance system with a new world order of universal and collective security. A 
more limited pact would amount not to a minor variation on his scheme, but to an 
attack on the ideological foundation of his foreign policy. Rejecting compromise, 
he therefore sought to appeal over the heads of his Senate opponents by taking 
the case for unconditional ratification to the country in a great Western speaking 
tour beginning in September 1919. Often making several speeches each day and 
intending to go on for several weeks, he hoped to stir the mass of the people to 
rise up in his support and force his opponents to back down.
America’s choice, in Wilson’s characteristically stark portrayal, was between his 
internationalism, which assumed a radically reformed world order with America 
at its head, and the alternative of transforming America into a militarised and 
unilateral power within the old balance-of-power system, no better morally than 
the German state just defeated in war:
[W]e are making a fundamental choice. You have either got to have the old
system, o f which Germany was the perfect flower, or you have got to have a new 
393system...
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Is it possible.. .that there is a group o f individuals in this country who have 
conceived it as desirable that the United States should exercise its power alone, 
should arm for the purpose, should be ready for the enterprise, and should 
dominate the world by arms? .. .Are we going to substitute for pan-Germanism a 
sinister pan-Americanism? The thing is inconceivable. It is hideous. N o man dare 
propose that in plain words to any American audience anywhere. The heart of 
this people is pure... .It would rather have liberty and justice than wealth and 
power. It is the great idealistic force o f history, and the idealism o f America is 
what has made conquest o f the spirits o f men.394
His opponents, he said, offered only a return to the “old and evil order ... that old 
and ugly plan of armed nations, of alliances, of watchful jealousies, of rabid 
antagonisms, of purposes concealed, running by the subtle channels of intrigue 
through the veins of people who do not dream what poison is being injected into 
their systems.”395 Thus, he said, it was the reservationists who lay beyond the 
pale of America’s ideological tolerance. They were the ones who wanted to take 
the United States into the world of the great powers without the radical 
transformation of the international system Wilsonianism thought made that 
possible. The choice, he argued, was extreme: “We ought either to go in or to 
stay out. To stay out would be fatal to the influence and even to the commercial 
prospects of the United States, and to go in would be to give her leadership of the 
world.” 396
During this battle Wilson’s health broke. Exhausted and unwell, he returned to 
Washington on doctor’s orders three weeks into the Western tour. On October 
2nd, he suffered a massive stroke. Though he recovered enough function -  just -  
to continue in office, he was substantially incapacitated for the remainder of his 
presidency. Unable to convince enough Senators to support the League treaty 
without amendments, he did retain sufficient support to block any version 
incorporating Lodge’s reservations. This he chose to do. Thus, a coalition of 
‘irreconcilable’ isolationists who sought no overseas commitments whatsoever,
394 Omaha, Nebr., Sep. 8, 1919, WP2 p.42
395 San Francisco, Calif., September 17, 1919, WP2 p.235
396 Quoted in Ambrosius, Wilson, p. 150
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and those loyal to Wilson’s absolutist demand for ‘all or nothing’, killed the 
prospect of any version of the treaty passing.
Even as defeat unfolded, Wilson maintained his sense of self-righteousness. As 
he had been happy to tell foreign governments in the past, he now told the US 
government: ‘the people’ were behind his ideas; their representatives had erred. 
“Personally,” he wrote, in January 1920, “I do not accept the action of the Senate 
of the United States as the decision of the Nation.” It was on this basis that he 
called for the 1920 elections to serve as “a great and solemn referendum” on the
•  *207
Pans settlement. His party was soundly beaten, and he slipped from office 
quietly in March 1921. He had been reduced, in less than four years, from 
perhaps the most politically dominant president in US history to a physically 
broken man in whose ideas the public seemed to have lost faith. Yet he retained 
belief in the ultimate triumph to come of what he had attempted. In his last public 
pronouncement, on Armistice Day of 1923, he addressed a group of veterans 
gathered outside his house, telling them:
I am not one o f those that have the least anxiety about the principles I have stood 
for. I have seen fools resist Providence before, and I have seen their destruction, 
as will come upon these again, utter destruction and contempt. That we shall 
prevail is as sure as that God reigns.398
In spite of the ultimate failure of his own political career, Wilson left a legacy of 
ideas that fed the core debates of US foreign policy in the decades that followed. 
The brand of internationalism that he proposed, based upon liberal universalism 
and optimism, downplaying the role of force, has been the focus of savage 
criticism from realists, especially since WWII.399 Realists see Wilsonianism as 
the apotheosis of the moralistic foreign policy that has plagued US foreign 
policy, a damaging utopianism that links the US national interest with intrusive 
interventions aimed at perfecting foreign societies and encourages naive faith in 
the capacity of international institutions to preserve global security. Others in the
397 Message for Jackson Day Celebration, Jan. 8, 1920, WP2 p.455
398 Quoted in Clements p.223
399 See Kissinger, Diplomacy; Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy', Kennan, American 
Diplomacy', Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest among a great many others.
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mainstream foreign policy debate have sought to redeem the Wilsonian legacy, 
emphasising the necessity of pushing for the spread of liberal values that Wilson 
made the cornerstone of his pursuit of a new world order. Such thinkers in 
modem times, however, have almost always felt obliged to temper their claim to 
‘Wilsonianism’ with a qualifier such as ‘realistic’ or ‘hard’ to avoid the charge of 
softness.400 What both sides can agree upon, however, is that Wilson sought to 
lead America into the global system not through adoption of that system’s 
existing norms, but through reform of the world and its constituent nations in line 
with American preferences. The feasibility of such an enterprise, and therefore 
the ‘realism’ of making its pursuit the centrepiece of American objectives, has 
been the subject of the core debate of US foreign policy for almost a century.
Conclusion
Woodrow Wilson’s presidency marked a key point of transition in American 
thinking about global entanglement. The spur for change lay in shifting national 
and international circumstances. The increased territory, economic size and 
potential military power of the United States since its foundation had made it 
likely, if not inevitable, that it would broaden the scope of its self-defined 
interests and adopt a more globally engaged policy. While a necessary condition, 
however, this was not of itself sufficient to prompt sudden, wholesale change. 
Huge growth in American power potential was already apparent by the time of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s leadership, yet he remained constrained in his freedom of 
action by pre-existing principles embedded in American ideological culture 
regarding the separation of the American and European/global spheres. What 
differed in Wilson’s case was that the First World War brought about sudden 
upheaval in the international order. This generated pressure from the 
international system to complement the possibilities created by increased 
American strength.
400 For instance, see Max Boot, “The Myth of an American Neoconservative Cabal”, Daily Star, 
Lebanon, Jan 14 2004; http://www.benadorassociates.corn/article/1297 [accessed 19/06/08]; 
Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads, (London: Profile, 2006), pp.9- 
10
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Following on the path established by Roosevelt, Wilson intervened widely in 
Latin America in the first years of his presidency. He supported this with an 
ideology of ‘civilisation’ and self-determination under which the United States 
believed it could increase the ‘freedom’ of other peoples by interference in their 
national affairs, seeking to generate the proper conditions for them to enjoy 
liberty appropriately. This was rooted in the view that only certain forms of 
political order were compatible with progress, and that the US had a 
responsibility to guide other American nations in their exercise of freedom.
Under the Wilsonian ideology, the interests of the US and the Latin American 
states were identical, if properly conceived, and therefore it was legitimate to 
seek to build a cooperative system of states under a blanket of US hegemony. 
This conceptualisation of the Monroe Doctrine would later serve as the basis of 
Wilson’s global new world order.
Wilson’s America was drawn into the First World War directly by German 
submarine attacks, and indirectly by concern over the consequences of a German 
victory for US interests and broader geopolitical stability and security. But 
Wilson did not justify America’s joining the war by arguing that it would thus 
achieve a more beneficial balance of power. Further, he did not conceive of US 
internationalism in the postwar world as the entry of the United States into the 
system of international relations as it had existed prior to the war. Instead, he 
argued that the European balance of power system had been one of the causes of 
the war, and that that system must now been destroyed, to be replaced by a new 
world order based on cooperation and collective security. This would be made 
possible by the empowerment of ‘peoples’ through the imminent universalisation 
of liberal democracy. Because ‘peoples’ correctly perceived their fundamental 
interests to be common and harmonious, Wilsonianism argued, democracy would 
produce peace. This intellectual separation of peoples from governments enabled 
Wilson to criticise foreign governments for incorrectly identifying their peoples’ 
deeper wishes when they interpreted their national interests to be in conflict with 
American policy preferences. Wilson’s vision of postwar order was also based on 
the belief that the United States would exercise leadership in the new system, and 
that the creation of new laws and institutions governing international behaviour 
would amount to the internationalisation of American standards. Thus, it was not
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a consideration for Wilson that the US itself might find itself criticised or 
constrained in the pursuit of what it might consider its legitimate interests.
The emergence of Wilsonianism demonstrates one of the central claims of this 
thesis: that national strategy develops based on the interaction of circumstances 
with embedded ideological principles developed in the nation’s past. 
Circumstances during Wilson’s presidency called for a new level of international 
engagement. Established ideological principles, however, made the suggestion 
that the United States should enter into the European balance of power 
problematic within the context of US political culture. This led Wilson to craft 
the argument that the new internationalism into which he was leading the United 
States was predicated on the abolition of the old balance of power order and the 
creation of a new, liberal order under US leadership.
The new American internationalism was thus, via Wilsonian ideology, made 
conditional upon an imagined ‘deal’ whereby the United States agreed to be 
globally engaged only on the condition that it could legitimately demand from 
the world the universal liberal democracy upon which the new global order was 
to be founded. Though Wilsonianism fell into abeyance for a number of years 
after Wilson’s personal political failure, this ‘deal’ would be a crucial component 
in the strategic thinking that followed the Second World War. After WWII, the 
United States at last made the strategic decision mandated by its size and 
strength: to accept status as a lynchpin of the global order. It would do so, 
however, based not on the balance-of-power ideology of the old European order, 
but on a fusion of Wilsonian ideas regarding global international reform and 
Rooseveltian ones embracing the necessity of military might in the service of the 
good.
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5. The Truman administration
‘In the struggle for men’s minds, the conflict is 
world-wide’ 401
Introduction
The United States’ embrace of a new internationalism did not proceed 
uninterrupted after the First World War. In the 1920s and 1930s, after Wilson’s 
departure from public life, the nation eschewed the level of entanglement he had 
sought. Though the US played a significant role in European affairs through the 
provision of credit and economic advice, it refrained from firm military-political 
alliance commitments. Ideologically, there was an effort to recapture the spirit of 
well-intentioned but ultimately detached relations with Europe embodied in the 
Founders’ Era consensus. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, a treaty that sought 
to prohibit the use of force as a tool of statecraft, was the most visible American 
commitment to European diplomatic affairs. It had more in common, however, 
with the pre-WWI tradition of arbitration treaties than with the firmer 
commitments to mutual defence represented by the League of Nations and, later, 
by the North Atlantic Treaty.
In fact, the direction of intellectual travel on America’s part in the inter-war years 
was away from entanglement rather than towards it. In the 1930s, the Great 
Depression instilled pessimism and inward focus, while the rise of fascism and 
the worsening of diplomatic relations between the major European states bred 
anxiety regarding the possibility of another major war. Rather than pre-emptive 
efforts to avert war through American commitment, the United States’ chief 
response was Congress’s passage of a series of Neutrality Acts in 1936, 1937 and 
1939, prospectively limiting trade with belligerents in wartime so as to avoid a 
recurrence of 1917’s casus belli. Ultimately, however, America did not stay out 
of the Second World War. This was partly thanks to the efforts of president
401 NSC-68, p. 11
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Franklin Roosevelt to aid the Allied side, and partly due to the decision of Japan 
to attack the United States at Pearl Harbour in December 1941 and of Hitler’s 
Germany to declare war immediately thereafter.402
This chapter focuses on the period after that conflict was won. It does so because 
it considers the years of the mid- and late 1940s, under the leadership of Harry 
Truman, to be a decisive moment in the history of US strategic thought and 
policy. It was in this period that the decision to embrace a fully engaged global 
internationalism took place. Certainly there had been internationalists in the 
United States before, and a strand of national life given over to internationalist 
thought. But it was only after the Truman administration’s period in office that a 
stable bipartisan consensus existed in favour of extensive American 
commitments to preserve global order, and to maintain the military capability to 
meet such commitments. This chapter argues that the Truman administration 
made the case for, and commitment to, a new American internationalism on the 
basis of a revival of Wilsonian principles of liberal universalism and the 
Rooseveltian argument for accumulating armed strength in the defence of a 
righteous civilisational cause. In doing so, it broke decisively with the ideology 
of the Founders’ Era consensus, which finally lost the last of its hold over the 
thinking of American political leaders. Simultaneously, however, it rejected 
American entry into global affairs on the basis of seeking a stable balance of 
power between rival states with equivalently legitimate interests. This had 
profound implications for the ideological basis of US strategic thinking in the 
decades to come.
This chapter first sets out the national and international context in which the 
Truman administration operated. It then discusses the decline in relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, i.e. the emergence of the ‘Cold 
War’, which demanded a coherent new global strategy. The remaining sections 
then examine in details the strategic thinking that emerged in response to this 
conflict with the USSR. These cover President Truman’s own conception of the
402 For a detailed account of FDR’s steady insertion of the US into the conflict through verbal and 
tangible support for the Allies, see Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003), pp.455-680
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Cold War, the vision of ‘containment’ advanced from within of the State 
Department by George Kennan, and the construction of a strategy of militarised 
confrontation in the Clifford-Elsey Report and NSC-68. In outlining the strategy 
formulated by the Truman administration, this chapter emphasises the 
administration’s Wilsonian attribution of the problems of global order to the 
domestic constitution of the Soviet state, and its insistence on the universalisation 
of liberalism as the ultimate route to international peace and stability. It also 
notes the decisive adoption by US leaders of Rooseveltian beliefs concerning the 
necessity of a large standing military establishment on the part of the United 
States.
What follows is not an argument about whether the Cold War did or did not 
produce a balance of power ‘on the ground’; clearly it did. The argument made 
here concerns America’s perception of what it was doing and why. The 
conclusion it reaches agrees with Macdonald that the Cold War should be viewed 
not as a simple balance of power, but as a clash of rival, frustrated universalisms: 
“The irony,” he notes, “was that neither Leninism nor American-style liberalism 
accepted traditional balance of power politics philosophically, but structural 
realities meant that this was the most that could be hoped for in the short run.”403
National and international context
The Second World War profoundly altered the global distribution of power, 
leaving the traditional great powers of Western and Central Europe outside the 
top rank. By 1945, Germany lay in ruins economically, politically and 
ideologically. France had clearly been defeated and humiliated in the war even 
though it recovered its sovereignty thanks to Allied victory. The United 
Kingdom, in spite of its central role in the defeat of Germany and Churchill’s 
place alongside Stalin and FDR at the table of the ‘Big Three’, had seen its 
solvency and its grip on empire irreparably undermined, facts thst would become
403 Douglas J. Macdonald, ‘Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for 
Empirical Analysis’, in Westad, Reviewing the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 180- 
204. Quotation from p. 182.
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apparent soon after the end of hostilities. In Asia, Japan submitted to US 
occupation, while in China civil conflict raged.
The United States and the Soviet Union were the only powers to emerge stronger 
from the war. The USSR had endured enormous loss of life, and had suffered a 
political near-death experience immediately following Hitler’s unexpected 
invasion. It had regrouped, however, and assembled titanic military capacity, the 
brutal effectiveness of which had been displayed in a fierce counter-onslaught 
across Europe to Berlin. The United States, meanwhile, suffered none of the 
carnage others endured on the home front, and under the demands of war its 
economy had demonstrated a productive capacity that towered over that of 
others. Before WWII the international system had been based around a 
multiplicity of significant powers. By 1945, there were only two in the top tier. 
As a result, unprecedented systemic pressure existed for the United States to play 
a central role in the management of international order.
Domestically, too, the war had changed the United States, through its impact on 
the views of American leaders. America’s decision to turn away from Wilson’s 
legacy in favour of defensive isolation looked in hindsight like an error of 
historic moment. It had allowed a war that might have been contained in size by 
early American commitment to engulf half the world before dragging the United 
States in anyway. Many, therefore, looked to Wilsonianism for inspiration in 
seeking to build a new peace. They hoped that peace might centre on a new 
world organisation, a successor to the League of Nations
Yet such aspirations for a new world order had been raised and then discarded in 
US politics only 25 years earlier. There remained, even among influential 
political leaders, a school of thought that believed a retraction of US 
commitments to within its own hemisphere could once again be workable and 
desirable.404 It remained to be seen if a durable new internationalism could be
404 The best known ‘isolationist’ of the immediate postwar period was Senator Robert Taft of 
Ohio, who espoused historically familiar concerns regarding overseas commitments, and their 
corresponding requirement for a national security state antithetical to constitutional liberty at 
home. See John Moser. ‘Principles Without Program: Senator Robert A. Taft and American 
Foreign Policy’, Ohio History, vol.108, 1999, pp. 177-192
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constructed. That it did ultimately prove possible owed much to the pressures of 
circumstance: the desire of the Soviet Union to exercise its role as a military and 
ideological superpower, and the inability of others to resist it without American 
assistance. The manner in which the United States reasoned its way to its new 
internationalism, however, was also significant.
From ‘one world’ to ‘two ways of life*: Truman’s inheritance and the 
deterioration of US-Soviet relations
Precisely when and why US-Soviet relations passed the point of no return from 
alliance to enmity is a matter of debate.405 The visible fracture came after the 
transition from President Franklin Roosevelt, who died in office in April 1945, to 
his successor Harry Truman. Most historical accounts attribute importance to the 
shift from FDR’s nuanced -  some would say disingenuous -  management of Big
405 For a general survey of the historiography of the Cold War, see ‘America and the Cold War: 
Containment of Hegemony?’ in Francis G. Couvares et al, Interpretations o f American History: 
Patterns and Perspectives, 7th ed., (New York: Free Press, 2000), Chap 8. See also Melvyn P. 
Leffler and David S. Painter, Origins o f the Cold War, (New York: Routledge, 1994) and Odd 
Arne Westad, Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, (London: Frank 
Cass, 2000). The founding division in the field is that between ‘orthodoxy’, which chiefly blames 
the Soviet Union for the conflict, and ‘revisionism’, which points to the political and economic 
ambitions of the United States as a cause. This initial split has been followed by more subtle and 
sophisticated divergences between post-revisionism, neo-orthodoxy and neorevisionism. This 
second stage of debate has been more sympathetic on all sides to the role of ideology in the 
construction of US perceptions of national interest, even as authors have continued to disagree on 
the extent to which this allows ‘blame’ for the Cold War’s outbreak to be distributed. For the 
‘orthodox’ argument, see George Kennan’s ‘X’ article and NSC-68, discussed in more detail 
later. For revisionism see Lippmann, The Cold War, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972 -  1st ed. 
1947). Later, more radical, revisionist critiques include most notably William Appleman 
Williams, The Tragedy o f American Diplomacy, (New York: Dell, 1972); Walter LaFeber, 
America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000, 9th ed., (London: McGraw-Hill, 2002). Most 
radical of all is the revisionism of the ‘New Left’, for which see Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of 
War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis o f1943-45, (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1969); Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, (London: Vintage, 1992). Post-revisionism and 
neo-orthodoxy are both represented best -  at different stages of his career -  by John Lewis 
Gaddis; see Gaddis, ‘The Emerging Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War’, 
Diplomatic History, 7, Summer 1983, pp. 171-90. See also Gaddis, The United States and the 
Origins o f the Cold War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).; Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment: a critical appraisal o f postwar American national security policy, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). The best representative of subtle neo-revisionism is Melvyn P. Leffler, 
‘The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War’, American 
Historical Review, 89, April 1984, pp. 346-81. This chapter’s argument is broadly sympathetic to 
the neo-revisionist approach, which places emphasis on the importance of America’s ideological 
definition of its interests and the threats facing them, but does not seek particularly to condemn 
the US as the ‘guilty party’ in the Cold War’s emergence, which much revisionism seeks to do.
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Three diplomacy to Truman’s insistence on plainer speaking. Certainly, Truman 
was not kept well informed by FDR regarding the details of his Soviet policy.406 
There is an argument to be made that in adopting a confrontational approach and 
demanding the Soviet Union meet undertakings made at the Yalta Conference of 
February 1945. Truman’s approach ran counter to reassurances informally given 
to Stalin by FDR to Stalin regarding the meaning of those agreements407
The Declaration on Liberated Europe made at Yalta did appear to commit the 
USSR to hold free elections and form representative governments in territories 
under its military control, but it is clear with hindsight that Stalin had no 
intention of living up to American conceptions of freedom and representation. 
FDR’s priority, however, was to preserve friendly personal relations with Stalin, 
and thus he seems to have been willing to tolerate the emergence of an unspoken 
divergence of interpretation from Yalta.408 Pierce terms this the “Rooseveltian 
practice of disguising unprincipled agreements with the pretence of principle”, 
arguing that it was a practice “with which Truman never felt comfortable.. .and 
which he would soon abandon. He would also abandon the idea that cooperation 
was to be valued in and of itself, even if principles had to be sacrificed for the 
sake of it.”409 Others have suggested that the difference between FDR’s 
trajectory just before his death and Truman’s upon arrival in office may have 
been more a matter of timing and style than underlying substance. FDR, they 
suggest, hoped ultimately to use his powers of persuasion to iron out problems 
through personal diplomacy at a later stage, but by the last days of his life he had 
begun to see the need for a toughening of policy 410 Access to the definitive truth 
on his thinking is impossible, however, as he left no record of his innermost 
thoughts and plans.
406 McCullough, pp.339; 355
407 For an example of a standard survey account emphasising Truman’s inexperience and 
bluntness, see William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: American Since World War II, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.54-78.
408 My three chief sources for insight into US policy under FDR are: Townsend Hoopes and 
Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation o f the UN, (New Hqven: Yale University Press, 1997); 
John Lewis Gaddis, United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, Conrad Black, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt: Champion o f Freedom, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003)
409 Pierce, p. 153
410 See Gaddis, United States, pp. 157-173
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FDR also left a legacy of planning for a new world organisation, the United 
Nations, which would be established by the San Francisco Conference of April- 
June 1945. The central plank of world order was to be concert between ‘Four 
Policemen’: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China. FDR 
expressed the hope that the “common denominator” of a desire for peace would 
bring together the dominant world powers in a “common association of interest”. 
Reflecting on the failed experiment of Wilson’s League, he observed that it had 
been “based on magnificent idealism”, but that “good intentions alone” were not 
inadequate defence against “the predatory animals of this world”. Rather than 
subscribe to Wilson’s faith in the controlling influence o f ‘moral force’, 
therefore, Roosevelt embraced his cousin Theodore’s belief that a secure order 
must rest on proper acknowledgement of the role of hard power.411
Yet if FDR was ‘realistic’, then part of that realism involved recognising the 
ideological constraints imposed by American politics. As one pair of close 
analysts note, Roosevelt believed in “rightful primacy of the strong” and 
“trusteeship of the powerful”. But in dealing with the Soviet Union he also 
believed that explicit “sphere-of-influence politics would produce a new wave of 
American isolationist recoil, rooted in moral disgust, and that this could fatally 
undermine prospects for American leadership -  either in war or in a postwar 
effort to secure a lasting peace.”412 Cordell Hull, FDR’s Secretary of State, had 
promised Congress and the American people in November 1943 that in the 
settlement brought about after the war there would “no longer be need for 
spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the 
special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to 
safeguard their security or promote their interest.”413 Such rhetoric reinforced 
American cultural resistance to thinking of international relations in terms of 
balance-of-power politics. Wilsonian ideas of universality had to be invoked to 
make new international commitments palatable.
411 Quoted in Hoopes and Brinkley, pp.74, 64
412 Ibid, pp.46,28 This latter concern cannot have been eased by the famous (or infamous) 
meeting of Churchill and Stalin where explicit ‘percentages’ of Soviet and US/UK influence in 
the states of liberated Europe were discussed and agreed. See p. 171.
413 Gaddis, United States, pp.30-1
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At the outset of his presidency, Truman rhetorically summoned the combined 
spirits of Wilson and FDR to drive forward the plan for the UN, and continued to 
express the aspiration of a fundamentally cooperative world order. “It is one 
world, as [Wendell] Willkie said,” he noted. “It is a world in which we must all 
get along... And it is my opinion that this great Republic ought to lead the way. 
My opinion is that his great Republic ought to carry out the ideals of Woodrow 
Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt”.414 Echoing Wilson’s call to the American 
people after WWI, Truman emphasised that America’s great power had 
bestowed upon it a “duty to assume the leadership and accept responsibility”.
The reality of American power as displayed in the war was “the fact that 
underlies every phase of our relations with other countries,” he warned. “We 
cannot escape the responsibility which it thrusts upon us. What we think, plan, 
say and do is of profound significance to the future of every comer of the world.” 
As Wilson had done before him, Truman told Americans: “the entire world is 
looking to America for enlightened leadership and progress.” 415
At first, as Pierce puts it, “UN revived the internationalist hope that it was 
possible to universalise American principles.”416 As with Wilson’s new world 
order, however, the American plan for international cooperation implicitly 
depended upon the political character of the states within that order. 
Unfortunately for hopes of harmony, the Soviet Union was invested in political 
principles starkly at variance with American leaders’ liberal assumptions. This 
manifested itself starkly in Europe, where areas under Soviet control were denied 
anything Americans could accept as democratic process. At the Potsdam 
Conference in the summer of 1945, Stalin responded sharply to criticism, 
declaring that “if a government is not fascist, a government is democratic.” This 
was a blunt early demonstration of divergence between Soviet and American 
readings of Yalta.417
4,4 Quoted in Pierce, p. 127. Willkie was the Republican presidential candidate of 1940, and had 
gone on to write a popular book promoting internationalism under the title ‘One World’.
415 Ibid, pp. 127, 123.
416 Pierce, p. 129
417 Quoted in McCullough, p. 445.
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‘Cold War’ policy, as the term is usually understood, did not emerge fully in 
America until the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, which 
secured political approval for a massive military build-up. The degeneration of 
US-Soviet relations into hostility occurred before that, however, the result of a 
steady accumulation of confrontations. In 1946, the United States successfully - 
forced the Soviets out of northern Iran, and resisted a Soviet push for joint 
control (with Turkey) of the Dardanelles. In 1947, the Truman Doctrine and 
Marshall Plan were announced. The former promised American military aid to 
fight communist rebels in Greece and Turkey, the latter pledged stability- 
boosting economic support for Western Europe, crucial to undermining 
communism’s advance on the political front. 1948 saw standoff in the divided 
European theatre: a communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade, 
the latter prompting an American-led airlift of supplies to thwart Stalin’s plan to 
strangle the city into submission. In 1949, the United States broke its taboo 
against military alliances with the North Atlantic Treaty, providing 
unprecedented commitment to the defence of Western Europe. Meanwhile, the 
Soviet Union gained new ability to threaten America and its allies with its 
acquisition of the atomic bomb. In Asia, the fall of China to Mao’s communists 
underlined the global nature of the Cold War struggle. The militarisation of US 
policy ushered in by Korea was thus the logical conclusion of a trend well 
established in the five years that preceded it.
Over the course of this period the Truman administration made the journey from 
a vague desire to ‘get tough’ with the Soviets to a comprehensive diagnosis of 
the nature of the Soviet threat and a programme to respond to it. The emergence 
of this programme had both a public and an internal dimension. In public, it took 
the form of an argument presented by the president and his top aides that the 
Soviet Union, because of its malign political nature, threatened freedom on a 
global basis, and the United States needed to respond. Internally, it took the form 
of a series of reports that fleshed out the same argument at more length. Both the 
public and the internal discussion arrived at the same conclusions: (a) that the 
source of the threat lay in the nature of the Soviet system itself, (b) that the 
United States must act to help others defend their freedom against 
Soviet/communist encroachment, and (c) that the long-term goal of such a policy
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was to undermine the Soviet system itself. Reform of the Soviet state was 
necessary to the emergence of a lasting peace. Both publicly and privately, the 
administration rejected simple acceptance of a balance of power based on 
spheres of influence. Instead, it adopted of a policy of containment aimed 
ultimately at engineering the collapse of the Soviet system.
Truman’s conception of the Cold War 418
Truman’s conception of the Cold War, and the argument he made to justify 
America’s participation in a global struggle, rested on five key interconnected 
principles. First, that the divergence of political values between the American-led 
‘free world’ and the Soviet Union was the central feature of world politics. 
Second, that the United States had a responsibility to defend freedom against 
Soviet efforts to undermine the political systems of free states, and a duty to 
object to Soviet domination in the states where the USSR already exercised 
domination. Third, that a simple spheres-of-influence deal with the Soviet Union, 
requiring America to accept the USSR’s actions in its own putative sphere as 
legitimate, was not acceptable. Fourth, that the values of ‘freedom’ were 
universally valid, and their spread part of the historical destiny of the world; even 
the Soviet Union could not resist them forever. Fifth, that military strength on the 
part of the United States would be an essential part of the defence and ultimate 
advance of ‘freedom’ and to the peace of the world. ‘Freedom’ in this system of 
thought was, as one would expect, defined as democratic capitalism. Thus, 
Truman subscribed to internationalist convictions that blended Wilsonianism and
418 In what follows, my chief sources are the major histories of the early Cold War cited earlier, 
supplemented by primary and secondary sources specifically focused on the Truman 
administration. Most notable among the latter are: David McCullough, Truman (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1992); Anne R. Pierce Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and 
Power in American Foreign Policy, (Westport: Praeger, 2003); Robert L. Beisner, Dean 
Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Harry S. Truman, 
Memoirs, Volume One: Year of Decisions, (Great Britain: Hodder & Stoughton, 1955); Memoirs 
Volume Two: 1946-52 Years o f Trial and Hope, (New York: Smithmark, 1996); Dean Acheson, 
Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1987). Also of importance were the papers available at the Truman library, 
http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/photos/av-photo.htm [accessed 19/06/08], especially the sub­
collection of documents entitled ‘Ideological Foundations of the Cold War’, and public papers 
available via http://www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws [accessed 19/06/08]. Specific sources are cited 
for specific quotations throughout the chapter.
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Rooseveltianism, universal civilisational moralism with, if not militarism, then at 
least a belief in the righteous necessity of military strength and potentially 
physical force in defence of the right.419
Pierce notes that Truman “found it difficult to look at the divisions forming in 
Europe in terms of power alone”, and this is reflected in a great many of his 
statements.420 The ‘Truman Doctrine’, expounded in an address to Congress in 
March 1947, was the landmark statement that publicly signalled the United 
States’ adoption of a mission to resist Soviet communism. In it, Truman 
described the world as divided between ‘two ways of life’, between which “every 
nation” had to choose, but where the choice was “too often not a free one”. One 
way of life, he said, was “based upon the will of the majority, and.. .distinguished 
by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of 
individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political 
oppression”. This was, in idealised form, the American system. The second, 
embodied by the Soviet Union, was “based upon the will of a minority forcibly 
imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”
With the world divided thus, Truman, argued, “it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures.421 The immediate practical purpose of 
the Doctrine’s proclamation was to justify US aid to the Greek and Turkish 
resistance to domestic communist forces. Truman’s argument reflected the 
Wilson/Roosevelt conception of self-determination, as played out in Latin 
America, in asserting that even substantial US intervention served to preserve the 
autonomous freedom of the affected states, not to impose American political 
preferences. Intervention was justified as necessary to protect the natural path of 
‘free’ development from interruption by outside forces, but it itself was not 
acknowledged to be outside interference.
419 The latter referring to Theodore, not Franklin.
420 Pierce, p. 150
421 Address to Congress, Mar 12, 1947, http://www.vale.edu/1awweb/avalon/trudoc.htm [accessed 
19/06/08]
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Communism, to Truman, was the cause only of “a militant minority, exploiting 
human want and misery”. The “seeds of totalitarian regimes,” he argued, were 
“spread and grown in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full 
growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that 
hope alive.” The purpose of US aid would be to “restore internal order and 
security so essential for economic and political recovery”, which would in turn 
allow the aided states to “build an economy in which a healthy democracy can 
flourish” and thus allow the country “to become a self-supporting and self- 
respecting democracy”422 Thus, communism was not treated as one of the 
legitimate courses that might freely be taken by a people, even in reaction to 
poverty and disorder. Rather, it represented the destruction of freedom and as 
such had to be resisted. True freedom consisted in the establishment of the 
preconditions for democratic capitalism to flourish, even if that meant US 
interference. US policy sought the “creation of conditions in which we and other 
nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion,” Truman 
argued. This goal drew a line of continuity between the recent war and the new 
conflict with the Soviets. WWII had been a victory “over countries which sought 
to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.” Now, as then, he 
told Americans, the “free peoples of the world look to us to us for support in 
maintaining their freedoms.”423
“We follow [our] policy for the purpose of securing the peace and wellbeing or 
the world,” he said in a radio address later the same year. “It is sheer nonsense to 
say that we seek dominance over any other nation. We believe in freedom, and 
we are doing all we can to support free men and free governments throughout the 
world.”424 In unmistakable echo of Wilson’s desire for “conquest of the spirits of 
men” rather than territory, Truman later told an audience at Berkeley: “The only 
expansion we are interested in is the expansion of freedom... The only realm in
422 Ibid. The same principle was advanced in parallel by Secretary of State George Marshall in 
announcing the ‘Marshall Plan’ of economic aid to Europe. “Its purpose,” he said of the plan, 
“should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of 
political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.” Marshall Plan Speech, June 5, 
1947. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1947/s470605a e.htm. [accessed 19/06/08]
423 Address to Congress, Mar 12, 1947, http://www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm.
[accessed 19/06/08]
424 Radio Address to the American People on the Special Session of Congress, October 24th, 
1947, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid:= 12779. [accessed 19/06/08]
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which we aspire to eminence exists in the minds of men”425 His narrative, like 
Wilson’s was that only the United States identified its national interests with 
those of the whole; American interventions were therefore uniquely righteous, 
preserving freedom and autonomy, even though those of others undermined 
those values.
Yet though the pressing concern was to avert Soviet expansion, Truman did not 
set it as his strategic objective to simply hold the line against the Soviets in a 
perpetual balance of power. Instead, he argued explicitly that American 
principles had universal validity, and hence a universal appeal to peoples that 
would ensure their ultimate triumph, even in Russia. Speaking in Chicago in July 
1949, he argued that the Soviet mindset of “relying on force as a method of 
world organisation”, which called for “the destruction of free governments” was 
doomed in the long run to either “destroy itself, or abandon its attempt to force 
other nations into its pattern”. In contrast, “the democratic principles which have 
been tried and tested in free nations” had “superior attraction for men’s minds 
and hearts”, which was why they were “now winning the allegiance of men 
throughout the world”. “The world longs for the kind of tolerance and mutual 
adjustment which is represented by democratic principles,” he said.426 America’s 
role in advancing this was a special one, in Truman’s view: “We have always 
been a challenge to tyranny of any kind. We are such a challenge today,” he 
declared.427
In his farewell address in January 1953, he made it clear that the long-term 
strategy of the United States was the internal reform of the Soviet system:
As the free world grows stronger, more united, more attractive to men on both 
sides o f the Iron Curtain — as the Soviet hopes for easy expansion are blocked — 
then there will have to come a time of change in the Soviet W orld. Nobody can 
ever say for sure when that is going to be or exactly how it will come about, 
whether by revolution, or trouble in the satellite states, or by a change inside the
425 Quoted in McCullough, p.628
426 Address in Chicago Before the Imperial Council Session of the Shrine of North America, July 
19. 1949. http://www-presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid:::::13248. [accessed 19/06/08]
427 Ibid.
198
Kremlin. W hether the Communist rulers shift their policies o f their own free will 
— or whether change comes about in some other way — I have not a doubt in the 
world that a change will occur. I have a deep and abiding faith in the destiny o f 
free men. W ith patience and courage, we shall one day move on into a new era. 428
Thus Truman saw the long-term establishment of international peace as coming 
from the universalisation of liberty and the extinction of the destabilising 
influence of totalitarian government. This did not mean that he lacked 
pragmatism; he was well aware that the costs of war were too high to permit a 
military crusade to liberate those under Soviet domination immediately. A war 
with the Soviets, he warned in 1945, would be “total war, and that means the end 
of our civilization as we know it.”429 The hard fact that the United States was not 
in a position to overwhelm the Soviet Union militarily compelled Truman to 
tolerate a de facto division of the world into spheres of influence. But this 
commonsense element of realism did not imply acceptance that the division of 
the world into spheres was the natural and stable product of international 
relations as usual, an equilibrium between two states legitimately pursuing their 
competing interests. Rather, Truman combined grudging recognition that “we 
have to operate in an imperfect world”, with insistence that “we shall not give 
our approval to any compromise with evil.”430
The Soviet Union had its sphere as a material fact, but that did not mean the US 
had to accept it in principle. In Pierce’s formulation, Truman “combined 
resignation to a Soviet sphere and the principled belief that the Soviets should 
not have been allowed a sphere in the first place... [Although] the sphere might 
be tolerated, it would never be accepted.”431 A balance of power thus emerged in 
practice as the Cold War distribution of power, but ideologically this reflected 
frustrated universalism rather than contentment with a theory of order based on 
balance-of-power rivalry. Of self-determination and self-government, Truman 
observed in 1945:
428 Jan 15, 1953, Farewell Address,
http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059, [accessed 19/06/08]
429 Quoted in McCullough, p.472
430 Quoted in Pierce, p. 131
431 Pierce, p. 156
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It may not be put into effect tomorrow or the next day. But, nonetheless, it is our 
policy; and we shall we shall seek to achieve it. It may take a long time, but it is 
worth waiting for, and worth striving to attain. The Ten Commandments 
themselves have not yet been universally achieved over these thousands o f years.
Yet we struggle constantly to achieve them .. ,432
Truman’s accepted the Wilsonian link drawn between the existence of illiberal 
government and international instability. In the Truman Doctrine address, he 
argued that America’s objective of a cooperative and peaceful world order would 
be unattainable “unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free 
institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to 
impose upon them totalitarian regimes.” This was essential because “totalitarian 
regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine 
the foundations of the international peace, and hence the security of the United 
States.” Intervention now, to preserve governments against communism, was “an 
investment in world freedom and world peace.” 433 In his 1949 inaugural address, 
he declared that “the actions resulting from the Communist philosophy are a 
threat to the efforts of free nations to bring about... lasting peace.” 434 Thus the 
problem was not merely Soviet behaviour, but the system of government from 
which that behaviour sprang.
In making this attack on the domestic ideological roots of Soviet behaviour, 
Truman opted to build his foreign policy around what Pierce calls, “a broad 
conception of national security -  one in which he included the principles of 
democracy.. .”435 “In the long run,” he told Americans in early 1950, “ .. .our 
security and the world's hopes for peace lie ... in the growth and expansion of 
freedom and self-government. As these ideals are accepted by more and more
432 Oct 27 1945, quoted in Pierce, p. 166
433 Address to Congress, Mar 12, 1947, http://www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm [accessed 
19/06/08]
434 Jan 20, 1949, Inaugural Address,
http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/whistlestop/50vr archive/inagural20ian 1949.htm, [accessed 
19/06/08]
435 Pierce, p. 135
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people... they become the greatest force in the world for peace.”436 This 
formulation became part of the bedrock of Cold War ideology. By the end of his 
presidency, it had become uncontroversial for Truman to assert that the objective 
of US foreign policy was universal liberty, telling Congress that America’s goal 
was to “bring peace to the world and to spread the democratic ideals of justice 
and self-government to all people.”437
Truman also adopted the Wilsonianism intellectual distinction between “peoples” 
and governments, essential to America’s recurring claims to serve common 
interests even when faced with the opposition of other states. “I believe men and 
women of every part of the globe intensely desire peace and freedom,” Truman 
explained in an address at Berkeley in 1948. “I believe good people everywhere 
will not permit their rulers, no matter how powerful they may have made 
themselves, to lead them to destruction. America has faith in people. It knows 
that rulers rise and fall, but that the people live on.”438 Thus, though his time in 
office witnessed the emergence of a world defined by conflict between the 
American and Soviet governments, Truman could argue with conviction that the 
true interests of the Russian and Soviet-dominated peoples were also best served 
by America’s aspirations. Speaking from the floating transmitter of the Voice of 
America in 1952 he declared:
There is a terrific struggle going on today to win the minds o f people throughout 
the w orld... W e have no quarrel with the people o f the Soviet Union or with any 
other country... W e know that you are suffering under oppression and 
persecution. W e know that if  you were free to say what you really believe, you 
would join with us to banish the fear o f war, and bring peace on earth and good 
will towards all men. 439
436 Feb 22, 1950 Address on Foreign Policy at the George Washington National Masonic 
Memorial, http://www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid^ 13713. [accessed 19/06/08]
437 January 9th, 1952, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 
http://www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid= 14418. accessed [accessed 19/06/08]
438 Quoted in McCullough, p.628
439 March 4, 1952, Address Broadcast from the Voice of America floating Radio Transmitter 
Courier, http://www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14423. [accessed 19/06/08]
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This statement was propagandist^, certainly, in the sense that it was intended to 
serve political ends. Yet it was not ipso facto insincere. As Wilson had been 
before him, Truman was acutely conscious that what he sought from the 
American people was a significant ideological movement. As a soldier in Europe 
after the armistice of November 1918, Truman had himself embodied 
Americans’ habitual desire for non-entanglement, writing home that “most of us 
don’t give a whoop (to put it mildly) whether Russia has a Red Government or 
no Government and if the King of the Lollipops wants to slaughter his subjects or 
his Prime Minister then it’s all the same to us.”440 Such sentiments had 
overpowered Wilsonianism in the interwar years. Now, in the 1940s, Truman 
sought to convince the next generation of Americans to think differently.
Like Wilson, he was aware of the scale of the political challenge. “I knew that 
George Washington’s spirit would be invoked against me, and Henry Clay’s and 
all the other patron saints of isolationism,” he recalled, “But I was convinced that 
the policy I was about to proclaim was indeed as much required by the conditions 
of my day as was Washington’s by the situation in his era and Monroe’s doctrine 
by the circumstances which he then faced.”441 He sought change, spurred by 
changing circumstances, but knew that he had to be sensitive to his ideological 
inheritance in the process; he needed to bridge from the old consensus to a new 
internationalism without leaving a daunting gap. Like Wilson, he did this by 
avoiding the suggestion that that America should join the great power balance of 
self-interested rivalry it had shunned thus far. Instead, its new global engagement 
would be justified by the pursuit of a new world order based on liberty.
The chief area in which Truman clearly embraced the Roosevelt’s strategic 
perspective rather than Wilson’s was regarding the role of armed strength. For 
the United States to play the role he wished it to, and for world order to take the 
desired shape, America would have to embrace military build-up on a level not 
before countenanced. In 1945, Truman drove forward unification of the armed 
forces, and began to nudge the nation towards accepting the need for increased
440 Quoted in McCullough, p. 138.
441 Memoirs Vol. 2, p. 102
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means to achieve America’s broadened ends. “The desire for peace is futile,” he 
warned Congress:
.. .unless there is also enough strength ready and willing to enforce that desire in 
an emergency. Among the things that have encouraged aggression and the spread 
o f war in the past have been the unwillingness o f the United States realistically to 
face this fact, and her refusal to fortify her aims o f peace before the force o f 
aggression could gather in strength.442
Just as Roosevelt had called on Americans to set aside their suspicion of military 
establishments to meet the demands of a changing international environment, so 
Truman now took up the cause. In April 1946, on Army Day, he told the public 
that:
.. .we must remain strong because only so long as we remain strong can we ensure 
peace in the world. Peace has to be built on power for good. Justice and good will 
and good deeds are not enough. W e cannot on one day proclaim our intention to 
prevent unjust aggression and tyranny in the world, and on the next day call for 
the immediate scrapping o f our military might.443
Military strength was no longer -  as it had been for the bulk of American history 
-  painted as an evil to be minimised, or a peripheral feature of American political 
life. It was to be instrumental to America’s new global role. “We must face the 
fact that peace must be built upon power, as well as upon good will and good 
deeds,” he admonished Congress in autumn 1945.444 The translation of such 
rhetoric into reality took time. At first, Truman’s achievements were limited to 
administrative reform of the armed forces, commitment to aid Greece and 
Turkey, and the ratification of the North American Treaty. These were 
considerable achievements when measured against the prior ideological 
consensus, but authorisation for a large military build-up of the sort advocated in
442 Dec 19, 1945, President Truman's Message To Congress Recommending Army-Navy Merger 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/poIicv/post-war/451219a.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
443 April 6th, 1946, Address in Chicago on Army Day,
http://www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12625. [accessed 19/06/08]7
444 Quoted in McCullough, p.474
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internal documents such as NSC-68 remained elusive, for reasons both budgetary 
and political. It was only at the turn of the decade, with the crisis atmosphere 
sparked by the outbreak of the Korean War, that proposals for a vast expansion 
of military expenditure were enacted. Nevertheless, in a way that had not been 
the case since Roosevelt -  and with more lasting impact -  Truman wove a 
narrative that combined America’s duty to pursue a universalist liberal agenda 
with a commitment to a substantial peacetime military establishment. He had 
concluded early in his presidency that “unless Russia is faced with an iron fist 
and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they 
understand, ‘How many divisions have you?’”445
Truman’s feelings toward liberals who did not believe in military expansion, who 
placed their faith in diplomatic outreach to resolve tensions with the Soviet 
Union, resembled Roosevelt’s irritation with the ‘pacifist tendency’. In his diaiy 
in September 1946 Truman wrote of former Vice President Henry Wallace, who 
was pushing for a policy of accommodation towards the Soviet Union:
He wants to disband our armed forces, give Russia our atom bomb secrets, and 
trust a bunch o f adventurers in the Kremlin Politburo. I do not understand a 
‘dreamer like th a t... The Reds, phonies and ‘parlor pinks’ seem to be banded 
together and are becoming a national danger. I am afraid they are a sabotage front 
for Uncle Joe Stalin. They can see no wrong in Russia’s four-and-a-half million 
armed force, in Russia’s loot o f Poland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Manchuria. 
They can see no wrong in Russia’s living off the occupied countries to support 
the military occupations.446
Truman was clear that he could see the wrong in it. The Soviet sphere might exist 
in practice, but it should be opposed in principle by the United States. To do so 
credibly, and to defend free states against expansive Soviet tendencies, the 
United States would need to be armed, and heavily so.
445 Ibid. 480
446 Quoted in McCullough, p.517
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George Kennan and the sources o f Soviet conduct
The thinker associated more closely than any other individual with the policy of 
‘containment’ of the Soviet Union -  apart, arguably, from Truman him self- was 
George Kennan. Kennan had formulated his analysis of the Soviet system and 
strategy while serving at the US embassy in Moscow. He then returned to 
Washington to head the new Policy Planning Unit at the State Department, 
created to promote long-term thinking and strategic coherence in US policy. 
Kennan first registered as a major intellectual presence with his ‘Long 
Telegram’, a message transmitted from Moscow that delivered a pessimistic 
assessment regarding the Soviet Union’s openness to US diplomacy.447 Then, 
shortly after being installed in Washington, he published ‘The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct’ (under the pseudonym ‘X’) in the journal Foreign Affairs. The article 
offered a similar diagnosis, aimed this time at the American public, and proposed 
‘containment’ as the best strategic response.448
In later years, Kennan would become a prominent realist critic of US policy, 
accusing others of interpreting containment too militaristically and invoking 
universal principles too readily and without effect.449 Yet inspection of these two 
most influential pieces of writing, which coincided with the formulation and 
promulgation of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, reveals that despite 
being the ‘realist in residence’ of the Truman administration Kennan himself 
contributed to the development of two of the critical ideological pillars of 
American Cold War ideology. These were the beliefs that (a) the barrier to 
international peace lay in the nature of the Soviet system of government, and (b) 
the long-term objective of US strategy must be a change in that system. By 
helping establish these principles in administration strategy, Kennan aided the 
embedding of the Wilsonian mindset of which he was later critical.
447 Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall [‘Long Telegram’], Feb 22, 1946,
http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/whistlestop/studv_coHections/coldwar/documents/index.php7docu 
mentdate=1946-02-22&documentid=6-6&studvco1lectionid=&pagenumber:::l, [accessed 
19/06/08]
448 ‘X’ [George Kennan], ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25:1/4, 1946/47, 
pp.566-582
449 See George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984); Memoirs 1925-1950, (New York: Pantheon, 1983).
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In both the Long Telegram and the X Article Kennan argued that the Soviet 
outlook was driven by a poisonous blend of traditional Russian security paranoia 
with the more recent phenomenon of Marxism-Leninism. The resulting 
worldview, he said, provided the rationale for the USSR’s harsh policies at home 
and belligerent demeanour abroad. According to the Russian perspective, he 
explained, the Soviet Union existed “in antagonistic ‘capitalistic encirclement’ 
with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.”450 
‘The truth’, as Kennan saw it, was that “[i]f not provoked by forces of 
intolerance and subversion” the “‘capitalist’ world of today is quite capable of 
living at peace with itself and Russia”. The Soviet government, however, had 
convinced itself of the inevitability of conflict between capitalism and 
communism. Thus it viewed its relations with the outside world as necessarily 
founded on conflict.451 “Ideology”, he argued, had taught Russians “ ...that the 
outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the 
political forces beyond their borders.”452
“[The] Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of [the] situation 
beyond Russia’s borders,” he explained:-
. . .  At [the] bottom o f [the] Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is [a] 
traditional and instinctive Russian sense o f insecurity... [T]hey have always 
feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between [the] western world and 
their ow n.. .[and] they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly 
struggle for total destruction o f rival power, never in compacts and compromises 
with it.453
This was the product of Russian history as well as communist doctrine, he noted, 
though the latter was well suited to the soil provided by the former. “Only in this 
land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant 
equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international,” he suggested,
450 Kennan, Long Telegram (hereafter LT), p.l
451 LT, p.4
452 Kennan, ‘Sources of Soviet Conduct’ (hereafter ‘Sources’), p.569
453 LT, pp.5-6
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“could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble 
by peaceful means.”454
This paranoid perspective, conjuring imagined enemies all around, had served to 
justify extraordinary repression within the Soviet political system, of which 
Kennan had caught glimpses while in Moscow. Seeking chiefly the “security of 
their own rule”, Kennan argued, Soviet leaders had been “prepared to recognize 
no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods.”455 The 
“basic altruism of purpose” of the Bolshevik “dogma”, he observed, had served 
to provide “justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the 
dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule”. Now the Marxist 
ideology was the
.. .fig leaf o f their moral and intellectual respectability. W ithout it they would 
stand before history, at best, as the last o f that long succession o f cruel and 
wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced [the] country on to ever new 
heights o f military power in order to guarantee [the] external security o f their 
internally weak regimes.. ,456
The Soviet attitude was the product of “uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries 
old movement in which conceptions of offence and defence are inextricably 
confused.”457 A prevailing ideology of ‘hostile encirclement’ served to prop up a 
vicious regime, allowing internal opposition to be:
.. .portrayed as the agents o f foreign forces o f reaction antagonistic to Soviet 
power... [T]here is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace 
confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in 
the realities o f foreign antagonism but in the necessity o f explaining away the 
maintenance o f dictatorial authority at home.458
454 LT, p.6
455 ‘Sources’, p.569
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458 ‘Sources’, p.570
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The Soviet system was totalitarian, its politics shrouded in secrecy at home. 
Abroad, Kennan argued, it would seek to expand its power to the maximal extent 
unless prevented from doing so by the United States. At the moment, he said, 
Soviet expansionism was “restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of 
as being of immediate strategic necessity... However, other points may at any 
time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to 
new areas.”459 Because the “theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of 
capitalism” had “the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it,” Soviet 
expansionism was less acute a threat then Hitler’s had been.460 Nevertheless, the 
long-term Soviet objective was clear, and needed to be resisted by force, or at 
least the ability to threaten it.
Key to Kennan’s analysis was the idea that Soviet policy was “impervious to 
logic of reason”. It was, however, “highly sensitive to logic of force.” The 
Soviets could and would withdraw when “strong resistance” was encountered. 
“Thus,” he advised, “if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his 
readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there 
need be no prestige engaging showdowns.”461 This aspect of his analysis -  
emphasising caution -  reveals why Kennan was uncomfortable with the more 
confrontational stances advocated by later Cold War policymakers. It is also 
clear, however, that the necessity of military strength on the part of the United 
States was an essential component of Kennan’s analysis, even if not in the one­
dimensional way he felt others later misinterpreted him as having meant. Talking 
and goodwill would not resolve the issues on which the US and the USSR were 
in conflict, he advised; Soviet leaders were “not likely to be swayed by any 
normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no 
appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental 
approaches.”462 In describing the role he saw for force, Kennan echoed 
Roosevelt’s search for balance between strength and restraint. The United States 
needed to pursue “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of 
Russian expansive tendencies”, but should not confuse such a policy with
‘Sources’, p.573
461 LT, p. 15
462 ‘Sources’, p.574
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“outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of 
outward ‘toughness’.”463 While seeking to avoid outright confrontation, 
containment was “a policy ... designed to confront the Russians with unalterable 
counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the 
interests of a peaceful and stable world”.464
Yet despite the realism of much of his advice, Kennan’s analysis also tacitly 
accepted the Wilsonian agenda of intellectually separating peoples from 
governments and looking to the former to embrace liberal ideas. In the Long 
Telegram he reported that “never since [the] termination of [the] civil war have 
mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from [the] doctrines of 
communist party than they are today” 465 On an underlying level, he argued, the 
attitude of the Soviet leadership “does not represent the natural outlook of the 
Russian people.” The people, he asserted, were “by and large, friendly to [the] 
outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they 
are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy [the] fruits 
of their own labor.” The Soviet leadership might push the party line with 
discipline, but Kennan felt that the public was “often remarkably resistant in the 
stronghold of its innermost thoughts.”466 Continuing this logic, Kennan argued 
that if the United States could be successful in frustrating Kremlin plans to 
extend its power, the Soviet system itself would come under stress. This could 
prompt reform of the Soviet system, which should be the ultimate objective of 
American policy. “[T]he United States has it in its power to increase enormously 
the strains under which Soviet policy must operate,” he wrote, “to force upon the 
Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to 
observe in recent years.” By so doing, he suggested, the United States would 
“promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break­
up or the mellowing of Soviet power.”467
4W ‘Sources’, pp. 576, 575
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Once the United States had established a secure line against Soviet subversion of 
other societies, its objective should be to establish a functioning and prosperous 
free world, the attractiveness of which to all people would undermine the 
sustainability of the Soviet system. The “health and vigor” of American society 
was essential, he said, as was advocacy of a positive alternative to communism 
as a global ideology. “We must formulate and put forward for other nations a 
much more positive and constructive picture of [the] world we would like to see 
than we have put forward in [the] past.”468 In the peroration of ‘Sources’, Kennan 
invoked the historic American sense of destiny and mission:
To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best 
traditions and prove itself worthy o f preservation as a great nation...
Providence.. .by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, 
has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves 
together and accepting the responsibilities o f moral and political leadership that 
history plainly intended them to bear.469
Though he was the most ‘realistic’ thinker in the Truman administration, Kennan 
thus in fact in his most famous documentary contributions aided the emergence 
of a strategic worldview that blended Wilsonianism with Rooseveltianism rather 
than embracing balance-of-power realism. He attributed some of the paranoia of 
Soviet policy to the prevailing attitudes bred by Russian historical experience, 
but also argued that a major cause of the problem lay in ideological perceptions 
without basis in the USSR’s external environment. It was the need to preserve 
and justify a totalitarian domestic system of politics at home that drove Soviet 
policy.
If this was the origin of the problem, then it was logical that its ultimate solution 
must be the reform of the Soviet domestic system. This was likely the wish of the 
Soviet peoples anyway, Kennan suggested, who were quite distinct in attitude 
from the Soviet government, and who were growing -  and would continue to 
grow -  increasingly disillusioned with the system. The key to attaining the
468 LT p. 17
469 ‘Sources’, p.582
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peaceful international order sought by the United States lay, first, in amassing the 
physical power to defend liberal government where it existed, and then in putting 
pressure on the USSR in such a way as to hasten the ultimate breakdown of the 
Soviet system at home. Kennan was a cautious strategic thinker, who emphasised 
patience and restraint, and thus less bold and militaristic an advocate of ‘regime 
change’ than others who followed him. Yet the Wilsonian principle of regime 
change was still central to the strategy he sold to the administration and the 
nation.
Polarisation and militarisation: the Clifford-Elsey Report and NSC-68
Two of the most significant internal documents on US-Soviet relations produced 
by the Truman administration were the ‘Clifford-Elsey Report’ of September 
1946, so known because compiled by White House counsellor Clark Clifford and 
aide George Elsey,470 and the Report to the National Security Council of April 
1950, generally known by the short-form NSC-68 471 As the dates suggest, 
Clifford-Elsey was a relatively early analysis, coming after the Long Telegram 
but predating the Truman Doctrine. Alongside Kennan’s analysis, it contributed 
to the administration’s initial decision that its approach to Soviet relations should 
toughen. NSC-68 was written and read significantly later, when the policy of 
containment was already established doctrine. Principally prepared by Paul 
Nitze, Kennan’s successor as head of the planning unit, it was chiefly important 
for its advocacy of substantial military build-up to meet the Soviet threat. The 
effective adoption of NSC-68 as a guiding policy document after the outbreak of 
the Korean War in summer 1950 marked a decisive point in the American 
leadership’s embrace of a ‘Cold War’ strategic perspective.
470 Report, ‘American Relations with the Soviet Union’ by Clark Clifford, Sep 24, 1946 
[hereafter ‘CER’],
http://www.trurnanlibrary.org/whistlestop/studv collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4- 
1 ■pdf#zoom=100. [accessed 19/06/08]
47 ‘A Report to the National Security Council -  NSC 68’, Apr 12, 1950, [hereafter NSC-68], 
http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/whistlestop/studv collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-
l.pdf#zoonv=100, [accessed 19/06/08]
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The two documents reflect the outset and conclusion of an intellectual journey: 
one was written as the US-Soviet conflict was still taking form, the other 
confirmed the Cold War’s establishment, in militarised form, as the dominant 
paradigm for US policymaking. Clifford-Elsey crystalised a growing sense that 
the desired cooperative world order would not prove possible due to the 
pathologies of the Soviet system. It suggested that the US prepare for the fact 
that it might have to accept, in the short term, the division of the world into free 
and unffee spheres, and take the steps necessary to defend the free world. NSC- 
68, coming later, served to confirm the logic of ideas already expressed by 
Truman, Kennan and others: it argued explicitly that the long-term objective of 
US policy should be to apply counter-pressure leading ultimately to the reform of 
the Soviet system. It was also significant for its embrace of military build-up as 
an essential component in such a strategy.
The documents’ classified status adds a further dimension to their interest value 
when seen in parallel with the administration’s public statements. Though 
government officials may sometimes write with the historical record in mind, 
such documents -  for internal consumption only -  serve to demonstrate at least 
that there was no wholesale divergence between the administration’s public and 
private assessments. Certainly the reports were not designed for public 
propaganda purposes: Truman considered Clifford-Elsey sufficiently “hot” that 
he ordered all copies kept under lock and key because of their potential to 
inflame the diplomatic situation.472 Dean Acheson, Truman’s Secretary of State, 
famously observed in his memoirs that NSC-68 was designed to serve a 
bureaucratic purpose: to “bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’” so it 
would support Truman’s intended policy of militarised containment. In such an 
enterprise, he observed “[qualification must give way to simplicity of statement, 
nicety and nuance to bluntness, almost brutality, in carrying home a point”. The 
result, he admitted, was that the administration may have made its points “clearer 
than truth”, though in that they “did not differ from most other educators”. Yet
472 McCullough, pp.545,772
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even if it served to simplify, NSC-68 nevertheless accurately reflect the core of 
administration thinking.473
The Clifford-Elsey Report
Clifford-Elsey offered an analysis that laid the intellectual ground for the case 
presented later to the public. It diagnosed that the “fundamental tenet of the 
communist philosophy embraced by Soviet leaders” was that “the peaceful 
coexistence of communist and capitalist nations is impossible”. This explained 
the USSR’s “seizing every opportunity to expand the area, directly or indirectly, 
under Soviet control.”474 Like Kennan’s analysis, the report claimed that 
“conventional diplomacy, goodwill gestures or acts of appeasement”475 could 
have no hope of success when dealing with the Soviet Union. The only positive 
was that Soviet leaders wanted “to postpone thee conflict for many years” and 
would be “flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resistance 
encountered.”476
The report provided a dispiriting catalogue of the accumulating disputes between 
the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe. Noting the Soviet 
government’s formal subscription to the Declaration of the United Nations, the 
Declaration of Three Powers at Teheran and the Declaration on Liberated Europe 
at Yalta, the report observed that the USSR was therefore committed on paper to 
a host of liberal principles, including respecting “the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live”, commitment to “the 
elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance”, and aiding 
‘liberated’ European nations in “in establishing internal peace, forming 
representative governments and holding free elections” 477 The USSR had 
violated these understandings, the report argued, by imposing one-party 
communist rule, “exploiting ... the Soviet definitions of terms such as
473 Acheson, Present, p.374, 375
474 CER, p.3
475 Ibid, p.4
476 Ibid, p.8
477 Ibid, pp. 16, 18,21
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‘democratic’, ‘friendly’, ‘fascist’, et cetera, which are basically different from the 
non-communist understanding of these words.”478 Governments created in the 
Soviet sphere were “notoriously unrepresentative”, the report said, but the Soviet 
Union was “determined to maintain them by as much force as necessary 
inasmuch as no truly representative government would be reliable, from the 
Soviet point of view.”479 As such, in Germany as elsewhere: “Political life in the 
Soviet zone is not being reconstructed on a democratic basis. Democratic ideas, 
in our sense of the term, are not being fostered.”480
Following the Wilsonian tradition of separating ‘people’ and state, Clifford-Elsey 
argued that Soviet policy was “based, not upon the interests and aspirations of 
the Russian people, but upon the prejudices, calculations and ambitions of the 
inner-directorate of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.”481 The diplomatic 
posture of the Soviet government could best be explained as a tool used to 
preserve the dictatorial state: “[VJerbal assaults on the United States are designed 
to justify the Russian people the expense and hardships of maintaining a 
powerful military establishment and to insure the support of the Russian people 
for the aggressive actions of the Soviet Government.”482 In essence, the USSR’s 
aggressive foreign policy was the product of dictatorship at home.
At this early stage in the Cold War, before the public breakdown of relations 
signalled by the Truman Doctrine and the X Article, there still remained a degree 
of belief that the Soviet leadership might be talked into turning back from the 
precipice:
The primary objective o f United States policy toward the Soviet Union is to 
convince Soviet leaders that it is in their interest to participate in a system o f  
world cooperation, that there are no fundamental causes for war between our two 
nations, and that the security and prosperity o f the Soviet Union, and that o f the
478 Ibid, p.27
479 Ibid, p. 10
480 Ibid, p.28
48] Ibid, p.4
482 Ibid. p.59
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rest o f the world as well, is being jeopardised by aggressive militaristic
483imperialism such as that in which the Soviet Union is now engaged.
Even in its peroration, the report expressed residual hope that Soviet leaders 
would “change their minds and work out with us a fair and equitable settlement 
when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be 
frightened.”484 The goal, as with Wilsonian thinking in the past, was to convince 
a hostile power that the United States had the true interests of other nations’ 
peoples at heart, and invite it to join it in furthering the agenda of harmonious 
interests that US policy sought to advance. Failure of this strategy, as per the 
Wilsonian formula, was to be attributed to the illiberal nature of the government 
in question, leading to misperception of the true interests of its people.
In the absence of “Soviet cooperation in the solution of world problems”, the 
report concluded, the United States needed to be prepared for conflict. First, the 
US “should be prepared to join with the British and other Western countries in an 
attempt to build up a world of our own which will pursue its own 
objectives...”485 Using this cooperative ‘American system’ as a base, it should
A O £
resist Soviet efforts to “expand into areas vital to American security.’ This 
meant that the US ought to “support and assist all democratic countries which are 
in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR”. It should be the objective of 
US policy to “ensure that economic opportunities, personal freedom and social 
equality are made possible in countries outside the Soviet sphere by generous 
financial assistance.”487
Prefiguring the military build-up to come, Clifford-Elsey argued that:
The language o f military power is the only language which disciples o f power 
politics understand... Compromise and concessions are considered, by the 
Soviets, to be evidences o f weakness.. .The mere fact o f preparedness may be the
483 Ibid, p.71
484 Ibid, p.79
485 Ibid, p.72
486 Ibid, p.73
487 Ibid, p.75
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only powerful deterrent to Soviet aggressive action and in this sense the only sure
^ c 488 guaranty or peace.
The Clifford-Elsey report’s historical significance lies in its early mapping out of 
the shape of the coming conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Also worth noting, however, is its reiteration of Wilsonian principles regarding 
the sources of conflict, the possibilities for cooperation and the reasons for Soviet 
unwillingness to cooperate. It also began the process of blending in the 
Rooseveltian argument for the necessity of military strength, not as a tool of 
expansion, but to provide the ‘preparedness’ required to preserve peace.
NSC-68
NSC-68 was more philosophical in tone than the Clifford-Elsey Report. It went 
beyond summarising the facts of perceived Soviet agreement-breaking, offering a 
more expansive portrait of global ideological battle. It set the conflict between 
the superpowers in the context of international systemic factors: “the 
international distribution of power”, it argued, had been “fundamentally altered” 
by WWII, producing a bipolar world. But it also focused on the character of the 
Soviet state in rendering the situation particularly dangerous. The Soviet Union, 
“unlike previous aspirants to hegemony,” it said, “is animated by a new fanatic 
faith, antithetical to our own, which seeks to impose its absolute authority over 
the rest of the world.” As a result America faced choices “involving the 
fulfilment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilisation itself.” 489
The root of the conflict between the US and the Soviet ‘slave state’, the 
document argued, lay in their contrasting systems. The goal of America was “to 
assure the integrity and vitality of our free society” and “create conditions under 
which our free and democratic system can live and prosper” 490 It was also 
“principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition
488 Ibid, 74, 75
489 NSC-68, p.4
490 Ibid, p.5
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to Soviet expansion”, making it “the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality 
must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to 
achieve its fundamental design.”491 The reason for the USSR’s particular 
hostility toward America, it argued, lay in the impossibility of coexistence 
between the states’ rival systems. This was in part an centuries old issue: “The 
idea of freedom,” it asserted, “ .. .is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the 
idea of slavery... the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the 
idea of submission to authority”.492 As the nation that best embodied freedom, 
the United States could rely on others’ natural attraction to the idea, feeling “no 
compulsion... to bring all societies into conformity with it.”493 The Soviets, on 
the other hand, saw the idea of freedom as “a permanent and continuous threat” 
to their society, and therefore regarded its continued existence as “intolerable”. 
This natural antipathy of ideologies combined with the “polarisation of power” 
created crisis in global affairs because it “inescapably confronts the slave society 
with the free.”494
One of NSC-68’s targets for attack was any idea that Americans might consider 
it possible to return to the attitude of detachment from global affairs that had 
historically prevailed. The pursuit of such a policy, the report argued would 
allow the Soviet Union to dominate Eurasia. This would leave the US facing the 
military threat of a USSR empowered with vast new resources, as well as 
burdening America with “a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having 
abandoned their former friends and allies”. At the other extreme, a pre-emptive 
attack on the USSR would be terribly risky militarily, and also “morally 
corrosive”.495 What it proposed was the ‘middle way’: pressing ahead with the 
central concept of containment -  seeking to frustrate the “Kremlin design” by 
means short of war -  but adding considerably greater investment in both military 
strength and foreign aid, in recognition that the scale of the challenge had grown.
491 Ibid, p.6
492 Ibid, p.8
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NSC-68 was, on one level, a one-dimensional narrative of good versus evil.496 
Yet its reasoning was also, on closer inspection, rather convoluted. Its argument 
centred on a contrast between America’s lack of felt need to force others to 
embrace its system of ‘freedom’, and the Soviet Union’s compulsion to seek 
domination and conversion. Yet in attributing the source of this Soviet 
compulsion to its system of government, the effect of NSC-68’s argument was to 
set it as America’s strategic objective to force a change of regime type in the 
USSR. Thus, in seeming to argue that totalitarian regimes inherently threatened 
US interests, NSC-68 pushed an essentially Wilsonian conclusion: that only 
conversion of others to liberal systems of government could ultimately generate 
international peace.
NSC-68 argued that the short-term goal of the United States should be to “create 
a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or 
without conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms 
with the non-Soviet world.”497 Yet that strategy involved threatening the survival 
of the Soviet regime itself. The purpose of containment, the report argued, was to 
“in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the 
Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to 
generally accepted international standards.”498 And in sewing ‘the seeds of 
destruction’, there was clearly some hope of a harvest. “[Ojur policy and 
actions,” the report stated, “must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the 
nature of the Soviet system...” The aspiration was that this be achieved “to a 
maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.” 499 But the 
“intensifying struggle,” it observed, “requires us to face the fact that we can 
expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the 
nature of the Soviet system.”500 Thus, America’s goal must be “to change the 
world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin
496 The leftist critic Noam Chomsky sarcastically describes the document as possessing “the 
child-like simplicity of a fairy tale”. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, p. 10
497 NSC-68, p. 10
498 Ibid, p.21
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500 Ibid, p. 10
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design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system”.501 In its conclusion, the 
document emphasised that
The only sure victory lies in the frustration o f the Kremlin design by the steady 
development o f the moral and material strength of the free world and its 
projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal 
change in the Soviet system.502
NSC-68 thus recommended a strategy that did not respect the Soviet claim to a 
sphere of influence as a legitimate component in a balance-of-power rivalry. On 
the contrary, the course it recommended was to:
.. .take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence o f the Kremlin inside 
the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the 
establishment o f friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is 
essential to engage the Kremlin’s attention, keep it off balance and force an 
increased expenditure o f Soviet resources in counteraction, In other words, it
503would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.
Reprising the now-familiar distinction between the people and the state, the 
report argued that the United States should try to “make the Russian people our 
allies in this enterprise”. The measures taken by the US must be “not so 
excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil 
men who have enslaved them.”504 The United States, therefore, had to be careful 
to wield force carefully, so that “the Russian people can perceive that our effort 
is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their 
own interests.. .”505 The Cold War was not simply a conflict between 
governments over power or territory, the report argued: “at the ideological or 
psychological level, in the struggle for men’s minds, the conflict is world-
501 Ibid, p. 12
502 Ibid, p.64
503 NSC-68, p.56
504 Ibid, p. 12
505 Ibid, p. 12
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wide.”506 “It may even be said that the capabilities of the Soviet world, 
specifically the capabilities of the masses who have nothing to lose but their 
Soviet chains, are a potential which can be enlisted on our side,” the report 
advised.507
This analysis reflected the Wilsonian universalist tradition of thinking about 
international order. The “greatest vulnerability” of the Soviet Government lay 
“in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people”, because “Soviet ideas 
and practices run counter to the best and potentially the strongest instincts of 
men, and deny their most fundamental aspirations.” Faced with an adversary 
such as the United States whose ideology could affirm the “constructive and 
hopeful instincts of men” and was “capable of fulfilling their aspirations, the 
Soviet system might prove to be fatally weak.”508
Unlike Wilson’s hopeful anticipation of a new world order, however, NSC-68 
argued that the United States would need to acquire great military strength in 
order to advance its international agenda. In this regard it injected the strongest 
dose yet of Rooseveltian thinking into Truman administration strategy. The 
United States, it warned “cannot afford in the face of the totalitarian challenge to 
operate on a narrow margin of strength. A democracy can compensate for its 
natural vulnerability only if it maintains clearly superior overall power in its most 
inclusive sense.”509 Clearly, a step change was needed; the report warned that 
“the programs now planned will not meet the requirements of the free 
nations.”510 “A building up of the military capabilities of the United States and 
the free world is a precondition to the achievement of the objectives outlines in 
this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster,” it noted.511 
Sounding like Roosevelt in his pomp, the report warned that “no people in
506 Ibid, pp. 10
507 NSC-68, p.24
508 Ibid, pp. 15,16
509 Ibid p.24 The full checklist of the report’s recommendations, involving increased spending in 
a range of areas relating to the military, intelligence and foreign aid is pp.56-57
510 Ibid, p.31
511 Ibid, pp.49
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history have preserved their freedom who thought that by not being strong
c  1 j
enough to protect themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.”
As in its contrast of alleged American pluralism with Soviet ideological 
universalism, NSC-68 displayed a certain solipsism in its justification of 
American military build-up. It unequivocally attributed aggressive intent and 
“excessive strength” to the USSR because of its assessment that the Soviet Union 
possessed “armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend its national 
territory.”513 Yet the facts presented by the report itself made it clear that the 
underlying resources of the United States and its allies were far greater than 
those of the Soviet Union. The report’s recommendations for an American build­
up would therefore produce an even more “excessive” military capacity if the 
standard for acceptability was indeed the means “necessary to defend its national 
territory”. Though this apparent contradiction was not explicitly articulated, it is 
not difficult to imagine how it was resolved in the minds of the authors: via an 
implicit assessment of intentions. The assumption was that the intentions of the 
United States were axiomatically pacific, and that what strength it accrued in 
response to perceived threats would be used to preserve the conditions of 
freedom, not to impose a self-centred order. But from the Soviet perspective, of 
course, to pledge to defend and spread the ‘conditions necessary for freedom’ 
was a threat to impose a particular American order. Inability or unwillingness to 
appreciate this potential for divergence of perspectives regarding the benign 
quality of American intentions reflected a line of ideological continuity from the 
Wilson/Roosevelt approach to order and intervention. For better and for worse, 
this perceptual blind spot also lay at the heart of the American Cold War 
perspective.
512 Ibid, p.36
513 Ibid, p. 17
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Conclusion
The Truman administration governed during a crucial period of change in 
American strategic thinking. As a result of shifts in the international distribution 
of power following the Second World War, systemic pressure called for the 
engagement of the United States with the management of global order on an 
unprecedented level. During these years, a new internationalism was crafted 
which accepted a vastly increased role for the United States. Henceforth, the 
Founders’ Era consensus would no longer be the reference point for policy, and 
the United States would be ‘entangled’ in Europe and all the globe’s other 
theatres.
Yet the manner in which that engagement took shape was the product of 
interaction between new national circumstances and existing ideological 
dispositions. The new internationalism did not involve the acceptance by 
American policymakers that the United States should participate in a balance-of- 
power system of order based on rival interests of equivalent legitimacy. That is to 
say, it would not join the international system as already existent. Instead, the 
new internationalism was based on a weaving together of Wilsonian and 
Rooseveltian ideas. This meant that the US saw its ultimate objective as an 
American-led international order based on the fundamentally harmonious 
interests of all peoples. The refusal of the Soviet Union to cooperate with this 
plan for world order was attributed, in the Wilsonian style, to its flawed system 
of illiberal government, and reform of that system was thus a key US objective. 
This objective, and the defence o f ‘freedom’ to the extent it was already 
established, would require America to develop military might on an 
unprecedented scope. The nation needed to prepare for the manly defence and 
expansion of civilisation that Roosevelt had argued must be the United States’ 
destiny.
In the Cold War mindset, interweaving Wilsonianism and Rooseveltianism, 
intervention was not considered real intervention if it was American intervention, 
because it sought only to establish the basis for true autonomy and freedom. The 
interests of other nations could not truly be in conflict with those of the United
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States, though it was possible that illegitimate governments might have a warped 
understanding their country’s national interest. Ultimately, the peoples of the 
world, if they could only control their governments, would support the American 
agenda. Uniquely equipped with insight into the true interests of peoples and 
nations, the United States could exercise legitimate global leadership as it 
pursued its liberal universalist objectives. Most crucially of all, the new 
internationalism was contingent on the pursuit of these objectives. To attempt 
less would be for the US to accept membership of the old, rivalrous balance-of- 
power order. Only the pursuit of the new world order, and all the reforms 
required for that order to function, could justify the abrogation of the Founders’ 
Era consensus. Wilson’s ‘deal’ was still thought valid.514
The actual international order that was brought about by Cold War policy was a 
de facto balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Ideologically, however, this was not the result of balance-of-power philosophy 
on the part of the United States. Rather, it was the result of frustrated 
universalism, an important distinction. As Walter Lippmann, arguably more of a 
realist thinker than any at the core of administration policy, observed after 
hearing the Truman Doctrine declared, the administration’s strategy was “a 
vague global policy which sounds like the tocsin of an ideological crusade, has 
no limits. It cannot be controlled. Its effects cannot be predicted.”515 Whereas 
balance-of-power philosophy positively desires limits and shudders at the 
prospect of hegemonic quests, the United States clearly set it as its Cold War 
objective to acquire military and ideological supremacy.
514 See Chapter 4, p. 17
515 Quoted in McCullough, p.549
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6. The Bush administration (2001-05)
‘A Balance of Power that Favours Freedom’
Introduction
The Cold War that emerged under the Truman administration defined world 
order from the 1940s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the 
strategy pursued by the United States throughout that period was based on the 
principles established under Truman. When it ended, it did so on much the basis 
that the Truman administration had hoped: the USSR, contained over decades by 
US pressure, struggled to maintain the vitality of its political and economic 
ideology in the eyes of its own people. Ultimately, even those at the top of the 
system came to favour reform in line with a limited set of liberal principles, 
beginning a chain of events that led to the revolutionary overthrow of the Soviet 
regime.
This chapter focuses not on the immediate years of the ‘post-Cold War era’, but 
on the first administration of the 21st century: that of George W. Bush. Like 
many of his predecessors, including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, 
Bush was a state governor when he ran for national office. He was also the son of 
a president and grandson of a US Senator. Despite this combination of 
experience and pedigree, however, he came to the presidency with limited 
knowledge of foreign affairs. He went on, however, to embrace during his first 
term of office a strategy in foreign policy that all thought bold, and some 
considered revolutionary.516 Especially significant, in the eyes of observers, was 
the administration’s combination of ambitious international engagement with a 
disposition favouring unilateral action.
516 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign 
Policy, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. See also James Mann, Rise o f the 
Vulcans: The History o f Bush’s War Cabinet (London: Penguin, 2004) for detailed discussion of 
the views held by those who came into office with Bush.
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The chapter begins as usual by discussing national and context, before providing 
a brief survey of the ways in which the administration has been assessed by 
critics. It then goes on to set out in detail the administration’s strategic thinking, 
headlined in the National Security Strategy of 2002 as the quest for a ‘balance of 
power that favours freedom’. This is then followed by a number of sections 
describing the key ideological elements of that strategy, namely: proclaiming the 
universal validity of liberal political values; linking international security to the 
spread of liberal democracy; asserting the fundamental commonality of interest 
between the world’s nations; distinguishing intellectually between peoples and 
governments; arguing that historical destiny mandates the triumph of the United 
States and its ideas; and claiming US military hegemony as a virtuous objective. 
Having thus distilled the key features of the Bush strategy, showing in the 
process the parallels between Bush and the Wilson/Roosevelt/Truman tradition, 
the chapter then spells out point-by-point the alternative realist ‘road not taken’. 
In so doing, it makes clear that US policy under Bush has not simply been an 
automatic response to circumstance, but a chosen course influenced by the 
embedded ideological traditions guiding America’s engagement with the 
international system.
The purpose of the chapter, adding the final major component to the thesis as a 
whole, is to demonstrate the intellectual linkages that rooted the strategy pursued 
by Bush in the evolving tradition of America’s evolving internationalism. The 
argument is not that Bush’s strategy was indistinguishable from that of earlier 
presidents. His administration dealt with national and international circumstances 
quite changed from those his predecessors faced, and consequently one would 
expect some change in policy. This period, no less than the others focused upon 
in this thesis, has been selected as meriting attention precisely because it was a 
period of strategic movement in the history of US foreign policy, not of stasis. 
The argument, as in previous chapters, is that changing national and international 
circumstances called for a degree of change in American thinking about 
international order and the US global role. But the administration could only 
carry forward that change on the basis of some connection to the pre-existing 
ideological framework of US foreign policymaking.
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Though it may have appeared -  and in some ways was -  radical, Bush 
administration policy in these years was in fact grounded in established 
principles of the American internationalist ideology, as evolved during the 
transition to global engagement via Roosevelt, Wilson and Truman. What 
emerged under Bush was in a sense new, but it was also the product of 
interaction between circumstances and ideological inheritance.
National and international context
At the turn of the 21st Century, the international order was defined by unipolarity. 
Though by no means omnipotent, the United States combined the world’s largest 
economy with a level of military spending that bested that of the other major
51 7powers combined. Beyond its ability to coerce, the appeal of American 
culture, and of its political system -  America’s ‘soft power’ in Joseph Nye’s 
terminology -  had outstripped all rivals since the demise of the communist
r i o
threat. In the decade since the end of the Cold War, no power had managed to 
assemble the resources required to challenge American power predominance. 
Thus US leaders were called upon to strategise in an international environment 
defined by American primacy.
Simultaneously, the international distribution of power had ‘globalised’ further. 
Europe remained a significant region, but European great powers were no longer 
pre-eminent actors constituting the core of the international system. 
Demographically gigantic powers such as China and India had risen in 
significance, and continued to rise, thanks to economic growth and relatively 
stable government. In Latin America and Africa, functional and autonomous 
states existed, at least to an extent they had not in previous centuries. In short, 
though the United States was the sole superpower, the number of significant 
powers in the next-highest tier had become larger and more widely
517 For discussion of relative American power and reach, see Andrew Bacevich, American 
Empire: The Realities & Consequences o f US Diplomacy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press; 2002)
518 See Joseph Nye, The Paradox o f American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t 
Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
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geographically distributed. Economic globalisation had also impacted upon the 
international system, with the range, depth and complexity of economic 
interdependence reaching levels unprecedented in previous centuries.
Perhaps the most significant change confronting American leaders was the 
increased consideration given to non-state actors in matters of national and 
international security. The plane hijackings, and subsequent terrorist attacks on 
Manhattan and the Pentagon, of September 11th, 2001 compelled the US 
government to think afresh regarding the significance for national security of 
terrorist movements. This bred a new concern regarding ideologies, in particular 
militant Islamism, that mandated terrorist assaults on the United States, and the 
political, economic and social problems of the societies in which those ideologies 
had taken root. This problem dovetailed with fear of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Such weapons had been a central feature of international life 
since the end of WWII, and their spread created worries for American security 
that extended beyond the most traditional and best understood threat occupying 
the thoughts of statesmen, i.e. military assault by a hostile great power.
The Bush administration was obliged by these conditions to form a coherent 
strategy for the advance of American interests that paid due attention to these key 
themes of US primacy, diffusion of global power, radical Islamist terrorism and 
the potential spread of lethal weapons technology. The need for such a strategy 
was dictated by the realities of the international environment and the position of 
the United States within the global system. The particular form that strategy took, 
however, was also heavily shaped by the ideological legacy of the Cold War, 
and, further, by the prior factors of ideology and national historical circumstance 
that in turn preceded Cold War strategy and shaped its formulation.
Critiques of Bush
The Bush administration has been chiefly associated in the literature with 
unilateralism, interventionism, militarism and an extremely forceful rhetoric of 
universalist democracy promotion. As a result, each of the major schools of
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thought in International Relations has found cause to criticise the administration 
for going against at least one of the principles each school consider central to 
good policy. Realist criticism, for example, has naturally reflected the priorities 
inherent in the realist theoretical model. Structural realism is consciously 
reluctant to take individual state’s foreign policies as the object of analysis. 
Nevertheless, its proponents have been able to point to the policy of the Bush 
administration, and the response generated in other powers as evidence of the 
systemic tendency for an aspirant hegemon to overreach and other powers to 
seek to pull it back.519
As for classical realism, the Bush administration might almost have been 
conceived as a case study for its preferred points of attack. The administration 
has tended towards idealistic and moralistic thinking regarding international 
affairs, as will be detailed below. Classical realists argue that this betrays 
insufficient thought about how reality constrains US power. Bush pursued grand 
objectives, namely militaiy-led regime change in Iraq, nation-building in 
Afghanistan, and the universal ‘end of tyranny’ as proclaimed in his second 
inaugural address. He did so, however, without adequate calculation of the costs 
of such a project were it to be seriously attempted.520 As a result of setting 
unattainable goals, realists argue, the United States has simultaneously over­
extended itself and generated charges of hypocrisy.521 The realist critique of 
Bush, therefore, is that under his strategy the United States set objectives that 
were too broad, failed to match ends to means, and neglected the pursuit of 
tactically necessary support from other powers. This latter failing partly 
involved a failure to show the necessary regard for established allies and
519 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War”, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 
2003 No. 134, pp. 51-61. In their anti-war policy advocacy, such authors as these faced a struggle 
to explain where they thought the room for choice existed given their usually structural account 
of international behaviour,
520 Dimitri K. Simes, “End the Crusade”, The National Interest, no. 87, Jan/Feb 2007, pp.4-11;
521 For realist analyses of and responses to the policy dilemmas arising from the Bush 
administration’s problems, see Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism (New York: 
Pantheon, 2007), Amitai Etzioni, Security First (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2007). For contemporary analysis of Bush’s actions with a generally realist standpoint, see 
Richard K. Betts “The Political Support System for American Primacy”, International Affairs,
Jan 2005, 81:1, pp. 1-14; “Suicide From Fear of Death?”, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2003, 82:1, 
pp. 34-43; “Striking First: a History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities”, Ethics and International 
Affairs, 17:1 (2003), pp. 17-24
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♦ S 9 9institutions. It also involved the alienation of strategically useful non- 
democratic nations through the use of extremist rhetoric in favour of 
democratisation.523 In short, the Bush administration represented the flowering of 
the ‘messianic’ strain of US foreign policy-making of which realists have long 
been critical.524 Under this reading, Bush represented a notable incarnation of 
long-standing impulses within American political culture. In giving vent to these 
impulses, realists believe, it neglected to pursue, and in due course damaged, the 
true national interest.
Bush has also been the subject of substantial criticism centring on liberalism’s 
priorities. For these critics, Bush’s major crime has been undermining the liberal 
international order and the institutions underpinning it. Having constructed a 
world order broadly in line with its own principles in the post-WWII era, liberal 
analysis suggests that the United States is its chief beneficiary of that order in 
terms of influence. Bush’s policies have provoked arguments with allies and 
undermined international law by bypassing international institutions and 
neglecting diplomacy, especially in initiating the Iraq War. From the liberal 
perspective, these were strategic errors, draining the legitimacy of a world order 
that the United States itself built and should seek to protect.
522 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Arrogant Empire’, Newsweek, (March 24,2003, US edition), p. 18.
523 The so-called ‘Baker Report’ of 2006, widely regarded as a realist push-back against Bush’s 
policy, implicitly made this criticism, calling for a new engagement with such powers as Iran and 
Syria in order to rescue the strategic situation in Iraq. Report of the Iraq Study Group,
http://www.usip.org/isa/iraq study group report/report/1206/iraq study group report.pdf. 
[accessed 19/06/08].
524 See Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism and Democracy 
Promotion in US Strategy”, International Security, 29:4, Spring 2005, pp. 112-56; Robert Jervis, 
“Understanding the Bush Doctrine”, Political Science Quarterly, 118:3, 2003, pp.365-388
525 For examples of liberal criticism of Bush along these lines, see: Stanley Hoffmann, “America 
Goes Backward”, New York Review of Books, vol. 50, no. 10, June 12, 2003; Timothy Garton 
Ash, “The War After War With Iraq”, Washington Post, March 20, 2003; John Lewis Gaddis, “A 
Grand Strategy of Transformation”, Foreign Policy, November/December 2002; Robert W. 
Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, “The Sources of American Legitimacy”, Foreign Affairs, 
Nov/Dec 2004, 83:6, pp. 18-32; George Soros, The Bubble o f American Supremacy: Correcting 
the misuse o f American power, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004); Michael Hirsh, At 
War with Ourselves: Why America is squandering its chance to build a better world, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Madeleine K. Albright, ‘Bombs, Bridges, or Bluster’, Foreign 
Affairs (September/October 2003); James P. Rubin, ‘Stumbling into War’, Foreign Affairs 
(September/October 2003)
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Many writers of a realist526 disposition, and some liberals 527, have accepted the 
proposition that Bush’s America was gripped by a strain of imperialist thinking, 
fuelled by the nation’s immense hard power and universalistic impulses. Both, 
for their own reasons, questioned the wisdom, practicality, sustainability and 
legitimacy of the United States seeking an imperial status in the world. There 
have also been critics coming from a constructivist and/or poststructuralist 
perspective, who have sought to deconstruct the administration’s use of the 
concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘war’ to justify policies of which they disapprove, 
and who regard the Iraq conflict as an imperialistic project enabled by a false 
rhetoric of liberation.528
The administration’s doctrine has also had its advocates. The most obvious of 
these are neoconservatives, from whose ideas Bush was perceived by many to 
have taken inspiration.529 The strong element of idealism and universalism in his 
ideology has also drawn support from liberal and left-wing ‘hawks’, however.530 
As his policies have run into practical difficulty and have bled popularity in 
recent years, support for ‘Bush Doctrine’ has become rarer, but there are those 
who argue that its essential points represent a core of ideas from which there
C ' l  1
cannot realistically be significant divergence in years to come. This argument
526 Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities & Consequences o f US Diplomacy, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2002); Dimitri K. Simes, “America's Imperial 
Dilemma”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec2003, 82:6, p91-102; Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: 
American Unilateralism and the Failure o f Good Intentions, (New York: Basic, 2003). Robert 
Jervis has written about the matter from a theoretically universalising perspective, attributing 
American imperial impulses to the ‘mission creep’ which affects all nations granted unrivalled 
power: Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire”, Foreign Policy, 137,2003 July-August, pp. 82-87.
27 G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition”, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2002, 81:5, p44- 
60; Ikenberry, “Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age”, Review of 
International Studies, 30:4 (2004), p. 609; Edward Rhodes, “The Imperial Logic of Bush’s • 
Liberal Agenda”, Survival. 45:1, (Spring 2003) pp. 131-153.
528 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005)
529 David Frum, The Right Man: An Inside Account o f the Surprise Presidency o f George W 
Bush, (NY: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003); David Frum and Richard Perle, An End To Evil: 
How to Win the War on Terror, (New York: Random House, 2003). Some neoconservatives have 
since changed their mind. See Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads, 
(London: Profile, 2006
530 For example Christopher Hitchens., “Taking Sides”, The Nation, Sep 26, 2002. 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20021014/hitchens [accessed 19/06/08]; Hitchens, “The End of 
Fukuyama: Why his Latest Pronouncements Miss the Mark”, Slate, Mar 1, 2006, 
http://www.slate.eom/id/2137134/ [accessed 19/06/08]. Even Daalder and Lindsey, op.cit., seem 
admiring,
531 See Timothy J. Lynch, and Robert S. Singh, After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American 
Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: CUP, 2008)
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is based on the view, counter to the arguments of Daalder and Lindsey or 
Ikenberry that the Bush strategy has represented a sharp break with the past, that 
there are thick strands of continuity from American history running through 
Bush.532
This thesis, clearly, sides with those who argue for continuity, at least in the 
descriptive sense that the Bush administration’s strategy represents the 
continuation of themes from the past more than is commonly acknowledged. In 
its argument regarding embedded ideological culture, it also endorses the view 
that radical change in the substance of strategy is highly unlikely. Whether or not 
this is desirable is another matter; this thesis argues that change is unlikely 
mostly because of the historically evolved national character of the United States, 
not because no other strategy is conceivable or workable in principle. As made 
clear at the outset, this thesis does not seek to arbitrate in the prescriptive debates 
of the discipline regarding the optimal foreign policy for America’s future. In its 
diagnosis of the ideological nature of America’s construction of its foreign policy 
strategy, however, it is sympathetic to the classical realist perspective, though 
agnostic regarding that school’s proposed solutions. It seeks to clarify the fact 
that Bush’s strategy was the product of longstanding historical patterns in the 
evolution of the culture of US foreign policy. Whether that serves to commend, 
excuse or condemn his tenure is a judgment for another place.
‘A balance ofpower that favours freedom the  National Security Strategy
The central document setting forth the Bush administration’s approach was the 
National Security Strategy, published in September 2002.533 The NSS was a 
public document, and as such aimed to explain the administration’s guiding 
worldview to the outside world in a persuasive manner. It also sought to provide 
a guiding framework to which the administration itself could refer, bringing
532 For another, shorter argument for continuity see John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and 
the American Experience, (London: Harvard University Press, 2004)
533 White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, (White 
House, September 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. (hereafter ‘NSS’) 
[accessed 19/06/08]
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coherence to the different strands of day-to-day policy. The process of preparing 
the NSS began prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but by the time of its publication 
it was inevitably, and correctly, seen as a response to the strategic environment 
thrown up by those events.
Much immediate reportage focused on the concept of ‘pre-emption’, which at 
least in the short term became the signature issue of the strategy. The NSS 
warned of the potential for connection between the threats of terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the president writing in his foreword that 
“the gravest danger” faced by the nation lay “at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology”. The consequences of terrorists acquiring WMD being dire, the 
strategy declared that to “forestall or prevent such attacks by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”534 The strategy was published 
after the administration had successfully overthrown the Taliban government of 
Afghanistan in response to its harbouring of al-Qaeda terrorists, and at a time 
when many considered an invasion of Iraq highly likely. In this political context, 
this phrase referring to ‘pre-emption’ was widely interpreted as the 
administration’s strategic centrepiece, even though it was mentioned few times 
and not emphasised in the introduction or conclusion.535
Those who saw in ‘pre-emption’ a forewarning of regime change in Iraq had 
their suspicions borne out by the invasion of March 2003. But despite the 
discursive tornado that arose in response to the doctrine of pre-emption, concepts 
of comparatively greater breadth and depth were set out in the NSS, as the 
document outlined the administration’s vision of the nature of international 
order, present and future. The emphasis chosen by accompanying and follow-up 
texts published by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of 
State Colin Powell suggests that both considered the most significant concept to 
be the “balance of power that favours freedom”.536 This phrase was used twice in
534 NSS p. 15
535 Its prominence in media coverage was in no small part thanks to unnamed administration 
sources briefing in advance on pre-emption’s adoption as policy in the NSS. This ensured that the 
press were looking for it when the document itself was published. See ‘Bush Developing Military 
Policy Of Striking First: New Doctrine Addresses Terrorism’, Washington Post, June 10, 2002.
536 Condoleezza Rice, ‘A Balance of Power that Favors Freedom’ (adapted from the 2002 
Wriston Lecture, delivered to the Manhattan Institute, New York City, October 1, 2002),
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the president’s foreword, and on multiple occasions in the opening paragraphs of 
sections within the document. It was also the headline of the article and lecture 
by Rice that accompanied the strategy’s official publication.
Before it began, there was some expectation that a Bush presidency would 
embrace a more realist worldview, placing emphasis on the national interest, 
narrowly defined, and traditional great power diplomacy. This was encouraged 
by a widely-read article published by Rice in Foreign Affairs during the 
presidential campaign of 2000, which criticised nation-building and liberal ideas 
of ‘international community’.537 9/11, however, forced some change of focus, 
obliging the administration to address more centrally the problem of non-state 
actors and the ideological dimension introduced to international security by an 
Islamist threat. What emerged was a worldview that retained some emphasis on 
military power and relations with great powers, but also injected powerful 
elements of ideological universalism and moralism. In short, what emerged was 
something that bore significant resemblance to the Roosevelt/Wilson/Truman 
internationalist ideology, adapted for the new era.
The NSS contained several key planks. First, it underlined the perceived 
importance of tackling rogue regimes, which provided the link-point between the 
threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation. Second, it reaffirmed with force the 
American government’s insistence on the absolute and universal righteousness of 
fundamental American values and practices. The American government was 
committed to the universal realisation of both liberal democracy and capitalism. 
Third, it asserted that there was unprecedented potential, which must be seized 
upon, for all great powers in the international system to cooperate.538 These three 
interconnected principles formed the spine of logic supporting the 
administration’s worldview.
http://usinfo.state.gov/iournals/itps/1202/iipe/pi7-4rice.htm. [accessed 19/06/08]. Colin L. 
Powell, ‘A Strategy of Partnerships’, Foreign Affairs, 83/1, (January/February 2004).
537 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs, 79:1, Jan/Feb 2000, 
pp.45-62
538 These themes correspond roughly with sections V, II and VIII of the document, but each runs 
through the whole document.
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The most essential fact to be noted regarding the NSS was that its central 
concept, the ‘balance of power that favours freedom’, was not what it at first 
appeared. The invocation of the phrase ‘balance of power’ seemed to send the 
signal that a new realism had emerged in US policy. On inspection, however, the 
concept and the ideology underlying it were deeply liberal in their assumptions 
regarding international order. Contrary to conventional usage in International 
Relations discourse, this “balance of power” did not really describe a ‘balance’ at 
all. Rather it envisioned a vast preponderance of power on a single side -  that of 
the United States -  and a world defined by the triumphant universalisation of 
liberal ideological values. The administration’s vision of international order was 
thus not of power balancing power, but of a concerted coalition of all major 
powers in furtherance of what it identified as common interests and universal 
values. Cooperation between major powers and the emergence of concord around 
foundational political values were viewed as mutually reinforcing trends, based 
on a dynamic of historical inevitability. Together they would support the 
emergence of a lasting world peace. The next several sections explain in detail 
the most crucial themes in the Bush administration’s strategic thinking, as set out 
in the NSS and then expanded in later statements.539
‘Universal, human hopes9: the universal legitimacy of liberal values
A fundamental feature of Bush’s strategic approach was stridency in asserting 
the universal validity of liberal political values. The National Security Strategy 
contended that only the liberal model of society remained viable, having 
triumphed in the contest of historical evolution:
539 Some of the secondary literature consulted on the Bush administration has been cited 
previously. In addition, the author engaged in a comprehensive reading of the speeches and 
public pronouncements of President Bush, as well as certain key statements and writings by 
Secretary of State Powell and National Security Adviser Rice. All specific quotations are 
referenced in detail, though many communicate ideas for which multiple further citations could 
be produced were space unlimited. For context on the decision-making and ideas of the 
administration, useful texts include Daalder and Linsay, America Unbound.; Mann, Rise o f the 
Vulcans; Bob Woodward, Bush at War (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), Plan of Attack, 
(London: Simon & Schuster 2004), State o f Denial, (London: Simon & Schuster 2006); Frum,
The Right Man; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiaso: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, (London: 
Allen Lane, 2006); Robert Draper, Dead Certain: The Presidency o f George W. Bush, (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2007).
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The great struggles o f the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism 
ended with a decisive victory for the forces o f freedom — and a single sustainable 
model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. . . .  [The] 
values o f freedom are right and true for every person in every society.. .54°
Such sentiments are common in American political discourse, but the Bush 
administration was especially frequent and vocal in expressing them. Even in his 
first inaugural address, before the post-9/11 surge in foreign policy activism,
Bush told Americans that the nation’s “democratic faith” was “more than the 
creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but 
do not own, a trust we bear and pass along.”541 In the post-9/11 environment of 
addressing the terrorist threat, this perspective hardened and deepened. In his 
State of the Union address of 2002, best known for the identification of the “axis 
of evil”, the president was also strident identifying ‘liberty’ as a universal value. 
“[LJiberty and justice ... are right and true and unchanging for all people 
everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from 
them,” he declared. He denied that the United States had any intention of 
“imposing our culture”, but nevertheless insisted it would “stand firm for the 
non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of 
the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and 
religious tolerance.”542
Arguing for the applicability of such principles even in a troubled region such as 
the Middle East, he insisted: “Prosperity and freedom and dignity are not just 
American hopes, or Western hopes. They are universal, human hopes. And even 
in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes those hopes 
have the power to transform lives and nations.”543 In January of 2003, as the final 
order to topple the government of Iraq approached closer, he told Congress and
540 NSS, foreword.
541 Bush, Inaugural address. Jan 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural- 
address.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
542 Bush, State of the Union Address, Jan 29, 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html. [accessed 19/06/08]
543 Bush , ‘President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership’, June 24, 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/2002Q624-3.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
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the nation that “Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right 
of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not 
America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity.544
In his widely reported speech to graduates at the military academy at West Point 
in 2002, Bush declared that:
The 20th century ended with a single surviving model o f human progress, based 
on non-negotiable demands o f human dignity, the rule o f law, limits on the 
power o f the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and 
equal justice and religious tolerance... .When it comes to the common rights and 
needs o f men and women, there is no clash o f civilizations. The requirements of 
freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. 
The peoples o f the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and 
opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to 
their hopes 545
The sentiment was repeated in his Radio Address after the commencement of 
‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, the invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s 
government. In that address he reassured Americans that “Iraqis, like all 
people.. .welcome their own freedom. It should surprise no one that in every 
nation and every culture, the human heart desires the same good things... As 
people throughout Iraq celebrate the arrival of freedom, America celebrates with 
them.”546 “The desire for freedom is not the property of one culture, it is the 
universal hope of human beings in every culture,” he observed a fortnight 
later.547
544 Bush State of the Union, Jan 28,2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/reIeases/2003/01 /20030128-19.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
545 Bush, At West Point, June 1, 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
546 Bush, Radio Address, Apr 12, 2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030412.htnil. [accessed 19/06/08]
547 Bush ‘President Discusses the Future of Iraq’, Apr 28, 2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/2003Q428-3.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
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The administration was harshly critical of those who expressed doubt regarding 
the suitability or ‘readiness’ of some societies for democratic government. 
Sometimes this could be blunt, accusing the administrations critics of 
sectarianism or racism. “There's a lot of people in the world who don't believe 
that people whose skin color may not be the same as ours can be free and self- 
go vem,” the president told a press conference in April 2003. “I reject that. I 
reject that strongly. I believe that people who practice the Muslim faith can self- 
govem. I believe that people whose skins aren't necessarily -  are a different color 
than white can self-go vem.”548 There was self-conscious touchiness in the 
administration regarding accusations that insistent promotion of liberal values 
amounted to a form of cultural imperialism, reflected in efforts to pre-emptively 
deny such intentions. The president repeatedly used public pronouncements to 
disavow the desire to impose American standards upon others, while 
nevertheless asserting that liberal principles were synonymous with universal 
human aspirations. This was a message replete with internal tension. Key to the 
self-image of the United States and the president’s vision was the idea that the 
US was not imposing its own ideas but merely facilitating others in obtaining 
what they naturally wanted for themselves. This desire to reconcile insistence on 
universal principles with the parallel craving to be seen as respectful of others’ 
autonomy displayed clear echoes of the tensions within Wilsonianism.
Sensing this dilemma, the administration tried to argue that it did not expect all 
societies to replicate American methods. In discussing the US-led efforts to 
reconstruct Afghan and Iraqi society along liberal democratic lines, as part of the 
“forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East”, Bush stated: “we are mindful 
that modernization is not the same as Westernization. Representative 
governments in the Middle East will reflect their own cultures. They will not, 
and should not, look like us.” Possible alternatives he conceded might include 
“constitutional monarchies, federal republics, or parliamentary systems”. He also 
conceded that “working democracies always need time to develop -  as did our
548 Bush, ‘President Bush Welcomes Canadian Prime Minister Martin to White House, Apr, 
2004,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040430-2.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
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own.”549 In his second inaugural address, Bush would claim to be prepared for 
the fact that new democracies might “reflect customs and traditions very 
different from our own.” “America,” he insisted, “ will not impose our own style 
of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own 
voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.”550
Yet although the need for wholesale transposition of institutions was denied, 
Bush still insisted on an extensive common of foundation for all societies, what 
he termed the “essential principles common to every successful society, in every 
culture.” “Successful societies,” he argued
.. .limit the power o f the state and the power o f the military — so that 
governments respond to the will o f the people, and not the will o f an elite. 
Successful societies protect freedom with the consistent and impartial rule o f law, 
instead o f .. .selectively applying the law to punish political opponents. Successful 
societies allow room for healthy civic institutions — for political parties and labor 
unions and independent newspapers and broadcast media. Successful societies 
guarantee religious liberty — the right to serve and honor God without fear o f  
persecution. Successful societies privatize their economies, and secure the rights 
o f property. They prohibit and punish official corruption, and invest in the 
health and education o f their people. They recognize the rights o f women. And 
instead o f directing hatred and resentment against others, successful societies 
appeal to the hopes o f their own people.551
Taking this full list, which encompassed the full range of liberal civil and 
political rights as well as insisting upon not only private property but 
privatisation, it was clear that the administration’s claim to be at ease with 
cultural pluralism was not credible. Essentially, Bush asserted an idealised 
conception of America’s own political and economic liberalism as universally 
valid, with variation only considered legitimate within narrow parameters.
549 Bush, ‘President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East’, Nov 6, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/l 1/20031106-2.html. [accessed 19/06/08]
550 Bush, ‘Second Inaugural Address’, January 20, 2005,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1 .html, [accessed 19/06/08]
551 Bush ‘Freedom in Iraq’, op.cit.
238
Democratic peace: ‘This advance of freedom will bring greater security’
The Bush administration’s assertive declaration of the supremacy of liberal 
values was not purely a moral imperative. Key to the logic of the Bush strategy 
was a direct link drawn between the progress of liberal values and the defence of 
American national security. This intellectual link existed from the earliest days of 
the post-9/11 ‘war’ against terrorism, but was elaborated upon in the years that 
followed. In the first months after 9/11, the administration was obliged to focus 
on dealing with the groups and governments most directly involved in the attack 
on America through the armed forces and intelligence agencies. But a longer- 
term strategy was also coming into view. In his 2002 State of the Union, the 
president told Congress, that America had “a greater objective than eliminating 
threats and containing resentment... [A] just and peaceful world beyond the war 
on terror.” What this meant became clearer as the administration steadily 
expanded of its policy to encompass Iraq. In his West Point speech in June 2002, 
Bush defended the concept of pre-emption, arguing that it was impossible to trust 
the Iraqi regime. In making this argument, he drew special attention to the Iraqi 
government’s undemocratic and illiberal nature. “We cannot put our faith in the 
word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then 
systemically break them,” he warned. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, 
we will have waited too long.”553
In theory, the administration held open the possibility that the Iraqi government 
might remove the need for war by opening up the country for inspection and 
disarmament, and ceasing to ‘destabilise’ the region. But in thinking reminiscent 
of NSC-68, the administration noted it was aware that root and branch changes of 
the sort it was demanding from Saddam Hussein would inexorably undermine 
the very qualities -  secretiveness, militarism and resistance to the US agenda -  
that sustained his regime’s existence. As such, US demands were almost certain 
to be rejected. Meeting America’s demands, the president declared, would
552 Bush, State of the Union 2002, op.cit.
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“change the nature of the Iraqi regime itself’, and while one might hope for this, 
there was “little reason to expect it.” Hence “regime change” was “the only 
certain means of removing a great danger to our nation.”554
With invasion imminent, the ideological horizons of the American argument 
began to expand. Saddam Hussein’s government had, Bush said “shown the 
power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East.” This set the 
stage for broadening the issue from Hussein’s personal contribution to regional 
problems, making a link between regional instability and an entire category of 
government, namely “tyranny”. “A liberated Iraq,” on the other hand -  meaning 
one governed in accordance with liberal/universal values -  would “show the 
power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress 
into the lives of millions.” Thus, the demands of security and ideals had become, 
in the administration’s formula, mutually supportive: “America's interest in 
security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free 
and peaceful Iraq. The first to benefit from a free Iraq would be the Iraqi people 
themselves.”555
Bush rejected the argument that seeking to spread freedom could undermine 
peace and stability. On the contrary, he argued, it would further it, by getting at 
the roots of terrorism. “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic 
values,” he argued, “because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies 
of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life.”556 The United 
States and its allies should work “to create the conditions for peace.” This was 
best achieved:
.. .by seeking the advance of freedom. Free societies do not nurture bitterness, or
the ideologies o f terror and murder . . .  American interests and American
557founding beliefs lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty.
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The “advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror 
in the world,” he argued after military operations to topple Hussein had been 
successful. “Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom 
takes hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life.” 
Condoleezza Rice simultaneously pressed home these arguments. Bringing a 
much-used analogy to bear, she declared of terrorists that “the fever swamps in 
which they grow can be drained”. The war on terror was “as much a war of ideas 
as a war of force”, she told an audience in Los Angeles in June 2003, which 
could only be won:
. . .  by appealing to the just aspirations and decent hopes o f people throughout 
the world — giving them cause to hope for a better life and a brighter future, and 
reason to reject the false and destructive comforts o f bitterness and grievance and 
hate. Terror grows in the absence o f progress and development. It thrives in the 
airless space where new ideas, new hopes and new aspirations are forbidden. 
Terror lives where freedom dies.559
This expansion of the regional agenda bloomed fully in the latter half of 2003, as 
the administration reacted to perceived success in Iraq by outlining a bold agenda 
for the whole of the ‘Greater Middle East’. In November, Bush set out what he 
termed his “forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East”. The intention, he 
said, was to adopt a direct and muscular approach to spreading liberal 
democracy. “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the 
lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -  because in the 
long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty,” he intoned. “As 
long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will 
remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And 
with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and 
to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo”.560
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Shortly thereafter, the president reaffirmed the message on a state visit to 
London, telling his audience that:
.. .by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of 
dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings 
danger to our own people... .As recent history has shown, we cannot turn a blind 
eye to oppression just because the oppression is not in our own backyard. N o  
longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient.561
Iraq, the case in which the administration had directly intervened to topple a 
“tyranny” and open space for “freedom”, was key because “a free and 
democratic nation, at the heart of the Middle East” would “send a message... 
from Damascus to Tehran, that democracy can bring hope to lives in every 
culture. And this advance of freedom will bring greater security to America and 
to the world.”562
Having broadened its ‘freedom agenda’ from Iraq to the Middle East, this 
process of expansion reached its logical conclusion in the Second Inaugural 
Address’s call for an eradication of tyranny across the globe. In that speech,
Bush proclamation that America faced a “mortal threat” which could not be 
resolved without the liberation of the entire world from “resentment and 
tyranny”. The United States, the president argued, had to accept that the 
“survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in 
other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in 
all the world.” “America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one,” 
he argued. It must be “the policy of the United States to seek and support the 
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, 
with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”564
561 Bush, ‘President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London’
November 19, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/l 1/20031119-l.html. 
[accessed 19/06/08]
562 Bush, ‘President Speaks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’, May 18, 2004, 
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2004/05/20040518-1 .html. [accessed 19/06/08]
563 Bush, ‘Second Inaugural’, op.cit.
564 Ibid
242
Thus, the administration placed the idea of ‘freedom’ at the heart of national 
security policy, and applied the theory of the liberal democratic peace as the 
basis of a global strategy. Its strategic objective was not peace based on 
managing relations between the states of the world as presently constituted. 
Rather, it was the reconstitution of those states, to render them compatible with a 
new international order and attain a more lasting, ultimate peace. The final world 
order, it argued, could rest only upon the universal adoption of liberal, 
democratic capitalist systems of domestic political order, as only this could 
enable cooperation on an international level. As an academic with a background 
in International Relations as well as a practitioner who had served closely under 
Brent Scowcroft, Rice was surely aware of the realist criticism that would likely 
descend upon the administration’s strategy. Realism could never be comfortable 
with a vision of peace requiring the universal acceptance of American values, nor 
could it find the prediction of a world order founded on essentially harmonious, 
US-defined interests plausible. Yet despite her own prior reputation as a realist, 
she rejected this realist analysis.
“The statecraft that America is called to practice in today’s world is ambitious, 
even revolutionary, but it is not imprudent,” Rice wrote in the Washington Post 
in 2005, seeking to set out the intellectual case for the democratic peace:
If the school o f thought called "realism" is to be truly realistic, it must recognize 
that stability without democracy will prove to be false stability.... Our experience 
o f this new world leads us to conclude that the fundamental character o f regimes 
matters more today than the international distribution of power. Insisting 
otherwise is imprudent and impractical. The goal o f our statecraft is to help 
create a world o f democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of 
their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. 
Attempting to draw neat, clean lines between our security interests and our 
democratic ideals does not reflect the reality o f today's world. Supporting the
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growth o f democratic institutions in all nations is not some moralistic flight of 
fancy; it is the only realistic response to our present challenges.565
As Arthur Link had written of Woodrow Wilson, so others could now write of 
Rice and Bush: they aspired to a “higher realism”.
‘Common interests and ... common values*
The Bush administration acquired a reputation early for confrontational anti­
diplomacy and unilateralism. But its ideological self-image was more complex. It 
reflected the tendency on the part of past American leaders, discussed in earlier 
chapters, to regard even unilateral American action as leadership in the pursuit of 
common interests beneficial to all. It imagined that as other states came to accept 
the universal validity of America’s domestic political values, they would 
necessarily also come to see that their interests lay in common with America’s.
In the meantime, the United States could presume to have an insight into the 
common interest that others sometimes lacked.
The National Security Strategy was premised on the idea that the awakening of 
common wants across the peoples of the world, combined with the common 
threats of the post-9/11 environment, ought to lay the basis for cooperation 
between all the world’s great powers.566 Throughout the NSS, the assumption 
was ever-present, if only partially articulated, that the ‘progress’ in the world of 
which the document spoke would be on the part of other powers towards values 
and practices identified as good by America, not vice versa. Convergence of 
values was decidedly not a process involving mutual movement towards some 
compromise point. It also appeared implicit that it would be America’s 
prerogative to determine the specific policy actions supposed to arise from these 
“common interests” mandating great power cooperation.
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The picture of world order painted by the NSS was of a concert of great powers 
cooperating peacefully under US leadership, facilitated in their perception of 
common interests by the increasing influence of universal values. This feature of 
the document seems to have been more important to Rice and to Powell than the 
more widely-discussed ‘doctrine of pre-emption’. Indeed, Rice used her 
accompanying lecture to explicitly play down pre-emption. The centrepiece, 
she asserted, was the administration’s marriage of US interests to the unstoppable 
spread of liberal political values, thus undercutting the false dichotomy between 
‘realists’ and ‘idealists’. Both Rice and Powell went out of their way to 
emphasise the importance of the idea of great power concert. They argued that 
now was the time to realise at last the longstanding American dream of an 
international system based on cooperation and common interest rather than 
competitive power-balancing. As Rice framed it in 2002:
This confluence o f common interests and increasingly common values creates a 
moment o f enormous opportunities. Instead of repeating the historic pattern 
where great power rivalry exacerbates local conflicts, we can use great power 
cooperation to solve local conflicts... Great power cooperation also creates an 
opportunity for multilateral institutions to prove their worth... And great power 
cooperation can be the basis for moving forward on problems that require 
multilateral solutions — from terror to the environment. 568
In Powell’s Foreign Affairs article of early 2004 he sought to rebut suggestions 
that the US was hostile to international cooperation.569 Seeking to reassert what 
he saw as the central themes of the NSS, he declared of pre-emption: “As to 
being central, it isn’t. The discussion of pre-emption in the NSS takes up just two 
sentences in one of the document’s eight sections.” Instead, he insisted, the 
administration’s strategic vision was one of concert based on common values and 
common interests:
567 Rice, A Balance of Power’, p. 3
568 Ibid p. 5
569 Colin L. Powell, ‘A Strategy of Partnerships’, Foreign Affairs, 83/1, (January/February 2004)
245
This development is not just good news; it is revolutionary news... An insight of 
the Enlightenment and a deep belief o f the American Founders — that politics 
need not always be a zero-sum competition — has at last been adopted by enough 
people worldwide to promise a qualitative difference in the character of  
international relations. If, instead of wasting lives and treasure by opposing each 
other as in the past, today’s powers can pull in the same direction to solve 
problems common to all, we will begin to redeem history from much human 
folly. 570
The Powell article and the NSS both referred to Bush’s West Point speech of 
June 2002, which set out the argument in favour of a ‘paradigm shift’ to a more 
cooperative international order. In that speech Bush claimed that America 
presently had its “best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century 
to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for
Such a new world order could tolerate ‘competition’ within agreed parameters, 
but only limited competition, based on shared values regarding freedom and 
progress. These would constrain the sort of fundamental divergence of perceived 
interests that had fed the “series of destructive national rivalries that left 
battlefields and graveyards across the Earth”. Competition between great nations 
is inevitable, but armed conflict was not, he declared.
More and more, civilized nations find ourselves on the same side — united by
common dangers o f terrorist violence and chaos. Today the great powers are also
increasingly united by common values, instead of divided by conflicting
ideologies. The United States, Japan and our Pacific friends, and now all o f
Europe, share a deep commitment to human freedom, embodied in strong
alliances such as NATO. And the tide o f liberty is rising in many other 
572nations...
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Russia, he suggested, was “now a country reaching toward democracy”, while 
“in China, leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only lasting 
source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom 
is the only true source of national greatness.” Hence, the longstanding American 
dream of cooperation rather than rivalrous power-balance could be reality:
“When the great powers share common values, we are better able to confront 
serious regional conflicts together, better able to cooperate in preventing the 
spread of violence or economic chaos.”
The 2003 effort to assemble global support for regime change in Iraq was a 
potential testing ground for the plausibility of this vision of cooperation in 
response to new threats in the new international environment. The United States 
argued that its proposed invasion was aimed at addressing the intertwined threats 
to global order posed by WMD and terrorism. Hence, by Bush’s reading, the 
overthrow of Hussein would further the common interests of all the world’s 
major powers, and indeed of the world as a whole. In practice, however, many 
other powers lined up to criticise and obstruct American efforts to assemble a 
coalition for invasion. That concert on Iraq proved elusive serves to highlight an 
inherent problem at the heart of Bush’s keenness to base his policy on the pursuit 
of assumed common interests: subjectivity. National interests, while they might 
be asserted to be common in the language of generalities, cannot be defined with 
sufficient objectivity to guarantee agreement on policy in concrete cases. Hence 
an actor, if it presses ahead unilaterally, may find itself advancing what it 
considers to be the interests of other powers, but executing policies those same 
powers oppose. This was the precarious ideological posture into which US policy 
twisted itself during the Iraq debate. A powerful nation may claim insight into 
common interests, but in the face of disagreement from others this takes on the 
appearance of pure presumption.
As Bob Woodward, the outsider with closest access to the administration wrote 
in 2002:
573 Ibid.
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When it came to fighting terrorism, the president... wanted world leaders to 
equate their national interests with American interests. Some would go along with 
him when their interests and goals coincided roughly with his, but go their own 
way when they did not. Bush didn’t like that when it happened and at times he 
took it personally. 574
Bush’s speeches from the outset of the War on Terror reflect this conflation in 
administration thinking between the American national interest and the global, or 
even civilisational, interest. On the day after 9/11, Bush made clear his 
expectation that the United States would “rally the world”, because the terrorists 
had “attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people
c n c
everywhere in the world.” Addressing Congress later the same month, he 
characterised the coming American campaign as “the world's fight. This is 
civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, 
tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us”. Confidently, he claimed 
that the “civilized world” was already “rallying to America's side.” An 
exhaustive list of examples of Bush’s use of this sort of terminology would be of 
inordinate length.577 The refusal to acknowledge national, religious or cultural 
bases for divergence in perception of interests allowed for a ‘rhetoric of 
expectation’: others were not merely hoped or desired but expected to support 
America, because its cause was that of ‘civilisation’. To do otherwise was moral 
failure.
Condoleezza Rice, first as National Security Advisor and later as Secretary of 
State, shadowed these arguments that a higher ‘collective interest’ was being 
served by US actions, even as it might appear that US national interests were 
clashing with others. The Iraq war was not simply about pushing US interests, 
she said in a speech in summer 2003: “The world has a vital interest in seeing
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these efforts succeed, and a responsibility to help.” America’s campaign, she 
argued, was against “the common enemies of man”, making advancing it “not 
only the right thing to do, it is the clear, vital interest of the world to do so.” 578
Peoples and governments
The basis for the Bush administration’s expectation of cooperation from all free 
societies, and its contempt for to opposition from non-democracies, lay in the 
Wilsonian intellectual distinction between peoples and governments. It was in 
the empowerment of peoples that the administration saw the route to a new world 
order of concord with American desires. During the effort to build support for an 
attack on Iraq, the distinction between people and regime could be used to 
support the ideological claim that America could act in a higher, universal 
interest encompassing a nation’s people even as it clashed violently with the 
same nation’s government. Upon receiving authorisation from the US Congress 
to use force in Iraq if he thought it necessary, Bush assured Americans that in 
accepting the “responsibility” to confront Saddam Hussein’s government “we 
also serve the interests and the hopes of the Iraqi people,” who would be the first 
to benefit when “the world's” demands were met. “Americans believe all men 
and women deserve to be free,” he observed. “And as we saw in the fall of the 
Taliban, men and women celebrate freedom's arrival.”579 “America is a friend to 
the people of Iraq,” he told Americans in a public address. “Our demands are 
directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens us.”580
In those tyrannous nations that fomented disorder, something they did by virtue 
of their very nature according to the administration, the president sought to find 
encouragement in the support o f ‘the people’ for America’s objectives. Though 
Iran had “a government that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass 
destruction, and supports terror”, it was possible also to see “Iranian citizens
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risking intimidation and death as they speak out for liberty and human rights and 
democracy. Iranians, like all people, have a right to choose their own government 
and determine their own destiny -  and the United States supports their
• c o  1
aspirations to live in freedom.” With the toppling the Baghdad government, 
Bush emphasised to Americans that the Iraqi people would feel that “their 
country is finally returned to them.”582 In her summer 2003 remarks in Los 
Angeles, Rice echoed these arguments, proposing that the Iraq campaign was 
“about building a better future for all of the people of the region. Iraq’s people, 
for sure, will be the first to benefit. But success in Iraq will also add to the 
momentum for reform that is already touching lives, from Morocco to Bahrain 
and beyond.”583
The second inaugural address allowed the president to underline his support for 
peoples and their interests against those of their oppressors. As he spoke of the 
“transformational power of liberty”, he also predicted admiringly that “citizens 
of Afghanistan and Iraq” would “seize the moment” and that their “example” 
would “send a message of hope throughout a vital region.” “I believe that 
millions in the Middle East plead in silence for their liberty,” he asserted. “ I 
believe that given the chance, they will embrace the most honorable form of 
government ever devised by man.”584 In adopting the posture of freedom’s 
champion, the Bush believed that the United States was aligning itself more 
closely with the interests of the peoples of other nations than were their own 
governments:
All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not 
ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your 
liberty, we will stand with you. Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or 
exile can know: America sees you for who you are: the future leaders o f your free 
country... The leaders o f governments with long habits o f control need to know:
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To serve your people you must learn to trust them. Start on this journey of
585progress and justice, and America will walk at your side.
The dynamic of historical inevitability
The Bush administration’s rhetoric, and the strategy underlying that rhetoric, 
asserted the historical inevitability of American objectives’ realisation. Much as 
Truman and Wilson described alternatives to liberal democracy as unsustainable, 
so the Bush administration took ideological comfort from that thought. Even if 
long struggles lay ahead, and temporary setbacks might intrude, America’s 
desired destination -  universal liberty -  lay at the end of history’s ordained road.
Immediately after 9/11, Bush offered a narrative fitting America’s attackers into 
the pattern of the nation’s previous opponents. The terrorists were “ the heirs of 
all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century”, being guilty of “sacrificing 
human life to serve their radical visions.. .abandoning every value except the will 
to power”. They followed “in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and 
totalitarianism.” Though those threats had been grave, however, the comparison 
was also reassuring: it meant that they would assuredly “follow that path all the 
way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.” “The 
, course of this conflict is not known,” Bush told Congress, “yet its outcome is 
certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we 
know that God is not neutral between them.”586 He revisited this theme in his 
speech before the United Nations a month later:
There is a current in history and it runs toward freedom. Our enemies resent it 
and dismiss it, but the dreams of mankind are defined by liberty... We're 
confident.. .that history has an author who fills time and eternity with his 
purpose. We know that evil is real, but good will prevail against it. This is
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the teaching o f many faiths, and in that assurance we gain strength for a long 
587journey.
This claim to insight into global destiny blended with a Wilsonian sense of 
American mission to forge an argument that America was required to serve as 
global leader, inspiring the world towards the fulfilment of its destiny. “We did 
not ask for this mission,” he declared, “yet there is honor in history's call. We 
have a chance to write the story of our times, a story of courage defeating cruelty 
and light overcoming darkness. This calling is worthy of any life, and worthy of 
every nation.”588
Later, with the ‘freedom agenda’ in the Middle East underway, the president 
expanded on these ideas as part of his advocacy of the liberal democratic peace. 
The forces of history, he argued, lay behind the expansion of liberal and 
democratic forms of organisation. “We've witnessed, in little over a generation, 
the swiftest advance of freedom in the 2,500 year story of democracy,” he said in 
November 2003. Noting that historians would no doubt present a variety of 
explanations for this phenomenon, he highlighted two that particularly convinced 
him. First, he believed that it was “no accident that the rise of so many 
democracies took place in a time when the world's most influential nation was 
itself a democracy”. In other words, America’s rise to power had been crucial to 
the spread of freedom. Second, he added, future historians would “reflect on an 
extraordinary, undeniable fact: Over time, free nations grow stronger and 
dictatorships grow weaker.” Thus American primacy combined with the self­
weakening flaws of other systems to ensure success. “The advance of freedom is 
the calling of our time,” he declared in the same speech. “It is the calling of our 
country... We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty 
is the direction of history.” 589
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Such faith in progressive history did not equate with passive fatalism. Indeed, in 
the less triumphalist moments of his speech, he argued that while he was clear 
that while “the progress of liberty is a powerful trend,” it was also the case that 
“liberty, if not defended, can be lost”. “The success of freedom,” he argued, “is 
not determined by some dialectic of history. By definition, the success of 
freedom rests upon the choices and the courage of free peoples, and upon their 
willingness to sacrifice.”590 Bush’s worldview thus contained an internal tension, 
the product of his desire to assure Americans of the righteous ultimate victory 
awaiting the liberal cause, without undermining their sense of urgency in fighting 
for it. Still, this was not intrinsically inconsistent, or at least its contradictions 
were not unique in universalist ideology. After all, Bolsheviks believed in the 
inevitability of communism’s ultimate victory -  or at least their ideology 
professed it -  yet they joined this to a powerful imperative for action to 
precipitate their desired revolution.
Bush’s ideology sought to interweave a narrative regarding the pressures of 
history with one allowing for the belief in human free will that was essential to 
liberal democracy’s raison d'etre. He explored this combination of ideas in the 
visionary rhetoric of the second inaugural when he declared that:
We go forward with complete confidence in the eventual triumph o f freedom. 
N ot because history runs on the wheels o f inevitability; it is human choices that 
move events. N ot because we consider ourselves a chosen nation; God moves and 
chooses as He wills. We have confidence because freedom is the permanent hope 
of mankind, the hunger in dark places, the longing o f the soul. When our 
Founders declared a new order of the ages; when soldiers died in wave upon wave 
for a union based on liberty; when citizens marched in peaceful outrage under the 
banner "Freedom Now" — they were acting on an ancient hope that is meant to 
be fulfilled. History has an ebb and flow o f justice, but history also has a visible 
direction, set by liberty and the Author o f Liberty.591
590 Ibid.
591 Second Inaugural, op. cit.
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* Military forces that are beyond challenge9: hegemonic US power
Bush combined these multiple Wilsonian features of policy with an absolute 
commitment to the importance of hard power. Clearly the administration did not 
accept pluralism of the sort required for a genuinely balance-of-power-oriented 
conception of world order. But its worldview was equally incompatibility with 
the balance-of-power perspective when it came to material considerations, in that 
it refused to countenance having the military power of the United States 
counterbalanced. It was central to the Bush administration’s worldview that the 
world’s hard power should not be widely distributed, and certainly never used to 
hold the US in check. Rather, it should be concentrated in the hands of the 
United States and its allies. “We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest 
weakness invite challenge,” Bush proclaimed at the moment of taking office.592 
The preservation of strength beyond challenge would be the consistent objective 
of his administration.
The National Security Strategy declared explicitly the principle that the United 
States should maintain an unassailable military predominance over other powers. 
It envisioned a cooperative system or order, but one predicated upon 
overwhelming -  and perpetual -  superiority on the part of the United States. 
Condoleezza Rice stated in her accompanying lecture that:
.. .the United States will build and maintain 21st century military forces that are
beyond challenge. We will seek to dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing
a military build-up in the hope o f surpassing, or equalling, the power o f the
593United States and our allies.
Given the NSS’s supposition that all the great powers would be America’s 
‘allies’, this might be parsed as less bold than on first appearance. Yet 
notwithstanding mild encouragement for friendly countries, such as those in 
Europe, to increase their strength, the strategy in practice entailed the United
592 Inaugural address, Jan 20, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html. [accessed 
19/06/08]
593 Rice, ‘A Balance of Power’
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States itself remaining alone at the global pinnacle of military strength. This 
supposition was reflected in the administration’s military planning, reflected in 
the Quadrennial Defence Reviews published under the Bush presidency.594
Realist theory would scoff at the suggestion that this strategy showed any 
appreciation of the desirability of basing world order on a balance of power. 
America instead aspired to hard-power hegemony complemented by ideological 
supremacy. In contrast to restrained realist thinking, the administration adopted 
a view of hard power resembling Theodore Roosevelt’s civilisational 
imperialism, albeit updated to be even more thrusting in light of unipolarity. Vast 
resources of hard power, under this ideology, represent a positive feature of 
world order so long as in the possession of civilised powers, powers disposed to 
use them for the preservation and extension of civilisation. The United States 
being the ultimate civilised power, a near-monopoly on force on its part would 
serve as the ultimate guarantor of civilisation and progress. Indeed, it was the 
American near-monopoly on force -  the very imbalance of power in the 
international system -  that would serve to enable the inauguration of the new era 
of cooperation, according to Bush. “America has, and intends to keep, military 
strengths beyond challenge,” he declared in his West Point speech, “thereby, 
making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries 
to trade and other pursuits of peace.”595 Such an ideology, if actualised, would be 
the attainment of what Roosevelt had speculated upon and Wilson had promised: 
the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to encompass the globe.
594 QDRs can be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001 .pdf. (2001) and 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/ODR20060203.pdf (2006) [accessed 19/06/08]. It should 
be noted in the spirit of bipartisanship that planning for unchallengeable American military 
superiority was likewise a cornerstone of the Clinton administration’s thinking, and defence 
spending had actually begun to climb again during Clinton’s second term, after a post-Cold War 
dip. Figures from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0904490.html. [accessed 19/06/08].
595 Bush, At West Point,op.cit.
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The Road Not Taken: ideological choice and the Bush administration
The above quotation and analysis has set out clearly the Bush administration’s 
ideological worldview in regard to foreign policy. The key beliefs and principles, 
which might usefully be enumerated at this point, were:
1. That an international order based on a genuine ‘balance of power’ was 
not desirable.
2. That an historic opportunity existed to create a new world order based on 
cooperation rather than rivalry.
3. That only one set of values, and one system of social organisation, 
remained legitimate: liberal democracy and capitalism.
4. That the spread of such a system was key to American security, as 
explained by the theory of democratic peace.
5. That shared values and democratic systems would lead to the acceptance 
by other states that their interests were fundamentally common or 
harmonious, and not in conflict.
6. That the United States, being the natural leader among nations, could 
claim to have special insight into the common interest, and thus 
legitimately expect others to support its agenda.
7. That ‘peoples’ should be distinguished from governments. Peoples could 
be expected to embrace the American agenda because of their sympathy 
for the universal values it advanced. Governments who perceived their 
interests to be in conflict with that agenda could ipso facto be accused of 
lacking insight into their people’s true interests, or failing to represent 
them properly
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8. That there was a progressive narrative underlying history, driving the 
ultimate universalisation of liberal modes of social organisation.
9. That unchallengeable military supremacy on the part of the United States 
could and should serve as the foundation of international peace, and the 
defence o f ‘civilisation’.
These principles did not stand alone, but were mutually supportive components 
in a cohesive ideological edifice. Together, they formed an ideological web of 
support for administration policy. The reason that the realisation of a cooperative 
new world order was thought possible, for example, was because of the 
irresistibility of liberal values to peoples throughout the world. And American 
leadership in promotion of the spread of those values could be justified because 
of the implications of democratic peace theory for the defence of US security. 
The military hegemony of the United States, meanwhile, could be considered 
compatible with peacemaking because of the special role accorded the United 
States in terms of civilisational advancement and insight into the common 
interest. This rendered its possession of such force benign, when in other hands it 
would be seen as threatening order.
There was nothing inevitable about the US government’s adoption of these 
principles as the basis of its worldview, at least not as a matter of logic. In 
principle, it was perfectly possible for American leaders to adopt a number of 
quite different perspectives. Among those alternative possibilities was a true 
balance-of-power approach based on realist principles. Such an approach might 
have emphasised the following principles, counter to those embraced by Bush:
1. That the international order, being essentially anarchic, is defined by 
the competitive pursuit by states of their clashing interests. The only 
stable world order is a balance of power between these competing 
entities, and a sound US policy should pursue such a balance.
2. That an international order based fundamentally on cooperation and 
identity of interests is inherently unfeasible. States’ interests are
257
incompatible due to the very nature of the system: gains in power and 
security for some translate into losses for others.
3. That liberal values are the historical product of social development 
spurred by events in particular places in particular periods, and no 
more. While societies based on them have clear strengths, they also 
have weaknesses, and there is no sound basis to assume all other 
societies will eventually be based on liberal values of the sort 
embodied in the West. They may never be.
4. That there is no necessary reason why universalising liberal social 
structures is required for America’s own security. Armed strength and 
a strategy aimed at balancing threats against one another is the best 
strategy to be secure.
5. That there is no such thing as a ‘common interest’ in the broad sense 
that liberals use the term, and the interests of the world’s powers are 
far from identical. In the absence of detailed agreement on what such 
an interest is and what policies would serve it, declarations of the 
existence of a ‘common interest’ merely advance an empty concept.
6. That the United States can have no claim to special insight into 
others’ interests, nor any claim to world leadership beyond what its 
coercive power can compel or persuasive power can elicit. A nation 
that presumes to lecture others on their ‘true’ interests is engaging 
only in ideological assertion, and is guilty of conflating its own 
interests with those of others. Given the tendency of states to prize 
autonomy, this is more likely to generate resentment than procure 
cooperation.
7. That ‘peoples’ may be distinct from governments, but projecting 
American preferences onto the populations of dictatorships only 
serves to foster illusions regarding the prospect of global harmony. 
Peoples with different histories and present contexts may desire social
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structures quite different from the ‘liberty’ favoured by the Bush 
administration. Even if all nations did embrace something 
approaching liberal democracy, the theory that this would ameliorate 
all disputes over national interests remains debatable.
8. That history has no progressive narrative. Perhaps it is cyclical, with 
phases of creation and destruction and no ultimate destination. 
Perhaps there is no discemable trend save the interpretation imposed 
by men’s minds.
9. That an effort by the United States to sustain unchallengeable military 
hegemony runs counter to the logic of the international system and 
the lessons of the ages. Others are discontented by such imbalance, 
and it also tempts the hegemonic power to overreach and exhaust 
itself
The practical implications of a shift from the Bush administration’s worldview to 
one based on this latter set of principles would likely be substantial. An approach 
based on these principles would emphasise the capabilities of other states, not 
their domestic political character. It would tend to attribute other states’ 
intentions and actions to their national interests rather than to shortcomings in 
their embrace of liberal values. This would have an impact on policy towards 
‘rogue states’, with blame for their behaviour no longer being attributed 
primarily to defects in their domestic order. It would not necessarily mean a 
reduction in interventionism, but it would assuredly change the character of that 
intervention, reducing the importance of democratising regimes in pursuit of 
utopian harmony. The character of American relations with other major powers 
would also change, with a new acceptance of the pursuit of compromise between 
opposed readings of national interest rather than a narrative of struggle between 
the common civilisational interest of the US agenda and the recalcitrance of 
others. The maximisation of US power with a view to defending its interests 
would become a narrower objective, conceived in less messianic terms.
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Examining the major actions and pronouncements of the Bush administration, 
one can clearly identify ways in which such an alternative worldview might have 
resulted in difference. The decision to occupy Iraq with a light touch, based on 
the conviction that a democratic successor state would ‘emerge’ after only a brief 
period, is far less comprehensible without Bush’s optimistic assumptions 
regarding the universality of liberal values among peoples. The administration’s 
pursuit of the ‘forward strategy for freedom’ in the Greater Middle East would be 
unsustainable without the democratic peace theory’s claim that the solution to 
terrorism lies in liberalising and democratising other nations. Contrary to the 
relevant statements by Bush, Rice and Powell, under this alternative worldview 
the international system would not appear poised for unprecedented cooperation 
and peace. Instead, the rise of major new powers and the shrinking of American 
influence and popularity due to failing interventionism in the Middle East might 
suggest the opposite: the dawn a new era of conflict. Meanwhile, without the 
Bush administration’s faith in the inevitable triumph of democracy and in the 
moral righteousness of American efforts to hasten the arrival of that end state, 
policy towards such non-democratic great powers as Russia and China would 
likely be quite different both in terms of the issues discussed and the manner of 
their discussion.
The Bush administration approached its policy decisions on the basis of a liberal 
universalist worldview. It is important to note that this does not mean that its 
particular policies were the only ones possible on the basis of such a worldview. 
Ideologies exist on a spectrum ranging from the fundamentalist pursuit of 
principle to the pragmatic pursuit of compromise; one can imagine without much 
difficulty an administration wedded to the idea of the democratic peace but 
which was more cautious in its pursuit of that end.596 Nevertheless, though 
tactical decisions played a role in determining events, the overarching ideological 
assumptions held by the Bush administration led it to strategic conclusions that in 
turn impacted upon the way it perceived its tactical choices.
596 Regarding the spectrum of ideology from fundamentalism to pragmatism see Douglas J. 
Macdonald,, ‘Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis’, 
in Westad, Reviewing the Cold War, pp. 180-204
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One way to assess foreign policy choices made by a state is to look simply to the 
‘national interest’ as the determining variable: to say that the United States did as 
it did in order to maximise its power and security. In the case of the Bush 
administration’s choices, however, such an effort at analysis does not take us far, 
if anywhere. The administration explicitly argued that its policies served the 
national interest by neutralising the threat of WMD proliferation while spreading 
the model of democracy. But this could be -  and was -  criticised by taking issue 
with the liberal universalist assumptions underlying the administration’s 
definition of the national interest. It is clear that it is in the ideological territory 
related to defining interests that the argument between Bush and his critics took 
place; the dispute was not over whether to pursue the national interest at all, but 
over what it meant to do so.
Yet in examining the ‘alternative principles’ outlined above, which might have 
directed US policy otherwise, one is struck -  whatever one’s view of their 
objective merits -  by the implausibility of a US president declaring them, either 
to the political elite or to the mass public, as the essential principles guiding his 
foreign policy. Such principles are not unknown in the elite foreign policy 
discourse: they resemble postures adopted by European statesmen in certain 
periods, or described by tragedian historians of the classical world, or sometimes 
by the most self-consciously realist thinkers in the foreign policy field. Yet there 
is an intuitively ‘un-American’ quality to them. This sense of contradiction 
between true balance-of-power realism and American identity highlights what 
this thesis has argued to be an important truth regarding the formation of foreign 
policy strategy: that the national ideological history of the United States has 
shaped its political culture in such a way that the Bush administration’s 
conception of international affairs fits well within the mainstream of historical 
evolution. The balance-of-power alternative, meanwhile, would be profoundly at 
odds with the course of that stream.
As the first chapter of this thesis noted, ideology serves to provide policymakers 
with simplifications with which to understand the world, and a vision of some 
end-state they aspire to bring into being. It also provides them with a language in 
which to speak to their national audience when seeking to mobilise political
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support. It provides terms that express shared conceptual understandings as to 
how the world operates, and should operate, and a sense of the role of the nation 
within that context. The Bush administration formulated its version of the 
national interest and how it should be pursued, its vision of the international 
system and the American world role, in the context of a set of ideological 
concepts and understandings that preceded the administration itself in existence 
and influence. This ideological framework affected the administration internally, 
through the intellectual formation of the president and his advisers themselves, 
and also externally, through the expectations of the public -  elite and mass -  to 
which it needed to communicate its ideas in order to mobilise support for its 
exercise of power. It would be bold to insist that ideology was the primaiy 
determining factor in the policies of the Bush administration. National and 
international circumstances played a significant role. But it is impossible to 
adequately explain the administration’s translation of those circumstances into 
policy without reference to ideology and its role in the formation of strategy. In 
turn, it is impossible to understand ideology’s impact in this specific case without 
reference to history.
Conclusion
The Bush administration came to office in the context of a unipolar world order 
produced by the end of the Cold War. The nature of the future world order and 
the appropriate role for the United States within it were matters of ongoing 
uncertainty. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 then presented it with 
an even more pressing imperative to think about the appropriate strategy for the 
United States in such a world. The strategy that it formulated centred on liberal 
universalism combined with insistence on the importance of military strength. In 
this, it blended the core elements of Wilsonianism and Rooseveltianism, 
following in the tradition of the Truman administration’s management of the 
United States’ ideological transition to global engagement.
Bush’s National Security Strategy described its desired new world order as “a 
balance of power that favours freedom”. It did not, however, reflect balance-of-
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power thinking about order. In fact, it set forth an argument in favour of 
American military hegemony. It also asserted vigorously the universal validity of 
liberal political and economic values. Its objective was a fundamentally 
cooperative international order under American leadership, based on common 
values. To be clear: 'balance-of-power thinking', in the sense in which this thesis 
has used the term, is a state of mind or philosophy that leads one to approach any 
scenario -  be it one of weakness, equality or even unipolar strength -  by thinking 
in terms of material power, its manipulation, and its limits. There were thus ways 
of approaching even the post-Cold War and post-9/11 ‘worlds’ with a deep 
realist mindset, the principles of which were spelled out in the last section. The 
Bush tendency, however, was to think not in these terms, but in terms of a 
universally beneficial order that could be brought about by changing the internal 
nature of states, and to blame the internal nature of other states for the failure to 
realise utopia.
The administration’s foreign policy strategy was dominated by its assertion of 
the democratic peace theory, which linked American security to the spread of 
liberal democratic capitalism. In Iraq and beyond, this theory served as the 
centrepiece of the administration’s strategic thought. In making his case, Bush 
relied on a variety of Wilsonian principles, including the distinction between 
governments and peoples, and the claim of special insight on the part of the 
United States into the common interests mandated by the universality of liberal 
values. Similarly to Wilson, Bush claimed that the new world order he sought, 
predicated on the reform of other states’ domestic systems, was in line with the 
progressive direction of history, and that US leadership of such progress was 
destiny. Similarly to Roosevelt, his strategy linked US military power with the 
defence and advance of civilisation. His vision of world order resembled the 
globalisation of the expanded Monroe Doctrine. In a sense, this was the 
realisation of the objectives set by the Truman administration, whose strategy 
emerged in response to the Soviet Union’s frustration of universalist objectives.
Intellectually, there were alternative principles upon which the Bush 
administration might have based its strategy, perhaps focusing instead on a realist 
understanding of national interests and the pursuit of order based on a balance of
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power. That the administration did not engage with such an alternative had 
significant policy consequences. It is difficult, however, to conceive of the 
United States having embraced such alternative principles, because those of the 
Bush administration fit so well within the mainstream of American 
internationalism as it has evolved through previous key moments of transition, 
from the Founders’ Era through Roosevelt, Wilson and Truman. The Bush 
administration conceived of its strategy while operating in the ideological 
environment and political culture shaped by the particular national history of the 
United States. This made it far more likely that it would embrace certain 
ideological principles than others, which in turn had major consequences for 
policy. The Bush administration, while its strategies appeared radical to some, 
was also in important ways the natural flower of its national history. The nature 
of this relationship between history, ideology and strategy is discussed in the 
concluding chapter.
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Conclusion: National ideological history and 
the Bush strategy
Summary of the thesis argument
The argument made by this thesis draws together International Relations and 
History, while focusing on ideology. It argues, in short, that the Bush 
administration’s strategic worldview cannot be understood fully without placing 
it in the context of the historical evolution of American internationalism.
4 American internationalism’ in this context refers to a set of ideas, regarding the 
nature of the international system and America’s relationship with it, that 
emerged via interaction between national and international circumstances and 
prior ideological commitments. In part the thesis’s historical narrative of 
evolution over time serves to endorse realist ideas: as the underlying economic 
and military potential of the United States has grown, and as international 
circumstances have called for it, America’s strategic horizons have expanded.
The thesis also argues, however, that this trajectory of steady expansion involved 
not only the increase of America’s global diplomatic and military commitments, 
but also necessitated the development of an ideological structure to support such 
commitments. In this the thesis finds itself in sympathy with those varieties of 
classical realism and constructivism that have sought to use domestic factors, 
meaning especially national 'character’ and political culture, as an explanatory 
factor in state behaviour.
It is crucial to note that this thesis does not simply make an argument for 
historical continuity, though that forms part of what it has to say. It seeks to show 
that the George W. Bush administration’s strategic worldview displayed 
continuity from the objectives and assumptions of the Cold War strategy crafted 
by the Truman administration. That Cold War strategy in turn represented a 
blending of the Wilsonian and Rooseveltian ideas that formed the foundation of 
America’s first entry into global engagement. And going back still further, the 
American internationalism constructed by Wilson and Roosevelt was itself the
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indirect product of America’s history, though not in that case not in the sense of 
straight continuity of thought: rather, it was an ideological bridge resulting from 
the need to carry the United States from the Founders’ Era ideology of 
hemispheric separatism to one of global engagement. Viewed as a series of 
interlocking steps, therefore, the argument of the thesis is that the ideological 
posture of the United States in the 21st century was explanatorily linked to the 
nation’s circumstances, and the nation’s ideas, in its earliest years.
The national and international context of the United States in the years of the 
Founders’ Era, and the choices its leaders made in those years, led it to shun 
conscious involvement in the global balance of power order based on competing 
national interests. Instead, it sought separation from the global system, while 
pursuing a steadily expanding benevolent hegemony in the Western sphere. 
When circumstances -  in the form of its own growing power potential as well as 
turbulence in the international system -  later pushed the United States to become 
a global power, it was not prepared politically to simply join the pre-existing 
balance of power order. The nation was culturally predisposed to resist such a 
move because it would have required an outright break with the then-dominant 
consensus ideology on foreign policy that had been dominant for several 
generations. To put it another way -  the way this thesis has most often sought to 
encapsulate its central idea -  America’s history had rendered the nation 
ideologically averse to explicit balance-of-power thinking about international 
order.
The policies demanded by the circumstances of the present were ultimately 
reconciled with the ideological principles of the past by making the new 
American internationalism conditional on the pursuit of radical reform of the 
international order, based on Wilsonian and Rooseveltian principles. This 
reformist agenda, however, meant not only demanding a more cooperative 
system of relations between states, but also the pursuit the internal reform of 
other nations. The strong connection drawn between liberal democracy within 
states and the emergence of a new world order between them gave US foreign 
policy the prominent universalistic quality with which it has since become 
inextricably associated. Experienced in relating to other nations only by seeking
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either ideological detachment or the benign domination of the Monroe Doctrine, 
the United States sought in its new internationalism to extend the logic of the 
Monroe Doctrine to the global level. Its engagement with the world was 
predicated upon the spread of liberal values in an environment of American 
‘leadership’.
Though the Bush strategy of course represented a response to the particular 
demands of contemporary circumstances, it also reflected continuing 
commitment to this evolved American worldview. As such, the national 
ideological history of the United States is a significant explanatory factor in 
understanding the Bush administration’s strategy. The intended contribution of 
this thesis lies not merely in observing that an aversion to balance-of-power 
ideology is a feature of US foreign policy, but in offering this suggested 
explanation as to why that might be. The thesis also serves to point out that while 
the Bush strategy’s efforts to address new circumstances give it qualities that are 
particular to the moment of its construction, in its more general propositions the 
Bush strategy sits comfortably within a very American tradition of thinking 
about world order.
The historical evolution of American internationalism
As set out in Chapter Two, the founding of the United States under the 
Constitution took place with foreign policy and international order in mind. The 
operation of the European balance of power played a significant role in the birth 
of the nation. The growth of the American colonies was part and parcel of 
imperial rivalry between Europeans, and America’s successful fight for 
independence owed much to the support of Britain’s enemies, support with 
motives traceable to the global balance of power. The desire for a stronger union, 
which took concrete form in the new constitution, was based in rejection of 
Europe’s balance-of-power order: the new American order was explicitly 
intended to avoid replicating the European system, and to exclude European 
interference from intra-American relations.
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The relatively weak power position of the United States in its earliest years 
influenced its strategic choices, though it did not strictly determine them. With 
different leaders it might have chosen to align itself with one of the sides in 
Europe’s struggle. The major foreign policy arguments in the early politics of the 
United States centred on whether the United States should tilt towards either 
Britain or France in their lengthy war, either for reasons of commercial interest 
or political sympathy. Ultimately, these questions were answered with a strategic 
worldview outlined first and best in Washington’s Farewell Address and later 
accepted by opposition leader Thomas Jefferson upon his inauguration to the 
presidency in 1801. With Jefferson’s embrace of Washington’s principles, what 
this thesis has termed the ‘Founders’ Era consensus’ was forged, and this would
•  « t hserve as the spine of US ideology for the rest of the 19 century.
This consensus asserted that the United States existed in a separate sphere of 
interests from the European order, and on the basis of an incompatible set of 
values, and should thus reject being part of the European balance of power. As 
the material strength of the United States grew sufficiently to make it possible, 
and with European colonial control collapsing in Latin America, this ideology 
expanded into one of hemispheric separatism with the proclamation of the 
Monroe Doctrine. Within the Americas, the United States would pursue an 
‘American system’ of order, based upon its own hegemonic strength, and 
cooperation founded in the supposed identity of interests between the US and its 
southern neighbours. The Europe-centred global balance of power would not be 
allowed to entangle the United States through military or political commitments, 
and, reciprocally, European powers would be expected to refrain from 
interference in the Americas beyond their diminished colonial holdings.
The United States was not disconnected in practice from the global balance of 
power. The Monroe Doctrine was feasible only because of the support of British 
naval power. Further, the proclamation of a division of the globe into American 
and non-American sectors arguably amounted to a spheres-of-influence vision 
with a realist undertone. Importantly, however, the strategy was constructed 
intellectually -  or ‘ideologised’ -  not as an extension of realist power balancing, 
but as a strategic and intellectual separation of the United States, morally and in
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terms of its interests, from the global balance of power. The US conceived of 
itself as overseer of a peaceful and cooperative new order in the Americas, while 
the European-dominated global order would continue to operate, separately, on 
the basis of rivalry and war.
America’s strategic decisions in this period made sense in the context of its 
national and international circumstances. While the choices made were not the 
only ones that could have been, they were compatible with an easily appreciable 
conception of US national interest. Yet they also had ideological consequences 
beyond their effect on contemporary policy. By conceptualising the international 
order and America’s role within it in the way they did, the leaders of the 
Founders’ Era laid the basis for a mode of thinking about these issues that was 
not compatible with the European balance of power system. Conceiving of 
relations only in terms either of benign hegemony or separation, the United 
States was thus not ‘socialised’ into thinking about global order in balance-of- 
power terms, as the competitive interaction of rival states with divergent interests 
of equivalent legitimacy.
Chapters Three and Four describe the beginning of the United States’ transition 
from this Founders’ Era consensus to a new strategic global engagement. This 
was again in part driven by national and international circumstances. The 
expanded territory, economic size and military potential of the US pressed for an 
increase in its global role. Likewise, the destabilisation of the Europe-centred 
international order, and its eventual collapse during the First World War, 
provided external imperatives for a more expansive foreign policy. Such a move 
towards international engagement, however, required not merely change in 
policy but in thinking, major shifts in the ideology used by leaders both to 
understand and to explain. Both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, in 
their own ways, sought to facilitate the necessary ideological transition.
Neither Roosevelt nor Wilson succeeded fully in leading the United States into 
accepting its place as a great power in the existing global order. Indeed, at least 
in the latter case, it can be argued that he did not seek to achieve such an 
objective, at least not if framed in that way. Yet these two leaders did lay the
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basis for a new ideology of internationalism in America. That new 
internationalism was made contingent, however, on the reform of the 
international order to bring it in line with American principles. As such, it 
reflected the crucial significance of the nation’s ideological inheritance: it 
refused to engage with international affairs on the basis of the balance-of-power 
philosophy precluded by the Founders’ Era consensus.
Roosevelt was in some senses a realist thinker regarding international affairs. He 
believed in the expansion of America’s hard power and its world role; he 
envisioned the nation as competing with others, past and present, for greatness. 
He inserted the United States into global great power diplomacy, from Africa to 
the Far East, in a way that his predecessors had not. Yet there was also a 
romantic, moralistic quality to his thought. In the Western Hemisphere, he 
extended the scope of the Monroe Doctrine to legitimise an open-ended right of 
hegemonic intervention on the part of the US, and justified this by reference to a 
fundamental identity of national interests and a civilising mission on the part of 
the United States. He subscribed to a brand of liberal imperialism that asserted an 
objectively correct path for progress, with the United States possessed of the 
superior insight required to educate others, willingly or unwillingly, in the proper 
use of their freedom. In his attitude to global affairs, he was similarly inclined to 
think in terms of ‘civilisation’ and progress, conceiving of the First World War in 
moralistic terms as a conflict between civilisation and its enemies. Looking 
ahead to its conclusion, he advocated schemes not dissimilar to the idea of a 
‘concert of all’ that served as the basis of Wilson’s League of Nations.
Roosevelt’s chief divergence from Wilsonianism was his certainty that a 
predominance of armed strength on the side of the United States and other ‘good’ 
civilised nations would be key to the preservation of a just order. To adjust the 
Bush administration’s phrase, Roosevelt sought ‘a balance of power that favours 
civilisation’. He was not altogether successful in his own lifetime. Though he 
did succeed in expanding the navy significantly as president, he largely failed in 
his objective of ‘educating’ the nation as to the need for a new attitude to large 
military establishments, which they continued to regard with suspicion even after 
the First World War.
270
Wilson held office during a period when external events produced a level of 
turbulence in international affairs more amenable to mobilising support for 
radical change. In presiding over America’s participation in WWI and its 
settlement, he had the opportunity to make bolder strides than Roosevelt could.
In the pre-war part of his presidency, Wilson’s foreign policy served to expand 
and deepen the interventionism in the Western Hemisphere legitimated by 
Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In so doing, he nurtured the 
ideological paradox at the heart of Wilsonianism: insistence on the necessity and 
legitimacy of regular, deep intervention into the internal affairs of other nations 
combined with sincerely-meant and strenuous denial that American policy 
constituted interference. As with Roosevelt’s civilising mission, Wilsonianism 
conceived of political freedom as possessed of inherent limits. Liberty was 
thought obliged to result in liberalism and capitalism, or else the nation in 
question could be argued to have departed from the proper path of progress. US 
intervention was intended to create the preconditions for genuine ‘freedom’, even 
as it constrained the political and economic choices of those nations it affected.
In entering the war, and seeking leadership in the agreement of a peace 
settlement, Wilson transplanted this agenda to the global level with his vision of 
a new world order. Seeking to overcome the taboo against global entanglements 
imposed by the Founders’ Era consensus, he was obliged to construct an 
ideological case for change. Crucially, he did not do this by arguing that changed 
circumstances required America to change its principles. Instead, he argued that 
the world was changing to bring international order into line with American 
ideals. The United States had been hostile to entanglement, Wilsonianism 
argued, because of the European balance-of-power system. After the war, there 
would be a new world order, based not on a competitive balance of power, but on 
cooperation founded in harmonious interests. This would be enabled by the 
uni vernalisation of liberal democratic government. He blamed Germany’s 
autocratic system for the outbreak of the war, and for the nature of the 
international order that had preceded it. With Germany and its allies defeated, 
Wilson believed that the autocratic model of government had been discredited,
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and the tide had turned towards liberty. This would allow a cooperative system of 
international order, supported by the League of Nations.
This Wilsonian worldview was supported by a crucial intellectual distinction 
between governments and ‘peoples’. The peoples of all nations were imagined to 
share common interests, and to support the Wilsonian agenda. As such, their 
obtaining ‘self-determination’ in the form of democratic control of their states 
would allow the new world order to emerge. This distinction also allowed 
Wilson to accuse those governments who claimed their interests clashed with 
American preferences of failing to represent their people properly; if they only 
looked in good faith, they would see that their true interests, and their peoples’ 
wishes, lay in following American prescriptions. Wilson concerned himself little 
with the prospect of clashes between democratic nations, or indeed between the 
United States and the new body international laws and institutions he sought to 
build. This was because he viewed the new order as an internationalisation of 
American principles. He seemed to foresee that the mechanics of liberal 
democracy would by their operation bring others into agreement with the 
American perspective. Thus there would be no conflict. Further, the superiority 
of the United States -  “leader and umpire both” -  was built in to the Wilsonian 
vision, and he thought US leadership necessary to the new order.
In essence, and he said so explicitly, Wilson saw his new order as the 
transposition of his version of the Monroe Doctrine to the global level. As such, 
his new order would be an American-led system wherein other societies could 
pursue their interests within parameters set by American conceptions of 
appropriate liberty. This order would be cooperative and mutually beneficial, just 
as American leaders believed the Monroe Doctrine had been. In effect, Wilson 
brokered an imagined ideological ‘deal’ between America and the world. The 
United States would depart from its ideology of separation, but only on the 
condition that it could pursue a cooperative international order founded in the 
spread of liberal democracy. As Wilson put it, there should be an order based on 
an American-led ‘community of power’ rather than the pre-existing ‘balance of 
power’.
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The ideas of Wilson and Roosevelt went into abeyance during the inter-war 
years. In a further illustration of the importance of national and international 
circumstances to policy change, this remained the case until the Second World 
War obliged the US to become embroiled in global affairs, and to think in global 
terms regarding the postwar peace. By 1945, now at the head of a superpower -  
one of only two -  and with the great power dominance of Europe broken, 
American leaders were obliged to countenance unprecedented levels of global 
entanglement, and to mobilise support for it politically, necessitating justificatory 
ideology. On one level, the Cold War that emerged under the Truman 
administration represents a ‘hard case’ for the thesis argument that the United 
States was resistant to thinking about international order in balance-of-power 
terms. Looking at the facts on the ground, the result of the administration’s 
strategy was a standoff between two power blocs with conflicting interests: a 
classic bipolar balance of power. Yet ideologically the Cold War was not simply 
the balancing of two states competing for power: it was a clash of frustrated rival 
universalisms.
America’s leaders sought to bring the postwar world in line with rediscovered 
Wilsonian principles of cooperation. This would involve the ‘liberation’ of 
peoples, in accordance with the American understanding of liberty already 
outlined. This, however, was rendered impossible by Soviet control of Eastern 
Europe, and the USSR’s pursuit of a political and economic system incompatible 
with American aims. All the major reports of the period, discussed in Chapter 
Five, including the Clifford-Elsey Report, George Kennan’s Long Telegram and 
‘X’ Article and NSC-68, emphasised that the source of the conflict lay in the 
domestic system of the Soviet Union, which by its very nature could not coexist 
with ‘freedom’. As they constructed this argument, the US leadership in effect 
demonstrated mirror-image ideological tendencies on their own part: they 
constructed a worldview in which the security and prosperity of the United States 
could not be secured until the Soviet system was compelled to adopt the baseline 
of liberal principles Americans thought were required to support a peaceful 
world order.
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The policy of containment, though often celebrated for its realism -  not 
altogether unjustly when compared with to more extreme notions like ‘rollback’
-  thus originated in a reprise of Wilsonian thinking. It was believed that ultimate 
peace must rest on the creation of a cooperative order that could only stand on 
the basis of universal liberty. There was no explicit spheres-of-influence deal 
with the Soviet Union -  the obvious alternative course. Policymakers did not 
themselves believe in, nor could they readily justify to the American people, a 
policy based on the acceptance of Soviet actions as legitimate, even in the 
putative ‘Soviet sphere’. According to the ‘deal’ at the heart of Wilsonianism, 
America’s new global engagement was conditional on the pursuit of a 
cooperative order of harmonised interests via the universalisation of liberty. 
During the Cold War, this was precisely the long-range strategic and ideological 
vision adopted by the United States.
In addition, the Truman administration and its successors, blending the ideas of 
Roosevelt and Wilson, pursued their objective by means of unprecedented 
military build-up. As both a moral and a practical question, the need to accept a 
large standing military establishment was accepted for the first time in American 
history, based on the Rooseveltian moral insistence that ‘right be backed with 
might’, in the service of civilisation. This blend of universalism and militarism 
served as the basis of American internationalism through the Cold War.
The influence of national ideological history on the Bush worldview
The continuing effects of American internationalism’s ideological evolution are 
evident in the Bush strategy described in Chapter Six. The Bush administration 
operated in the context of a unipolar world order, obliged to respond to an 
apparently shifting environment of threats. The strategy that emerged pursued the 
objective a ‘balance of power that favours freedom’, as set out in the National 
Security Strategy of 2002. As the last chapter argued, this concept is 
misleadingly named. In fact, the administration rejected a true balance-of-power 
approach to international relations. It did not pursue a world organised by the 
competitive balancing of nations, each nation recognised to have opposed but
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legitimate interests. Rather, The NSS described a system wherein all the major 
powers should be in concert, pursuing common interests on the basis of common 
values. This system would operate under US leadership, resting in part on 
American military hegemony. This power pre-eminence of the United States was 
envisaged as continuing indefinitely into the future.
Though sometimes perceived as radical, and though undeniably blunt at times in 
the language used, this worldview was consistent with the established ideological 
principles of American internationalism. The worldview of the Bush 
administration was based on the nine principles outlined in Chapter Six. The 
administration’s advocacy of these principles was one rational response to its 
international context, based on a particular conception of the national interest. 
Certainly, understanding the power capabilities of the nation and its place in the 
international system is important to understanding the Bush worldview.
However, this course was not the only possible response. In principle, the Bush 
administration could have responded to the challenges posed by its context 
through the application of realist principles of the sort outlined in the ‘alternative 
approach’ also set out in Chapter Six. That it did not do so, this thesis contends, 
owes something to the ideological traditions of American internationalism.
The Bush perspective blended Wilsonian and Rooseveltian ideas about 
international order. In this it was similar in important regards to the worldview 
developed by the Truman administration when it established for the first time a 
durable basis for American internationalism. Bush’s worldview, like the 
mainstream of American internationalism, was founded on the Wilsonian ‘deal’: 
the United States agreed to engage with global affairs in a way previously 
prohibited by the Founder’s Era consensus, and in exchange perceived an 
entitlement to pursue the agenda of global reform contained in Wilsonian 
ideology. Unaccustomed as a result of its national history to dealing with 
international order on a consciously realist basis, US leaders continually consider 
themselves faced with a choice between detachment from the global order or the 
pursuit of its reform.
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This thesis does not present an argument for stasis in American foreign policy 
thinking. It does not argue that Bush’s foreign policy was identical Truman’s or 
Wilson’s any more than it argues that Wilson’s or Roosevelt’s were the same as 
that of George Washington. On the contrary, while pointing to aspects of 
underlying continuity, the argument of this thesis also concerns change and the 
manner of its occurrence. Ideological change, it argues, does not manifest itself 
in a sharp break between all that has gone before and that which circumstances 
demand must now be. Rather, it takes the form of ideological elision: a narrative 
must be offered -  for the benefit of leaders themselves as much as for the public 
-  of how the policies of the ‘new way’ can be reconciled with the principles to 
which the nation and its leaders were committed up to that point. Roosevelt, 
Wilson and Truman reshaped existing ideological formulations for new 
purposes; they did not cut a new American ideology from whole cloth.
The principles on which the Bush administration based its strategy, like those of 
its internationalist forerunners, had admirable features. They were idealistic and 
optimistic. They sought, in principle at least, to be inclusive rather than divisive 
regarding the future world order. They were morally concerned with the interests 
of other peoples, eschewing the language of American self-interest and zero-sum 
competition. In seeking a ‘democratic peace’, they proposed a comprehensive 
effort to address global problems, identifying a supposed root cause of global 
insecurity and seeking to address it. These very virtues, however, displayed on 
their reverse side the vices with which the administration became irrevocably 
associated. The objective of universal liberal capitalist democracy may be 
utopian and thus unattainable. Its pursuit may therefore be at best naive, at worst 
irresponsible, leading to open-ended commitments beyond the means of any 
nation to fulfil. The presumed right of the United States to identify others’ 
interests on their behalf and, in the event of disagreement, to question the 
legitimacy of others’ definition of their own interests -  even the legitimacy of 
their domestic systems -  could not fail to be perceived as presumptuous 
arrogance. In pursuing global leadership, the Bush administration displayed an 
assumption of American superiority and omnipotence highly likely to alienate 
others.
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To understand US foreign policy today, it is essential to understand its deepest 
ideological assumptions and how they derive from the historical evolution of 
American internationalism. This thesis has sought to make a significant 
contribution to clarifying both. The Bush administration was defined not only by 
its brusque, unilateral anti-diplomacy, but also by its sincere calls for others to 
follow and its ultimately disappointed expectation that they would. It was notable 
for its assertion of the American national interest, yet also for placing universal 
political values and the quest for a liberal and democratic world peace at the 
heart of its policy. These apparent tensions make most sense when seen as the 
long-term ideological consequence of America’s emergence from strategic 
detachment to the status of global power. The manner of that emergence meant 
that the Bush administration, like others since the establishment of American 
internationalism as the ideology of the mainstream, viewed unilateralism as 
compatible with serving the common interest. It viewed armed intervention in 
other nations' domestic politics as compatible with furthering their freedom and 
independence. And it viewed unparalleled US military armament as the 
cornerstone of a more peaceful world.
Most fundamentally, American leaders saw -  and still see -  the engagement of 
the United States with global politics as conditional on its right to pursue a 
demanding programme of global reform, seeking to produce a cooperative order 
of all nations under American leadership by promoting the adoption by all 
nations of an idealised version of America’s own political principles. Woodrow 
Wilson argued in 1919 that the modem United States sought not territorial 
expansion, but ‘conquest of the spirits of men’, and this remains the case today. 
The attainability of such a bold objective remains a matter of dispute and 
uncertainty. The historic consequences of its pursuit lie all around us.
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